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Series

Patent

2003

Boston University School of Law

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Pharmacogenomics, Genetic Tests, And Patent-Based Incentives, Michael Meurer Jan 2003

Pharmacogenomics, Genetic Tests, And Patent-Based Incentives, Michael Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

Pharmacogenomics promises to revolutionize medicine by using genetic information to guide drug therapy. Genetic tests will help doctors improve drug safety and efficacy by better matching patients and drugs. This Article evaluates the effectiveness of patent-based incentives to create genetic tests, and the optimal mix of public and private sector pharmacogenomic R&D. Drug patent owners have a strong incentive to develop genetic tests that predict adverse drug reactions and allow them to market drugs that otherwise would be shelved. Incentives are also strong for genetic tests that are created as part of the drug development process. Incentives tend to be weaker for genetic tests that are used in conjunction with existing drugs. Drug patent owners might gain or lose profit from introduction of genetic tests into existing drug markets. Profits may fall because of lost sales; or profits may rise because drugs are more valuable to appropriate patients, and because drugs become more differentiated.

Public sector R&D should target genetic tests that are likely to be underprovided by the private sector because private returns are low relative to social returns or private costs ...


Controlling Opportunistic And Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, Michael Meurer Jan 2003

Controlling Opportunistic And Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, Michael Meurer

Faculty Scholarship

It is useful to think of intellectual property (IP) law both as a system of property rights that promotes the production of valuable information and as a system of government regulation that unintentionally promotes socially harmful rent-seeking. This Article analyzes methods of controlling rent-seeking costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive IP lawsuits. My thinking is guided to some extent by the analysis of procedural measures for controlling frivolous litigation, and analysis of antitrust reforms designed to control strategic abuse of antitrust law. These analogies lead me to focus on pre-trial and post-trial control measures that reduce the credibility of weak ...