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Logic

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Norms Of Public Argumentation And The Ideals Of Correctness And Participation, Frank Zenker, Jan Albert Van Laar, Bianca Cepollaro, Anca Gâță, Martin Hinton, Colin Guthrie King, Brian N. Larson, Marcin Lewinski, Christoph Lumer, Steve Oswald, Maciej Pichlak, Blake D. Scott, Mariusz Urbanski, Jean H.M. Wagemans Mar 2023

Norms Of Public Argumentation And The Ideals Of Correctness And Participation, Frank Zenker, Jan Albert Van Laar, Bianca Cepollaro, Anca Gâță, Martin Hinton, Colin Guthrie King, Brian N. Larson, Marcin Lewinski, Christoph Lumer, Steve Oswald, Maciej Pichlak, Blake D. Scott, Mariusz Urbanski, Jean H.M. Wagemans

Faculty Scholarship

Argumentation as the public exchange of reasons is widely thought to enhance deliberative interactions that generate and justify reasonable public policies. Adopting an argumentation-theoretic perspective, we survey the norms that should govern public argumentation and address some of the complexities that scholarly treatments have identified. Our focus is on norms associated with the ideals of correctness and participation as sources of a politically legitimate deliberative outcome. In principle, both ideals are mutually coherent. If the information needed for a correct deliberative outcome is distributed among agents, then maximising participation increases information diversity. But both ideals can also be in tension. …


Defeasible Semantics For L4, Guido Governatori, Meng Weng (Huang Mingrong) Wong Jan 2023

Defeasible Semantics For L4, Guido Governatori, Meng Weng (Huang Mingrong) Wong

Centre for Computational Law

The importance of defeasibility for legal reasoning has been investigated for a long time (see among other [10, 3, 11]). This notion mostly concerns the issue that textual provisions of (legal) norms typically provide prima facie conditions for their applicability, but to understand a norm in full, we have to evaluate the norms in the context in which the norm is used and to see if other norms prevent it either to apply or to be effective. In other words, when evaluating norms, we must account for possible (prima facie) conflicts and exceptions. Indeed, in general, norms first provide the …


Law Library Blog (April 2019): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law Apr 2019

Law Library Blog (April 2019): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Law Library Newsletters/Blog

No abstract provided.


Ripensare La Razionalità: La Crescita Di Significato E I Limiti Del Formalismo, Susan Haack Jan 2019

Ripensare La Razionalità: La Crescita Di Significato E I Limiti Del Formalismo, Susan Haack

Articles

Man mano che la nostra conoscenza e la nostra esperienza crescono, i concetti assumono un significato nuovo e più ricco. La filosofia del linguaggio recente (post-Fregeana) hanno prestato poca attenzione a questo fenomeno; e filosofi radicali come Feyerabend e Rorty diedero per scontato che il cambiamento di significato fosse una minaccia alla razionalità. Ma i pensatori nella tradizione pragmatica classica – Peirce nella filosofia della scienza e, più implicitamente, Holmes nella teoria giuridica – riconobbero l’importanza della crescita di significato e capirono come questa potesse contribuire al progresso della scienza e all’adattamento di un sistema giuridico al cambiare delle circostanze. …


Rwu Law News: The E-Newsletter Of Roger Williams University School Of Law September 2018, Roger Williams University School Of Law Sep 2018

Rwu Law News: The E-Newsletter Of Roger Williams University School Of Law September 2018, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.


Trending @ Rwu Law: Michael Bowden's Post: How Law School Gives Politicians A "Running Start" 09-08-2017, Michael Bowden Sep 2017

Trending @ Rwu Law: Michael Bowden's Post: How Law School Gives Politicians A "Running Start" 09-08-2017, Michael Bowden

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.


Law Library Blog (February 2017): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law Feb 2017

Law Library Blog (February 2017): Legal Beagle's Blog Archive, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Law Library Newsletters/Blog

No abstract provided.


