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Full-Text Articles in Law
The 'Authority' Of Law: Joseph Raz Reconsidered, Andrew Stumpff Morrison
The 'Authority' Of Law: Joseph Raz Reconsidered, Andrew Stumpff Morrison
Law & Economics Working Papers
The article presents a critical reassessment of the legal philosophical writings of Joseph Raz. The critique develops from the author’s previous argument that law is – contra recent near-consensus – best understood as “the command of the sovereign, backed by force.” Given that this is the distinctly defining feature of law, Raz’s extended preoccupation with “reasons for obeying law” is misplaced and even nonsensical.
The Semantics And Pragmatics Of Legal Statements, Michael S. Green
The Semantics And Pragmatics Of Legal Statements, Michael S. Green
Popular Media
No abstract provided.
Prediction Theories Of Law And The Internal Point Of View, Michael S. Green
Prediction Theories Of Law And The Internal Point Of View, Michael S. Green
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
On Hart's Category Mistake, Michael S. Green
On Hart's Category Mistake, Michael S. Green
Faculty Publications
This essay concerns Scott Shapiro’s criticism that H.L.A. Hart’s theory of law suffers from a “category mistake.” Although other philosophers of law have summarily dismissed Shapiro’s criticism, I argue that it identifies an important requirement for an adequate theory of law. Such a theory must explain why legal officials justify their actions by reference to abstract propositional entities, instead of pointing to the existence of social practices. A virtue of Shapiro’s planning theory of law is that it can explain this phenomenon. Despite these sympathies, however, I end with the suggestion that Shapiro’s criticism of Hart, as it stands, is …
The Limits Of Legal Realism, Anthony D'Amato
The Limits Of Legal Realism, Anthony D'Amato
Faculty Working Papers
This article will address some criticisms of legal realism, primarily those of H.L.A. Hart, that have been unanswered in the literature and have appeared to discredit the realist approach to law. The article will also articulate what I believe to be more difficult problems with legal realism.
Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, And The Rule Of Recognition, Matthew D. Adler
Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, And The Rule Of Recognition, Matthew D. Adler
All Faculty Scholarship
This essay is a chapter in a volume that examines constitutional law in the United States through the lens of H.L.A. Hart’s “rule of recognition” model of a legal system. My chapter focuses on a feature of constitutional practice that has been rarely examined: how jurists and scholars argue about interpretive methods. Although a vast body of scholarship provides arguments for or against various interpretive methods --such as textualism, originalism, “living constitutionalism,” structure-and-relationship reasoning, representation-reinforcement, minimalism, and so forth -- very little scholarship shifts to the meta-level and asks: What are the considerations that jurists and scholars bring to bear …
Impartiality In Judicial Ethics: A Jurisprudential Analysis, W. Bradley Wendel
Impartiality In Judicial Ethics: A Jurisprudential Analysis, W. Bradley Wendel
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Punishment, Invalidation, And Nonvalidation: What H.L.A. Hart Did Not Explain, Richard Stith
Punishment, Invalidation, And Nonvalidation: What H.L.A. Hart Did Not Explain, Richard Stith
Law Faculty Publications
Elaborating first upon H. L. A. Hart's distinction between imposing duties and imposing disabilities, this article explores the two senses mentioned (but not fully explained) by Hart in which power-holders may be legally disabled. Legal invalidation (nullification) of norms that have been generated by vulnerable power-holders is seen to reduce diversity or pluralism in every normative sphere, from the supranational to the intrafamilial. By contrast, mere legal nonvalidation (noncognizance) of such norms tends to preserve the autonomy of the power-holders that created the norms, thus enhancing legal pluralism. Punishment for creating forbidden norms amounts in principle to an in-between sort …
Jurisprudence And Judicial Ethics, W. Bradley Wendel
Jurisprudence And Judicial Ethics, W. Bradley Wendel
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The fundamental value in judicial ethics is impartiality. This means that a judge is duty-bound to decide cases on their merits, be open to persuasion, and not influenced by improper considerations. The paradigm case of unethical behavior by a judge is taking a bribe to decide a case in favor of one of the parties. This kind of corruption, which is fortunately rare in many developed countries, is also relatively uninteresting from an intellectual point of view. A more difficult case of failure of impartiality, conceptually speaking, involves a judge who relies on extra-legal factors as the basis for a …
Constitutional Fidelity, The Rule Of Recognition, And The Communitarian Turn In Contemporary Positivism, Matthew D. Adler
Constitutional Fidelity, The Rule Of Recognition, And The Communitarian Turn In Contemporary Positivism, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Legal Institutions In Professor H.L.A. Hart's Concept Of Law, Robert S. Summers
Legal Institutions In Professor H.L.A. Hart's Concept Of Law, Robert S. Summers
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Natural Law And The Cultivation Of Legal Rhetoric, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Natural Law And The Cultivation Of Legal Rhetoric, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Scholarly Works
This essay appeared in a book celebrating Lon Fuller's contributions to jurisprudence. In it, Professor Mootz argued that Fuller's conception of secular natural law, designated as an "internal morality of law," lends welcome assistance to the effort to articulate a new direction in legal philosophy. He defended Fuller's natural-law approach from the common misinterpretations that it is either a hollow echo of the natural law tradition or an essentialist conception of law at odds with the legal-realist world that he helped to create with his doctrinal scholarship. By reading his famous, "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers," in a new …
No Vehicles In The Park, Pierre Schlag
A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Mullock, Robert S. Summers
A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Mullock, Robert S. Summers
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Mullock on Summers on Hart is bad enough, but Summers on Mullock on Summers on Hart is worse. Fortunately or unfortunately, there is no rule (primary or secondary) entitling either of us to vouch Professor Hart into the proceedings. With all due respect to Professor Mullock (and to me, of course), I fear the two of us may be compounding erroneous interpretations of Professor Hart’s work. Sans Hart, I shall exercise admirable restraint and argue over the meaning of the scripture. Regrettably, Professor Mullock and I are both defenders of the faith; I had hoped to draw the fire of …
Professor H.L.A. Hart's Concept Of Law, Robert S. Summers
Professor H.L.A. Hart's Concept Of Law, Robert S. Summers
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
H.L.A. Hart On Justice, Robert S. Summers
H.L.A. Hart On Justice, Robert S. Summers
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.