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Judicial review

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Jurisprudence

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“To Remand, Or Not To Remand”: Ventura’S Ordinary Remand Rule And The Evolving Jurisprudence Of Futility, Patrick J. Glen Jan 2010

“To Remand, Or Not To Remand”: Ventura’S Ordinary Remand Rule And The Evolving Jurisprudence Of Futility, Patrick J. Glen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

It is a foundational principle of administrative law that a reviewing court should not dispose of a petition for review or appeal on grounds not relied upon by the agency, and should not reach issues in the first instance not addressed administratively. In such circumstances, there is a strong presumption that the reviewing court should remand the case to the agency for further proceedings rather than reach out to decide the disputed issues. The United States Supreme Court explicitly extended operation of the “ordinary remand rule” to the immigration context in its 2002 decision in INS v. Ventura. Notwithstanding subsequent …


Process Theory, Majoritarianism, And The Original Understanding, William Michael Treanor Jan 2007

Process Theory, Majoritarianism, And The Original Understanding, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Radicals in Robes, Cass Sunstein posits that there are four primary approaches to constitutional interpretation: perfectionism, majoritarianism, minimalism, and fundamentalism.' The purpose of his eloquent and compelling book is twofold: Sunstein argues for minimalism, an approach that he contends makes most sense for America today; and with even greater force, Sunstein argues against fundamentalism, which he finds "wrong, dangerous, radical, and occasionally hypocritical."' The "Radicals in Robes" who are the targets of Sunstein's book are judges who embrace fundamentalism, which, in his view, embodies "the views of the extreme wing of [the] Republican Party."'

In Securing Constitutional Democracy: The …


Weak-Form Judicial Review And "Core" Civil Liberties, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2006

Weak-Form Judicial Review And "Core" Civil Liberties, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this Essay, I want to unearth some subordinated strands in the Rehnquist Court's free speech jurisprudence. For example, the Rehnquist Court allowed Congress to regulate campaign finance in ways subject to credible First Amendment objections, and to impose obligations on cable television systems that would almost certainly be unconstitutional were they imposed on newspapers. These decisions, I suggest, do not rest simply on the kind of deference to legislative judgment that fits comfortably into a system of strong-form review. Rather, they represent what I call a managerial model of the First Amendment, which accords legislatures a large role in …


Constitutional Culture Or Ordinary Politics: A Reply To Reva Siegel, Robin West Jan 2006

Constitutional Culture Or Ordinary Politics: A Reply To Reva Siegel, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Reva Siegel's lecture, ‘Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA,’ explores the interaction between the courts and social movements in creating constitutional meaning. In the primary part of this response I focus my comments on Siegel's three major contributions: First, the historical explanation of the source of the Court's authority in the development of the so-called de facto ERA; second, the articulation of a general, jurisprudential thesis regarding social contestation as a source of constitutional authority apart from text, history, and principle; and third, the quasi-sociological descriptive account of the form social …


Constitutionalization, Girardeau A. Spann Jan 2005

Constitutionalization, Girardeau A. Spann

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Students of constitutional law tend to suspect pretty early on that the Constitution simply means whatever the Supreme Court says that it means. Rather than fight that intuition, I think it is best to treat the student insight as one of the basic starting assumptions when teaching a course in Constitutional Law. The goal then becomes to help students figure out how best to maneuver and feel comfortable in a legal universe where the Constitution has only contingent meaning.

What the Supreme Court does when it clothes its political policy preferences in the garb of constitutional law can be described …


"Meet The New Boss": The New Judicial Center, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2005

"Meet The New Boss": The New Judicial Center, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A document entitled ‘Guidelines on Constitutional Litigation’ published in 1988 by the Reagan era Department of Justice is the springboard for Professor Tushnet's discussion of the Supreme Court's "new center. " The Guidelines urged Department of Justice litigators to foster a nearly exclusive reliance on original understanding in constitutional interpretation and to resort to legislative history only as a last resort. The Guidelines also advised Department of Justice litigators to seek substantive legal changes including more restrictive standing requirements, an end to the creation of unenumerated individual rights, greater constitutional protection of property rights, and greater limits on congressional power. …


The Secret Life Of The Political Question Doctrine, Louis Michael Seidman Jan 2004

The Secret Life Of The Political Question Doctrine, Louis Michael Seidman

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

"Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court."

The irony, of course, is that Marbury v. Madison, itself, "made" a political question, and the answer the Court gave was deeply political as well. As everyone reading this essay knows, the case arose out of a bitter political controversy, and the opinion for the Court was a carefully crafted political document - "a masterwork of indirection," according to Robert McCloskey's well-known characterization, "a brilliant example of Chief Justice Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while seeming …


Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, Neal K. Katyal Jan 2004

Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Contemporary constitutional law, in its quest for judicial restraint, has primarily focused on "the how" of judging - what interpretive methods will constrain the decisionmaker? This Article, by contrast, focuses on the "when"- if there are reasons to think that today's judicial decisions might later prove to be problematic, then are there methods that alter the timing of those decisions' impact to produce better outcomes? This Article outlines one new method for judicial decisionmaking in the post-9/11 world. Informed by pervasive legislative practices, I contend that the Supreme Court should prospectively declare that some of its national security opinions will …


Pragmatism And Judgment: A Comment On Lund, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2004

Pragmatism And Judgment: A Comment On Lund, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Nelson Lund's article is entitled The Rehnquist Court's Pragmatic Approach to Civil Rights.' I raise three questions about his analysis, two of which take off from the phrasing of his title. First, calling the present Court the Rehnquist Court is obviously easy, and I do it myself in the subtitle of my forthcoming book. Professor Lund has of course taken his charge from the conveners of this Symposium, and I do not mean to criticize him for doing so. Still, it may be worth pointing out that convening a symposium that encourages people to think in terms of "the Rehnquist …


