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Full-Text Articles in Law

Long Overdue: Fifth Amendment Protection For Corporate Officers, Tracey Maclin Oct 2021

Long Overdue: Fifth Amendment Protection For Corporate Officers, Tracey Maclin

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has extended to corporations many of the same constitutional rights that were originally intended to protect people.One notable exception, however, is the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compulsory self-incrimination.

“Corporations may not take the Fifth.” There is a long line of cases dating back to the start of the twentieth century stating—but never directly holding— that corporations are not protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause.

But the fact that a corporation cannot invoke the Fifth Amendment does not explain why a person who works for a corporation cannot. As a matter of text, the Fifth Amendment draws no distinction …


The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel Rauterberg Jan 2021

The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

This Symposium Article examines how the public/private divide works today and maps out some of the potential implications for major issues in securities law. Classic debates in securities law were often predicated on the idea that public companies are a coherent class of firms that differ markedly from private companies. For more than fifty years after the adoption of the federal securities laws, this view was justified. During that period, the vast majority of successful and growing private firms eventually accepted the regulatory obligations of being public in order to access a wider and deeper pool of capital, among other …


The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman Jan 2021

The Corporate Governance Machine, Dorothy S. Lund, Elizabeth Pollman

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional view of corporate governance is that it is a neutral set of processes and practices that govern how a company is managed. We demonstrate that this view is profoundly mistaken: For public companies in the United States, corporate governance has become a “system” composed of an array of institutional players, with a powerful shareholderist orientation. Our original account of this “corporate governance machine” generates insights about the past, present, and future of corporate governance. As for the past, we show how the concept of corporate governance developed alongside the shareholder primacy movement. This relationship is reflected in the …