Abductive Reasoning In Wto Law, Chios Carmody Jan 2017

Abductive Reasoning In Wto Law, Chios Carmody

Law Publications

Law is about many things, but at base it is about rights and obligations. That jural correlation is established and sustained by means of reasoning. We hold that an actor has a right or obligation by virtue of reasoning that classically occurs in one of two forms. An obligation creates a right by means of inductive logic that rests on the conviction of similar instances in the past and the need for proof. It can also create an obligation by means of deductive logic, that is, the process of reasoning from one or more statements (premises) that are used to …


Exceptions: The Criminal Law's Illogical Approach To Hiv-Related Aggravated Assaults, Ari Ezra Waldman Jan 2011

Exceptions: The Criminal Law's Illogical Approach To Hiv-Related Aggravated Assaults, Ari Ezra Waldman

Articles & Chapters

This Article identifies logical and due process errors in HIV-related aggravated assault cases, which usually involve an HIV-positive individual having unprotected sex without disclosing his or her HIV status. While this behavior should not be encouraged, this Article suggests that punishing this conduct through a charge of aggravated assault - which requires a showing that the defendant’s actions were a means likely to cause grievous bodily harm or death - is fraught with fallacies in reasoning and runs afoul of due process. Specifically, some courts use the "rule of thumb" that HIV can possibly be transmitted through bodily fluids as …


The Dna Of An Argument: A Case Study In Legal Logos, Colin Starger Jul 2009

The Dna Of An Argument: A Case Study In Legal Logos, Colin Starger

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article develops a framework for analyzing legal argument through an in-depth case study of the debate over federal actions for post-conviction DNA access. Building on the Aristotelian concept of logos, this Article maintains that the persuasive power of legal logic depends in part on the rhetorical characteristics of premises, inferences, and conclusions in legal proofs. After sketching a taxonomy that distinguishes between prototypical argument logo (formal, empirical, narrative, and categorical), the Article applies its framework to parse the rhetorical dynamics at play in litigation over post-conviction access to DNA evidence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, focusing in particular on …


Nietzsche’S Place In Nineteenth Century German Philosophy, Michael S. Green Jan 2004

Nietzsche’S Place In Nineteenth Century German Philosophy, Michael S. Green

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Hans Kelsen And The Logic Of Legal Systems, Michael S. Green Jan 2003

Hans Kelsen And The Logic Of Legal Systems, Michael S. Green

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


"Intensional Contexts" And The Rule That Statutes Should Be Interpreted As Consistent With International Law, John M. Rogers Mar 1998

"Intensional Contexts" And The Rule That Statutes Should Be Interpreted As Consistent With International Law, John M. Rogers

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Striving for consistency—for consistency, that is, properly understood—must characterize legal reasoning in order for the reasoning to deserve to be called "legal." It may conceivably be "good" or "moral" for identically situated persons to be treated differently by institutions with power, but doing so can hardly be called "legal." Very careful attention must be given, of course, to what is meant by "identically situated," as no two different persons can be 100% identically situated. Their names, for instance, are different. By identical, we must mean no relevant distinction, or no distinction that serves a purpose that we can articulate and …


Logic And Elements. (Premises And Conclusions: Symbolic Logic For Legal Analysis)." , Richard D. Friedman Jan 1998

Logic And Elements. (Premises And Conclusions: Symbolic Logic For Legal Analysis)." , Richard D. Friedman

Articles

We may happily agree with Holmes that logic is not the life of the law' and yet contend that logic should play a significant role in legal discourse. Logic cannot demonstrate the truth of premises, and so by itself it cannot demonstrate the merits of a legal argument. Moreover, even given the premises, it may be that a leap of faith, or intuition, has an irreducible role at least in some good legal arguments.2 But at least a sound legal argument will not be an illogical one. An argument will not be persuasive if it appears to violate basic principles …


Some Examples Of Using Legal Relations Language In The Legal Domain: Applied Deontic Logic, Layman E. Allen Jan 1998

Some Examples Of Using Legal Relations Language In The Legal Domain: Applied Deontic Logic, Layman E. Allen

Articles

The fundamental concept of the LEGAL RELATIONS Language (LRL) is the recursively-defined notion of LEGAL RELATION (LR). As LR is defined here, there is an infinite number of different LEGAL RELATIONS, and LRL is a language for precisely and completely describing each of those infinite number of dfferent LEGAL RELATIONS. With its robust collection of dfferent names, one for each of the different LEGAL RELATIONS, LRL provides adequate vocabulary for (1) describing every possible legal state of affairs, (2) accounting for every possible change from one legal state of affairs to another, (3) representing every possible legal rule, and (4) …


Logic And The Common Law Trial, Richard H. Underwood Jul 1994

Logic And The Common Law Trial, Richard H. Underwood

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In this article, the author explores some of the inconsistencies between logic and the practice of law. The article draws together numerous anecdotes and examples of situations in which common sense was rejected or ignored in the name of legal procedure. The article focuses on various argument styles employed by lawyers.


