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Employment contracts

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

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College Football Coaches' Pay And Contracts: Are They Overpaid And Unduly Privileged?, Randall S. Thomas, R. Lawrence Van Horn Jan 2016

College Football Coaches' Pay And Contracts: Are They Overpaid And Unduly Privileged?, Randall S. Thomas, R. Lawrence Van Horn

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

College football coaches' employment contracts and compensation garner public attention and scrutiny in much the same way as those of corporate CEOs. In both cases, the public perception is that they must be overpaid and pampered Economic theory claims that for coaches and CEOs to be overpaid, they must be receiving compensation in excess of the value they create for their organizations. However, both receive pay-for-performance compensation, which structurally aligns their compensation with value creation. This means we need to examine the underlying structure of the contract that gives rise to the observed compensation to determine whether they are appropriately …


Are College Presidents Like Football Coaches? Evidence From Their Employment Contracts, Randall Thomas, Lawrence R. Van Horn Jan 2016

Are College Presidents Like Football Coaches? Evidence From Their Employment Contracts, Randall Thomas, Lawrence R. Van Horn

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

College presidents and football coaches are frequently criticized for their high compensation. In this paper, we argue that these criticisms are unmerited, as the markets for both college presidents and football coaches exhibit properties consistent with a competitive labor market. Both parties compensation varies in sensible ways related to the size of the programs they manage, as well as their potential for value creation. Successful college presidents and football coaches can greatly increase the value of their schools well beyond the amount they receive in compensation. If these higher education executives' compensation is the result of a competitive labor market, …


An Empirical Analysis Of Noncompetition Clauses And Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, Randall Thomas Jan 2015

An Empirical Analysis Of Noncompetition Clauses And Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Employment contracts for most employees are not publicly available, leaving researchers to speculate about whether they contain postemployment restrictions on employee mobility, and if so, what those provisions look like. Using a large sample of publicly available CEO employment contracts, we are able to examine these noncompetition covenants, including postemployment covenants not to compete ("CNCs" or "noncompetes'), nonsolicitation agreements ("NSAs"), and nondisclosure agreements ("NDAs'). What we found confirms some long-held assumptions about restrictive covenants but also uncovers some surprises.

We begin by discussing why employers use restrictive covenants and examining how the courts have treated them. We then analyze an …


Comparing Ceo Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia And The United States, Randall Thomas, Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis Jan 2011

Comparing Ceo Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia And The United States, Randall Thomas, Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The results of our comparison of U.S. and Australian contracts offer some interesting contrasts with several earlier studies that compare U.S. and U.K. CEO compensation. In those prior studies, the authors conclude that U.S. CEOs' compensation is significantly higher than U.K. CEOs' compensation. What is interesting about our initial results is that U.S. CEOs clearly do not have higher base salaries in comparison to Australia. On the other hand, U.S. contracts are much more likely to include restricted stock and stock option features, which generally require payment after a CEO remains at the firm a fixed number of years, typically …


Arbitration Clauses In Ceo Employment Contracts: An Empirical And Theoretical Analysis, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin, Erin O'Connor Jan 2010

Arbitration Clauses In Ceo Employment Contracts: An Empirical And Theoretical Analysis, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin, Erin O'Connor

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A bill currently pending in Congress would render unenforceable mandatory arbitration clauses in all employment contracts. Some perceive these provisions as employer efforts to deprive employees of important legal rights. Company CEOs are firm employees, and, unlike most other firm employees, they can actually negotiate their employment contracts, very often with attorney assistance. Moreover, many CEO employment contracts are publicly available, so they can be examined empirically. In this paper, we ask whether CEOs bargain to include binding arbitration provisions in their employment contracts. After exploring the theoretical arguments for and against including such provisions in these agreements, we use …