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Full-Text Articles in Law
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman
Faculty Scholarship
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets. If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place, the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.
During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition …
To Call A Donkey A Racehorse—The Fiduciary Duty Misnomer In Corporate And Securities Law, Marc I. Steinberg
To Call A Donkey A Racehorse—The Fiduciary Duty Misnomer In Corporate And Securities Law, Marc I. Steinberg
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
A recurrent theme in corporate law is the presence of directors and officers owing fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the respective companies they serve. Although not as visible in the securities law setting, concepts of fiduciary duty-like obligations arise with some frequency. While the rigorous application of fiduciary standards was applied in days of yesteryear, its adherence today largely is nonexistent. Nonetheless, courts continue to embrace language in their opinions that emphasizes the continued presence of fiduciary duty standards. Reality, however, strikes a very different key. In fact, standards of fiduciary duty have become greatly diluted in the …
Stewardship Theater, Jeff Schwartz
Stewardship Theater, Jeff Schwartz
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship
Large asset managers like BlackRock and Vanguard have amassed staggering equity holdings. The voting rights that accompany these holdings give them enormous power over many of the world’s largest companies. This unprecedented concentration of influence in a small group of financial intermediaries is a pressing policy concern. While law and finance literature on the topic has recently exploded, no one has offered a satisfying theory to explain their voting behavior. Existing work tries to understand their approach to voting in conventional terms—as an attempt to improve the performance of portfolio firms—but this is not why large asset managers vote the …
Shareholder Engagement In The United States, Vikramaditya S. Khanna
Shareholder Engagement In The United States, Vikramaditya S. Khanna
Book Chapters
Shareholder voting and engagement in the US have undergone substantial changes over the last 50 years. They have moved from being relatively sleepy issues to those that trigger insomnia in even the most hardened executives. The changes in the ownership structure of US publicly traded firms are probably the most important reason for the shift, but so too are rule changes that have facilitated greater shareholder activism. This chapter explores these developments while describing the rules of the road for shareholder voting in the US by focusing on Delaware jurisprudence and changes in US federal securities regulations. It also examines …