Controlling Inadvertent Ambiguity In The Logical Structure Of Legal Drafting By Means Of The Prescribed Definitions Of The A-Hohfeld Structural Language, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon Jan 1994

Controlling Inadvertent Ambiguity In The Logical Structure Of Legal Drafting By Means Of The Prescribed Definitions Of The A-Hohfeld Structural Language, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon

Articles

Two principal sources of imprecision in legal drafting (vagueness and ambiguity) are identified and illustrated. Virtually all of the ambiguity imprecision encountered in legal discourse is ambiguity in the language used to express logical structure, and virtually all of· the imprecision resulting is inadvertent. On the other hand, the imprecision encountered in legal writing that results from vagueness is frequently, if not most often, included there deliberately; the drafter has considered it and decided that the vague language· best accomplishes the purpose at hand. This paper focuses on the use of some defined terminology for minimizing inadvertent ambiguity in the …


Peirce And Logicism: Notes Towards An Exposition, Susan Haack Jan 1993

Peirce And Logicism: Notes Towards An Exposition, Susan Haack

Articles

No abstract provided.


Proof In Law And Science, David H. Kaye Jan 1992

Proof In Law And Science, David H. Kaye

Journal Articles

This article addresses proof in both science and law. Both disciplines utilize proof of facts and proof of theories, but for different purposes and, consequently, in different ways. Some similarities exist, however, in how both disciplines use a series of premises followed by a conclusion to form an argument, and thus constitute a logic. This article analyzes the ways in which legal logic and scientific logic differ. Finding facts in law involves the same logic but quite different procedures than scientific fact-finding. Finding, or rather constructing, the law is also very different from scientific theorizing. But such differences do not …


Standards Of Persuasion And The Distinction Between Fact And Law, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1992

Standards Of Persuasion And The Distinction Between Fact And Law, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

The invitation to respond in these pages to Gary Lawson's very interesting article, Proving the Law, was tempting enough. But what made it irresistible was Professor Lawson's comment that he is "addressing, with a brevity that borders on the irresponsible, subjects well beyond [his] depth." Now, that's the kind of debate I really like. Let me jump right in. A principal question raised by Lawson, which I find quite interesting, may be phrased in general, and purposefully ambiguous, terms as follows: Before an actor treats a proposition as a valid2 proposition of law, what standard of persuasion should that proposition …


Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Storytelling, Bayesianism, Hearsay And Other Evidence, Richard D. Friedman Jan 1992

Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Storytelling, Bayesianism, Hearsay And Other Evidence, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

David Schum has long been one of our keenest commentators on questions of inference and proof. He has been particularly interested in, and illuminating on, the subject of "cascaded," or multi-step, inference.' This is a subject of importance to lawyers, because most evidence at trial can be analyzed in terms of cascaded inference. Usually, the proposition that the fact finder2 might immediately infer from the evidence is not itself an element of a crime, claim, or defense. Most often, an extra inference would be required to jump from that proposition to a proposition that the law deems material. Thus, inference …


Refocusing The New Evidence Scholarship : A Comment On Robert S. Thompson's "Decision, Disciplined Inferences And The Adversary Process", Terence J. Anderson Jan 1991

Refocusing The New Evidence Scholarship : A Comment On Robert S. Thompson's "Decision, Disciplined Inferences And The Adversary Process", Terence J. Anderson

Articles

No abstract provided.


Automatic Generation Of A Legal Expert System, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon Jan 1991

Automatic Generation Of A Legal Expert System, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon

Book Chapters

The use of the AUTOPROLOG system to generate automatically a legal expert system is described in this chapter. The interpretation of a statutory or other legal rule by one expert (or by the consensus of a group of experts) expressed in a normalized form is the only input needed by the AUTOPROLOG system (which includes Turbo Prolog, the AUTOPRO program, and some data files) to produce automatically a computer program that is an expert system for that legal rule. The process for producing a legal expert system for Section 213.1 of the Modal Penal Code, which deals with rape and …


Exploring Computer Aided Generation Of Questions For Normalizing Legal Rules, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon Jan 1988

Exploring Computer Aided Generation Of Questions For Normalizing Legal Rules, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon

