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Full-Text Articles in Law
Ebay, Permanent Injunctions, And Trade Secrets, Elizabeth A. Rowe
Ebay, Permanent Injunctions, And Trade Secrets, Elizabeth A. Rowe
UF Law Faculty Publications
This Article presents the first qualitative empirical review of permanent injunctions in trade secret cases. In addition, it explores the extent to which the Supreme Court’s patent decision in eBay v. MercExchange has influenced the analysis of equitable principles in federal trade secret litigation. Among the more notable findings are that while equitable principles are generally applied in determining whether to grant a permanent injunction to a prevailing party after trial, the courts are not necessarily strictly applying the four factors from eBay. The award of monetary relief does not preclude equitable injunctive relief, and courts can find irreparable harm …
The Pleading Problem In Antitrust Cases And Beyond, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Pleading Problem In Antitrust Cases And Beyond, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In its Twombly decision the Supreme Court held that an antitrust complaint failed because its allegations did not include enough “factual matter” to justify proceeding to discovery. Two years later the Court extended this new pleading standard to federal complaints generally. Twombly’s broad language has led to a broad rewriting of federal pleading doctrine.
Naked market division conspiracies such as the one pled in Twombly must be kept secret because antitrust enforcers will prosecute them when they are detected. This inherent secrecy, which the Supreme Court did not discuss, has dire consequences for pleading if too much factual specificity …
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators. The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial chambers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly remedies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defendant's assets. At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity) grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final judgment or an order. The …
Policy Watch: Developments In Antitrust Economics, Jonathan Baker
Policy Watch: Developments In Antitrust Economics, Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the federal courts transformed antitrust rules and the federal enforcement agencies altered their case selection criteria in response to theories developed by industrial organization economists. These developments in economic thinking, often associated with the Chicago school, led current antitrust law and practice toward a greater skepticism about the relationship between market concentration and market power and a greater recognition of the possible efficiency-enhancing role of vertical agreements (contracts between firms and their customers or suppliers) than was present in the 1950s and 1960s.This survey will begin where those developments leave off by highlighting more …
Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach To Antitrust, Thomas Arthur
Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach To Antitrust, Thomas Arthur
Faculty Articles
This Article will demonstrate the superiority of the statutory approach for producing more stable and consistent antitrust law. Part I details the development of the constitutional approach to antitrust, demonstrating how the rise of the pragmatic and instrumentalist view of law led to the displacement of the original statutory approach to antitrust. Part II illustrates that the constitutional approach fundamentally cannot produce workable antitrust law. It summarizes both the doctrinal disarray that continues to plague each major area of antitrust law and the irreconcilable policy prescriptions of the contending antitrust "schools." Part III presents an alternative, statutory approach to antitrust …
Attempts And Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer To The Prophylactic Riddle Of Section Two, Edward H. Cooper
Attempts And Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer To The Prophylactic Riddle Of Section Two, Edward H. Cooper
Articles
The efforts of activist antitrust lawyers to redefine the contours of attempted monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act1 have again forced the courts to wrestle with the classic antitrust dilemma: How far must single-firm competitive behavior be restrained to make competition free? The answer given by the majority of current decisions is that, absent some other established offense, single-firm behavior should be prohibited as an attempt to monopolize only when there is a specific intent to monopolize and the firm has come dangerously near to unlawful monopolization. A contemporary challenge to this orthodox answer is rapidly gaining force. …
The Statute Of Limitations In Antitrust Litigation, Carl H. Fulda, Howard C. Klemme
The Statute Of Limitations In Antitrust Litigation, Carl H. Fulda, Howard C. Klemme
Publications
No abstract provided.
The Statute Of Limitations In Antitrust Litigation Ii, Carl H. Fulda, Howard C. Klemme
The Statute Of Limitations In Antitrust Litigation Ii, Carl H. Fulda, Howard C. Klemme
Publications
No abstract provided.
Can A Manufacturer Be Compelled To Sell?, Henry M. Bates
Can A Manufacturer Be Compelled To Sell?, Henry M. Bates
Articles
The fight for price maintenance is not yet completely settled, despite, the decisions in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. Parks & Sons Company, 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502, and Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616, 58 L. Ed. 1041, which held invalid contracts, whether nominally of agency, or of sale, between manufacturer and wholesaler or jobber whereby the latter in purchasing agreed himself to maintain and to sell only to others who would maintain a schedule of prices established by the manufacturer. But there are more …