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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration The Answer?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Randall S. Thomas
The Indian Securities Fraud Class Action: Is Class Arbitration The Answer?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Randall S. Thomas
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In 2013, India enacted one of the most robust private enforcement regimes for securities fraud violations in the world. Unlike in most other countries, Indian shareholders can now initiate securities fraud lawsuits on their own, represent all other defrauded shareholders unless those shareholders affirmatively opt out, and collect money damages for the entire class. The only thing missing is a better financing mechanism: unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia, India does not permit contingency fees, so class action lawyers cannot front the costs of litigation in exchange for collecting a percentage of what they recover. On the other hand, …
The Reasonable Investor Of Federal Securities Law, Amanda Rose
The Reasonable Investor Of Federal Securities Law, Amanda Rose
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Federal securities law defines the materiality of corporate disclosures by reference to the views of a hypothetical reasonable investor. For decades the reasonable investor standard has been a flashpoint for debate with critics complaining of the uncertainty it generates and defenders warning of the under-inclusiveness of bright-line alternatives. This Article attempts to shed fresh light on the issue by considering how the reasonable investor differs from its common law antecedent, the reasonable person of tort law. The differences identified suggest that the reasonable investor standard is more costly than tort laws reasonable person standard - the uncertainty it generates is …
The End Of Class Actions?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
The End Of Class Actions?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this Article, I give a status report on the life expectancy of class action litigation following the Supreme Court's decisions in Concepcion and American Express. These decisions permitted corporations to opt out of class action liability through the use of arbitration clauses, and many commentators, myself included, predicted that they would eventually lead us down a road where class actions against businesses would be all but eliminated. Enough time has now passed to make an assessment of whether these predictions are coming to fruition. I find that, although there is not yet solid evidence that businesses have flocked to …
Form Vs. Function In Rule 10b-5 Class Actions, Amanda M. Rose
Form Vs. Function In Rule 10b-5 Class Actions, Amanda M. Rose
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court’s widely anticipated decision last term in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. did little to change the fundamental landscape of securities fraud litigation in the United States. Rule 10b-5 class actions premised on the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption of reliance may still be brought, although it is now clear that defendants may present evidence of lack of price distortion to rebut that presumption at the class certification stage. Halliburton does, however, raise a variety of new questions that will keep plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsel fighting for years to come. Determining the answers to these questions will …
Better Bounty Hunting, Amanda Rose
Better Bounty Hunting, Amanda Rose
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The SEC’s new whistleblower bounty program has provoked significant controversy. That controversy has centered on the failure of the implementing rules to make internal reporting through corporate compliance departments a prerequisite to recovery. This Article approaches the new program with a broader lens, examining its impact on the longstanding debate over fraud-on-the-market (FOTM) class actions. The Article demonstrates how the bounty program, if successful, will replicate the fraud deterrence benefits of FOTM class actions while simultaneously increasing the costs of such suits — rendering them a pointless yet expensive redundancy. If instead the SEC proves incapable of effectively administering the …
Intraportfolio Litigation, Amanda Rose, Richard Squire
Intraportfolio Litigation, Amanda Rose, Richard Squire
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The modern trend is for investors to diversify. Shareholders who own one S&P 500 firm tend to own many of the others as well. This trend casts doubt on the traditional compensation and deterrence rationales for legal rules that hold corporations liable for the acts of their agents. Today, when A Corp sues B Corp (for breach of contract, theft of trade secrets, or any other legal wrong), many of the same shareholders own both the plaintiff and the defendant. For these shareholders, damages just shift money from one pocket to another, minus of course lawyer fees. We offer here …
There Are Plaintiffs And . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Lynn Bai
There Are Plaintiffs And . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Lynn Bai
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums - small relative to the "provable losses" suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendant-company, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears …
The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Shareholder litigation is the most frequently maligned legal check on managerial misconduct within corporations. Derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions are portrayed as slackers in debates over how best to control the managerial agency costs created by the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. In each instance, early hopes these suits would effectively monitor managerial misconduct have been replaced with concerns about the size of the litigation agency costs of such representative litigation, which can arise when a self-selected plaintiff's attorney and her client that are appointed to pursue the claims of an entire class of …