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Corporate governance

Faculty Scholarship

International Law

Columbia Law School

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Kiobel And Corporate Immunity Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Struggle For Clarity Post-Sosa, Dorothy S. Lund Jan 2011

Kiobel And Corporate Immunity Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Struggle For Clarity Post-Sosa, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

In September 2010, a two-judge Second Circuit majority ruled that corporations are immune from liability under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”). This statute, which grants aliens access to federal district courts, has emerged as a controversial tool for international norm enforcement in the last thirty years. The unexpected decision to foreclose corporate liability has generated a wave of criticism from human rights activists and international law scholars who claim that the decision is grounded in a fundamental misunderstanding of international law.

This commentary examines the Kiobel decision against other recent interpretations of the ATS, especially those following the Supreme Court’s …


Racing Towards The Top?: The Impact Of Cross-Listing And Stock Market Competition On International Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2002

Racing Towards The Top?: The Impact Of Cross-Listing And Stock Market Competition On International Corporate Governance, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Cross-listing by foreign issuers onto U.S. exchanges accelerated during the 1990s, bringing international market centers into competition for listings and draining liquidity from some regional markets. Although cross-listing has traditionally been explained as an attempt to break down market segmentation and to increase investor recognition of the cross-listing firm, the globalization of financial markets and instantaneous electronic communications render these explanations increasingly dated. A superior explanation is "bonding": Issuers migrate to U.S. exchanges because by voluntarily subjecting themselves to the United States's higher disclosure standards and greater threat of enforcement (both by public and private enforcers), they partially compensate for …


"No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into The Problem Of Corporate Punishment, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 1981

"No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into The Problem Of Corporate Punishment, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?
Edward, First Baron Thurlow 1731-1806

The Lord Chancellor of England quoted above was neither the first nor the last judge to experience frustration when faced with a convicted corporation. American sentencing judges are likely to face a similar dilemma with increasing frequency in the near future, for a number of signs indicate that corporate prosecutions will become increasingly commonplace. At first glance, the problem of corporate punishment seems perversely insoluble: moderate fines do not deter, …