Book Chapters

The process of normalizing a legal rule requires a drafter to indicate where the intent is to be precise and where it is to be imprecise in expressing both the between-sentence and within-sentence logical structure of that rule. Three different versions of a legal rule are constructed in the process of normalizing it: (1) the logical structure of the present version, (2) the detailed marker version, and (3) the logical structure of the normalized version. In order to construct the third version the analyst must formulate and answer specific questions about the terms that are used to express the logical …


One Use Of Computerized Instructional Gaming In Legal Education: To Better Understand The Rich Logical Structure Of Legal Rules And Improve Legal Writing, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon Jan 1985

One Use Of Computerized Instructional Gaming In Legal Education: To Better Understand The Rich Logical Structure Of Legal Rules And Improve Legal Writing, Layman E. Allen, Charles S. Saxon

Articles

This article describes an innovation in legal education and speculates about its importance and effectiveness as an educational tool. The speculations about its potential use, however, are ones that each legal educator will be able to test individually to determine the effectiveness of this use of microcomputers to improve legal education. The computer software that permits the innovation to be used will be available to interested persons by the time that this article is published.


Clarifying Legal Drafting By Well-Structuring It: An Improved Version Of The Plain Language Game, Layman E. Allen Jan 1982

Clarifying Legal Drafting By Well-Structuring It: An Improved Version Of The Plain Language Game, Layman E. Allen

Other Publications

In order to be plain, language should be well-structured. This is the theory upon which the PLAIN LANGUAGE Game is based. It provides those who aspire to be legal drafters with practice in constructing well-structured statements - a useful skill for expressing clear legal norms. You have already encountered the underlining of part of the term 'well-structured', 'PLAIN LANGUAGE' and 'norm', and may be wondering about it The underlining of the first two letters of each word of a term indicates that the term is a defined term and that it is being used in its defined sense. Thus, a …


The Need For Clear Structure In 'Plain Language' Legal Drafting, Layman E. Allen, C. Rudy Engholm Jan 1980

The Need For Clear Structure In 'Plain Language' Legal Drafting, Layman E. Allen, C. Rudy Engholm

Articles

Language is not simple. To pretend otherwise is to mislead. In practice the aspect that is handled most ineptly in written legal materials is the structure. The focus of this article is upon structure and how to improve it. At the outset, let one thing be absolutely clear. In seeking to achieve clarity of expression, those who have no more to recommend than short sentences, simple words, and readability formulas are offering a cracker in circumstances where a full gourmet feast is gleaming in the chef's eye for those with the wit but to ask for the menu. To practice …


Language, Law, And Logic: Plain Legal Drafting For The Electronic Age, Layman E. Allen Jan 1980

Language, Law, And Logic: Plain Legal Drafting For The Electronic Age, Layman E. Allen

Book Chapters

The achievement of current demands for clearer legal drafting in the United States (New York, 1973 and President's Executive Order, 1978) and Great Britain (Renton Report, 1975) can be aided by applying modern logic to improve the language of the law. In considering how the expression of legal norms can be clarified by using some formal language techniques, particular attention will be given to alternatives for dealing with problems of inadvertent imprecision in current legal drafting, alternatives that facilitate human understanding as well as enhance the possibilities for analysis by computer. A brief sketch of the imprecision of the expression …


Normalized Legal Drafting And The Query Method, Layman E. Allen, C. Rudy Engholm Jan 1978

Normalized Legal Drafting And The Query Method, Layman E. Allen, C. Rudy Engholm

Articles

Normalized legal drafting is a mode of expressing ideas in statutes, regulations, contracts, and other legal documents in such a way that the syntax that relates the constituent propositions is simplified and standardized. This "normalization" results in documents that are easier to understand in the dual sense that they can be read faster and more accurately than corresponding documents that are not normalized. The query method is a technique for familiarizing learners with normalized drafting and providing practice in some of the easier aspects of doing it.


What Counts Is How The Game Is Scored: One Way To Increase Achievement In Learning Mathematics, Layman E. Allen, Gloria Jackson, Joan Ross, Stuart White Jan 1978

What Counts Is How The Game Is Scored: One Way To Increase Achievement In Learning Mathematics, Layman E. Allen, Gloria Jackson, Joan Ross, Stuart White

Articles

Pior investigation indicates that instructional gaming can be an effective tool for enhancing both motivation and achievement in the learning of mathematics. This study explores the extent to which the effectiveness of instructional gaming in facilitating the learning of specific mathematical ideas can be increased by incorporating devices that channel learners’ attention upon those ideas. In particular, the effect of channeling attention by changing the method of scoring is explored.