Law Commons^™

Allocating Business Profits For Tax Purposes: A Proposal To Adopt A Formulary Profit Split, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing, Michael C. Durst

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

The current system of taxing the income of multinational firms in the United States is flawed across multiple dimensions. The system provides an artificial tax incentive to earn income in low-tax countries, rewards aggressive tax planning, and is not compatible with any common metrics of efficiency. The U.S. system is also notoriously complex; observers are nearly unanimous in lamenting the heavy compliance burdens and the impracticality of coherent enforcement. Further, despite a corporate tax rate one standard deviation above that of other OECD countries, the U.S. corporate tax system raises relatively little revenue, due in part to the shifting of …

Corporate Governance, Enforcement, And Firm Value: Evidence From India, Dhammika Dharmapala, Vikramaditya Khanna

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This paper analyzes the effects of corporate governance reforms and enforcement on stock market development and firm value, using a sequence of corporate governance reforms in India. Our results, taken together, present a strong case for a causal effect of the reforms on firm value, and also underscore the importance of enforcement. The reforms (referred to as Clause 49 of the listing agreement) were phased in over the period 2000-2003. A large number of firms were completely exempt from the new rules, and the complex criteria for the application of Clause 49 created considerable overlap in the characteristics of affected …

What Explains Insider Trading Restrictions? International Evidence On The Political Economy Of Insider Trading Regulation, Laura N. Beny

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

This article investigates the determinants of insider trading regulation across countries. The article presents a political economy analysis of such regulation that takes into account both private (distributional) and public (economic efficiency) considerations. The model cannot be tested directly because the relevant private preferences and social costs are unobservable. However, existing theories of capital market development suggest that various observable social factors can explain the diversity of insider trading policies across countries. In turn, these social factors should reveal the underlying preferences and social costs motivating such regulation.

The main finding, based on data from a cross section of countries …

Do Delaware Ceos Get Fired?, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

Critics have charged that state competition in corporate law, which Delaware dominates, leads to a “race to the bottom” making management unaccountable. One metric of management accountability is forced CEO turnover, which we use to test the race to the bottom hypothesis. We compare California firms that choose to incorporate in California – the state with arguably the most restrictive corporate law rules – with those that incorporate in Delaware. We show that aspects of Delaware law attract firms that plan to grow through merger or acquisition and are vulnerable to shareholder lawsuits. We also document differences in corporate governance …

Back To The Future? The Potential Revival Of Territoriality, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

Since 1994, the trend in the United States and other developed countries appears to be to reduce the scope of residence jurisdiction and increase the emphasis on source jurisdiction. If this trend continues, these countries are likely to move toward territoriality and decrease the emphasis on their CFC rules. In the author’s opinion, the reason for this trend is political and economic, not legal. It is part of tax competition, specifically the competition to be the headquarters jurisdiction for multinationals. The author also thinks, however, that it is not necessary to go down this road because the solution to the …

Do Investors In Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence, Laura Nyantung Beny

Articles

This article characterizes insider trading as an agency problem in firms that have a controlling shareholder. Using a standard agency model of corporate value diversion through insider trading by the controlling shareholder, I derive testable hypotheses about the relationship between corporate value and insider trading laws among such firms. The article tests these hypotheses using firm-level cross-sectional data from twenty-seven developed countries. The results show that stringent insider trading laws and enforcement are associated with greater corporate valuation among the sample firms in common law countries, a result that is consistent with the claim that insider trading laws mitigate agency …

Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

I begin in Part II by explaining the wrong turn that the Court took in Basic. The Basic Court misunderstood the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages. As a result, the securities class action regime established in Basic threatens draconian sanctions with limited deterrent benefit. Part III then summarizes the cases leading up to Stoneridge and analyzes the Court's reasoning in that case. In Stoneridge, like the decisions interpreting the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 that came before it, the Court emphasized policy implications. Sometimes policy implications are invoked to broaden the reach …