Defending Korematsu?: Reflections On Civil Liberties In Wartime, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2003

Defending Korematsu?: Reflections On Civil Liberties In Wartime, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

According to Justice William J. Brennan, "After each perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error when the next crisis came along." This Article examines that observation, using Korematsu as a vehicle for refining the claim and, I think, reducing it to a more defensible one. Part I opens my discussion, providing some qualifications to the broad claim about threats to civil liberties in wartime. Part II then deals with Korematsu and other historical examples of civil liberties …


Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2003

Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States has strong-form judicial review. Strong- and weak-form systems operate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their characteristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate at the next lower level. Here legislatures …


Alarmism Versus Moderation In Responding To The Rehnquist Court, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2003

Alarmism Versus Moderation In Responding To The Rehnquist Court, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I begin in Part I by offering a description of the Supreme Court's recent decisions as a less substantial repudiation of prior principles than many think them to be, and as leaving Congress with the means to achieve a quite substantial proportion of the policy goals it pursued in the statutes the Court invalidated. Part II explains why Congress is unlikely to do so, in light of our apparent commitment to divided government, and parties that are organized around distinctive ideologies because of divided government. Part III turns to the prospect for continued policy transformation, identifying the conditions under which …


Environmental Law And The Supreme Court: Three Years Later, Richard J. Lazarus Jan 2002

Environmental Law And The Supreme Court: Three Years Later, Richard J. Lazarus

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In my Garrison Lecture three years ago, I surveyed the environmental law decisions of the Supreme Court between 1970 and 1999. I commented on which Justices had been more or less influential in shaping the Court's decisions and, even more provocatively (if not foolishly), sought to "score" the individual Justices on their responsiveness to environmental protection concerns based on their votes cast in a subset of those cases. The broader thesis of the lecture, however, was that there is something distinctively "environmental" about environmental law and that the Court's increasing inability to appreciate that dimension was leading to more poorly-reasoned …


The Limits Of Being "Present At The Creation", Roy A. Schotland Jan 2002

The Limits Of Being "Present At The Creation", Roy A. Schotland

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Having been invited late to this Symposium and having read fewer than all essays, I offer, (with deep appreciation for the invitation), only mini-comments on three of the many valuable contributions: the essays by Professors Persily, Hasen, and Gerken. But first, at risk of pedantry, may I suggest changing the Symposium's title to something like "Baker and its Progeny .... (or "Baker, doughnuts, and holes"?). Most of the treatment seems to be about the progeny, as surely it should be. While of course everyone knows how far Baker went, what Reynolds did, and what was not done until after Reynolds, …


Law And Prudence In The Law Of Justiciability: The Transformation And Disappearance Of The Political Question Doctrine, Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2002

Law And Prudence In The Law Of Justiciability: The Transformation And Disappearance Of The Political Question Doctrine, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Essay develops the foregoing argument by examining, in Section I, the transformation of the political question doctrine from Baker v. Carr through Walter Nixon v. United States. Section II charts a similar, perhaps even more dramatic transformation of the law of standing. Section I then examines Bush v. Gore, explaining how older doctrines of standing and political questions might have been thought relevant there. It argues as well that the very fact that those doctrines went unmentioned by the Court shows why we must take a historically grounded view of justiciability doctrines. Section IV sketches the historical settings in …


"Shut Up He Explained", Mark V. Tushnet Jan 2001

"Shut Up He Explained", Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Part I of this Commentary examines the conversational model of politics. I argue that the virtues Bennett finds in the conversational model exist only when, and to the extent that, participants in civil and political society can engage in undominated conversation. The requirement that conversation be undominated generates a substantial set of social prerequisites, mostly dealing with equality. And yet, determining what social arrangements actually satisfy those prerequisites is itself a matter of constitutional controversy. Resolving such controversies through politics is no solution, because the political arena is where we seek to ensure that nondomination prevails in civil society, and, …


Restoring What’S Environmental About Environmental Law In The Supreme Court, Richard J. Lazarus Jan 2000

Restoring What’S Environmental About Environmental Law In The Supreme Court, Richard J. Lazarus

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this Article, Professor Richard Lazarus examines the votes of the individual Justices who have decided environmental law cases before the United States Supreme Court during the past three decades. The Article reports on a number of interesting statistics regarding the identity of those Justices who have most influenced the Court's environmental law jurisprudence and the sometimes curious patterns in voting exhibited by individual Justices. Lazarus's thesis is that the Supreme Court's apparent apathy or even antipathy towards environmental law during that time results from the Justices' failure to appreciate environmental law as a distinct area of law. The Justices …


Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, Carlos Manuel Vázquez Jan 2000

Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article argues that conflicting analytical strains run through the Supreme Court's recent majority opinions in the area of state sovereign immunity. The "supremacy" strain stresses that, despite the Eleventh Amendment, the states remain obligated to comply with federal law, and that the Constitution envisions the "necessary judicial means" to enforce these obligations against the state. These means include suits by the federal government, private suits for injunctive relief, and suits seeking damages from state officials in their individual capacities. Thus, according to the supremacy strain, state sovereign immunity is unimportant because it merely bars unnecessary means of enforcing the …


Constitutional Scepticism, Robin West Jan 1992

Constitutional Scepticism, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Interpretive constitutional debate over the last few decades has centered on two apparently linked questions: whether the Constitution can be given a determinate meaning, and whether the institution of judicial review can be justified within the basic assumptions of liberalism. Two groups of scholars have generated answers to these questions. The "constitutional faithful" argue that meaning can indeed be determinately affixed to constitutional clauses, by reference to the plain meaning of the document, the original intent of the drafters, evolving political and moral norms of the community, or the best political or moral philosophical theory available and that, because of …