Law Commons^™

"Gatekeepers" Are Vital Participants In Anti-Money-Laundering Laws And Enforcement Regimes As Permission-Less Blockchain-Based Transactions Pose Challenges To Current Means To "Follow The Money", Sarah Jane Hughes

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Two phenomena dominate reports about blockchain-based transactions—that they will disrupt and displace legacy banking, securities, and trade intermediaries, and that they present new or greater opportunities for hiding proceeds of crimes or corruption. This essay does not deal with the former topic. Rather, the organizers of the symposium at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia School of Law asks me to consider the latter question. It proved to be a tough assignment.

This essay looks at the separate questions of (1) the degree to which permission-less blockchain transactions will disrupt current anti-money laundering (AML) regimes and enforcement efforts, and (2) what …

Civil Consequences Of Corruption In International Commercial Contracts, Padideh Ala'i

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

The United States legal system seeks to prevent and prohibit bribery and corruption through a myriad of laws, regulations and policies. Anti-corruption jurisprudence is more developed in the context of public sector contracts where the United States criminalizes bribery of public officials through 18 U.S.C. §201 (Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses). In addition, the United States was the first country to criminalize bribery of foreign government officials in 1977 with the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA has since been amended to comply with the adoption of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign …

In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility For Enforcement Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Larry D. Thompson

Scholarly Works

In this article I first review our nation's long-standing and active aversion to corporate corruption overseas, as principally embodied in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. I then explain how achievement of the FCPA's goals is undermined by the uncertainty in current federal enforcement policies and the consequent ambivalence toward self disclosure exhibited by multinational corporations. Finally, I argue that the only realistic way to make up the shortcomings in FCPA enforcement that flow from the Justice Department's limited resources is to motivate corporations themselves to police corruption in their foreign subsidiaries by giving them a concrete incentive in the form …