Law Commons^™

Converse-Osborn: State Sovereign Immunity, Standing, And The Dog-Wagging Effect Of Article Iii, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

“[T]he legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well-constructed government, are co-extensive with each other . . . [T]he judicial department may receive from the Legislature the power of construing any . . . law [which the Legislature may constitutionally make].” Chief Justice Marshall relied on this axiom in Osborn v. Bank of the United States to stress the breadth of the federal judicial power: The federal courts must have the potential power to adjudicate any claim based on any law Congress has the power to enact. In recent years, however, the axiom has sometimes operated in the opposite direction: …

The Constitution As A Source Of Remedial Law, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Equity’s Constitutional Source, Owen W. Gallogly argues that Article III is the source of a constitutional default rule for equitable remedies—specifically, that Article III’s vesting of the “judicial Power” “in Equity” empowers federal courts to afford the remedies traditionally afforded by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the Founding, and to develop such remedies in an incremental fashion. This Response questions the current plausibility of locating such a default rule in Article III, since remedies having their source in Article III would be available in federal but not state courts and would apply to state-law …

Federal Courts: Art. Iii(1), Art. I(8), Art. Iv(3)(2), Art. Ii(2)/I(8)(3), And Art. Ii(1) Adjudication, Laura K. Donohue, Jeremy M. Mccabe

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The distinction among the several types of federal courts in the United States has gone almost unremarked in the academic literature. Instead, attention focuses on Article III “constitutional” courts with occasional discussion of how they differ from what are referred to as “non-constitutional” or “legislative” courts. At best, these labels are misleading: all federal courts have a constitutional locus, and most, but not all, federal courts are brought into being via legislation. The binary approach further ignores the full range of federal courts, which are rooted in different constitutional provisions: Art. III(1), Art. I(8); Art. IV(3); Art. II(2)/I(8)(3); and Art. …

Supreme Silence And Precedential Pragmatism: King V. Burwell And Statutory Interpretation In The Federal Courts Of Appeals, Michael J. Cedrone

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article studies statutory interpretation as it is practiced in the federal courts of appeal. Much of the academic commentary in this field focuses on the Supreme Court, which skews the debate and unduly polarizes the field. This Article investigates more broadly by looking at the seventy-two federal appellate cases that cite King v. Burwell in the two years after the Court issued its decision. In deciding that the words “established by the State” encompass a federal program, the Court in King reached a pragmatic and practical result based on statutory scheme and purpose at a fairly high level of …

Aedpa As Forum Allocation: The Textual And Structural Case For Overruling Williams V. Taylor, Carlos Manuel Vázquez

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court read a section of the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to change the long-prevailing de novo standard of review of federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. In holding that Congress had denied the lower federal courts the power to grant habeas relief to prisoners in custody pursuant to wrong but reasonable state court decisions, the Court departed from the provision’s text and relied instead on its perception of a generalized congressional purpose to cut back on habeas relief and on the non-redundancy canon of statutory construction. On both scores, …

The Constitutional Right To Collateral Post-Conviction Review, Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Stephen I. Vladeck

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

For years, the prevailing academic and judicial wisdom has held that, between them, Congress and the Supreme Court have rendered post- conviction habeas review all but a dead letter. But in its January 2016 decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court may have dramatically upended that understanding in holding—for the first time—that there are at least some cases in which the Constitution itself creates a right to collateral post-conviction review, i.e., cases in which a prisoner seeks to enforce retroactively a “new rule” of substantive constitutional law under the familiar doctrine of Teague v. Lane.

On the …

The Case For The Repeal Amendment, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Today, a political movement has arisen to oppose what seems to be a highly discretionary and legally unconstrained federal government. Beginning in the Bush Administration during the Panic of 2008 and accelerating during the Obama Administration, the federal government has bailed out or taken over banks, car companies, and student loans. It is now preparing to vastly expand the Internal Revenue Service to help it take charge of the practice of medicine for the first time in American history. This marked and rapid increase of power has shaken many Americans who are now looking to the United States Constitution with …

Celebrating The 200th Anniversary Of The Federal Courts Of The District Of Columbia, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

February 27, 2001 marked the 200th anniversary of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, the courts we know today as the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The history of these courts is interesting, albeit somewhat confusing; their names changed no fewer than six times since their creation. Indeed, from 1863 until 1893, the two courts were joined and called the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Because of their location in the nation's capital and their unusual dual jurisdiction as both …

The Second Circuit And The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The most significant development in federal trial procedure in recent years has been the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, effective July 1, 1975. In the intervening two years since the Rules became effective, the courts of the Second Circuit have bad occasion to make several illuminating applications of and references to them.

An examination of some of these decisions provides insight into the kinds of questions that are coming up not only in the Second Circuit, but around the country, and the kinds of answers that are being given. It is not the bizarre or unusual case that …

The Proposed Amendments To The Federal Rules Of Evidence, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Supreme Court has approved a uniform code of evidence for all federal courts. Amendments to the Supreme Court's rules are now pending in the House of Representatives. From the point of view of a specialist in the law of evidence, Professor Rothstein analyzes the differences between the Supreme Court's proposals and the House amendments and suggests solutions to these conflicts.