Law Commons^™

Addressing Global Threat: Exploring The Relationship Between Common Purpose And Leadership, Charles R.H. Powell

Antioch University Full-Text Dissertations & Theses

While the mention of common purpose is prevalent in leadership studies, there are few attempts to explore the relationship between common purpose and leadership. This study delves into the questions of if and how common purpose and leadership inform one another. How leaders adapt purpose and leadership approaches in response to evolving and turbulent conditions may foster the depth and sustainment of immediate and subsequent accomplishments. Through phenomenological research in the venue of nuclear weapons reduction, a common purpose that is both globally pervasive and imbued with a sense of urgency, the lived essence of those engaged in common purpose …

Export Controls: A Contemporary History, Bert Chapman

Libraries Faculty and Staff Presentations

Provides highlights of my recently published book Export Controls: A Contemporary History. Describes the roles played by multiple U.S. Government agencies and congressional oversight committees in this policymaking arena including the Commerce, Defense, State, and Treasury Departments. It also reviews the roles played by international government organizations such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, export oriented businesses, and research intensive universities.

Overview And Operation Of U.S. Financial Sanctions, Including The Example Of Iran, Barry E. Carter, Ryan Farha

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Financial sanctions are increasingly being used in the mix of international economic sanctions being employed by the United Nations, regional entities, and individual countries, including the United States. These financial sanctions have become more focused and effective as the tools and techniques have improved significantly for tracing and identifying the financial transactions of terrorists, weapons proliferators, human rights violators, drug cartels, and others. These sanctions can not only freeze financial assets and prohibit or limit financial transactions, but they also impede trade by making it difficult to pay for the export or import of goods and services.

In spite of …

Power, Exit Costs, And Renegotiation In International Law, Timothy L. Meyer

Scholarly Works

Scholars have long understood that the instability of power has ramifications for compliance with international law. Scholars have not, however, focused on how states’ expectations about shifting power affect the initial design of international agreements. In this paper, I integrate shifting power into an analysis of the initial design of both the formal and substantive aspects of agreements. I argue that a state expecting to become more powerful over time incurs an opportunity cost by agreeing to formal provisions that raise the cost of exiting an agreement. Exit costs - which promote the stability of legal rules - have distributional …

Soft Law As Delegation, Timothy L. Meyer

Scholarly Works

This article examines one of the most important trends in international legal governance since the end of the Second World War: the rise of "soft law," or legally non-binding instruments. Scholars studying the design of international agreements have long puzzled over why states use soft law. The decision to make an agreement or obligation legally binding is within the control of the states negotiating the content of the legal obligations. Basic contract theory predicts that parties to a contract would want their agreement to be as credible as possible, to ensure optimal incentives to perform. It is therefore odd that …

Soft Law As Delegation, Timothy Meyer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This article examines one of the most important trends in international legal governance since the end of the Second World War: the rise of "soft law," or legally non-binding instruments. Scholars studying the design of international agreements have long puzzled over why states use soft law. The decision to make an agreement or obligation legally binding is within the control of the states negotiating the content of the legal obligations. Basic contract theory predicts that parties to a contract would want their agreement to be as credible as possible, to ensure optimal incentives to perform. It is therefore odd that …