Law Commons^™

Resoling International Shoe, Donald L. Doernberg

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman sharply restricted general jurisdiction over corporations, limiting it to a corporation’s (1) state of incorporation, (2) state of principal place of business, or (3) another state where the corporation is “essentially at home.” The Court analogized the first two categories to an individual’s domicile. The Court made clear that the third category is very small, leading Justice Sotomayor, in her opinion concurring in the judgment, to charge that the Court had made many corporations “too big for general jurisdiction.” It is noteworthy that although the Court used the …

Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident, Alien Defendants, Austen L. Parrish

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The Due Process Clause with its focus on a defendant's liberty interest has become the key, if not only, limitation on a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. This due process jurisdictional limitation is universally assumed to apply with equal force to alien defendants as to domestic defendants. With few exceptions, scholars do not distinguish between the two. Neither do the courts. Countless cases assume that foreigners have all the rights of United States citizens to object to extraterritorial assertions of personal jurisdiction.

But is this assumption sound? This Article explores the uncritical assumption that the same due process considerations apply …

"Defendant Veto" Or "Totality Of The Circumstances?": It's Time For The Supreme Court To Straighten Out The Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, Robert J. Condlin

Faculty Scholarship

Commentators frequently claim that there is no single, coherent doctrine of extra-territorial personal jurisdiction, and, unfortunately, they are correct. The International Shoe case, commonly (but inaccurately) thought of as the wellspring of the modern form of the doctrine, announced a relatively straightforward, two-factor, four-permutation test that worked well for resolving most cases. In the nearly sixty-year period following Shoe, however, as the Supreme Court expanded and refined the standard, what was once straightforward and uncomplicated became serendipitous and convoluted. Two general, and generally incompatible, versions of the doctrine competed for dominance. The first, what might best be described as …