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Full-Text Articles in Law

The Separation Of Voting And Control: The Role Of Contract In Corporate Governance, Gabriel V. Rauterberg Jun 2021

The Separation Of Voting And Control: The Role Of Contract In Corporate Governance, Gabriel V. Rauterberg

Articles

The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting power. Whether a director is elected or a merger is approved depends on how shareholders vote. Yet, in private corporations shareholders routinely alter their rights by contract. This phenomenon of shareholder agreements—contracts among the owners of a firm— has received far less attention than it deserves, mainly because detailed data about the actual contents of shareholder agreements has been lacking. Private companies disclose little, and shareholder agreements are thought to play a trivial or nonexistent role in public companies. I show that this is ...


Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Ofer Eldar Aug 2020

Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Ofer Eldar

Articles

A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corpo- rations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Secur- ities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doc- trine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit ...


Golden Parachutes And The Limits Of Shareholder Value, Albert H. Choi, Andrew C.W. Lund, Robert Schonlau Jan 2020

Golden Parachutes And The Limits Of Shareholder Value, Albert H. Choi, Andrew C.W. Lund, Robert Schonlau

Articles

With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, Congress attempted to constrain change-in-control payments (also known as “golden parachutes”) by giving shareholders the right to approve or disapprove such payments on an advisory basis. This Essay is the first to empirically examine the experience with the Say-on-Golden-Parachute (“SOGP”) vote. We find that unlike shareholder votes on proposed mergers, there is a significant amount of variation with respect to votes on golden parachutes. Notwithstanding the variation, however, the SOGP voting regime is likely ineffective in controlling golden parachute (“GP”) compensation. First, proxy advisors seem ...


Piling On? An Empirical Study Of Parallel Derivative Suits, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, Adam C. Pritchard Nov 2017

Piling On? An Empirical Study Of Parallel Derivative Suits, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Using a sample of all companies named as defendants in securities class actions between July 1, 2005 and December 31, 2008, we study parallel suits relying on state corporate law arising out of the same allegations as the securities class actions. We test several ways that parallel suits may add value to a securities class action. Most parallel suits target cases involving obvious indicia of wrongdoing. Moreover, we find that although a modest percentage of parallel suits are filed first, over 80 percent are filed after a securities class action (termed “follow-on” parallel suits). We find that parallel suits and ...


China's 'Corporatization Without Privatization' And The Late 19th Century Roots Of A Stubborn Path Dependency, Nicholas Howson Oct 2017

China's 'Corporatization Without Privatization' And The Late 19th Century Roots Of A Stubborn Path Dependency, Nicholas Howson

Articles

This Article analyzes the contemporary program of “corporatization without privatization” in the People's Republic of China (PRC) directed at China's traditional state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through a consideration of long ago precursor enterprise establishments--starting from the last Chinese imperial dynasty's creation of “government-promoted/-supervised, merchant-financed/-operated” (guandu shangban) firms in the latter part of the nineteenth century. While analysts are tempted to see the PRC corporations with listings on international exchanges that dominate the global economy and capital markets as expressions of “convergence,” this Article argues that such firms in fact show deeply embedded aspects of path dependency ...


The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis Sep 2015

The Institutional Appetite For Quack Corporate Governance, Alicia J. Davis

Articles

This Article offers evidence that higher quality internal corporate governance is associated with higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. This finding is consistent with the idea that institutions have greater reason than individual investors to prefer well-governed firms, but surprising given the substantial empirical evidence that casts doubt on the efficacy of internal governance mechanisms. The study described in this Article also finds that higher quality external governance is associated with lower proportions of ownership by certain types of institutional investors, also a somewhat surprising result given available empirical evidence on the positive relationship between external governance and firm ...


Think Like A Businessperson: Using Business School Cases To Create Strategic Corporate Lawyers​., Alicia J. Davis Apr 2015

Think Like A Businessperson: Using Business School Cases To Create Strategic Corporate Lawyers​., Alicia J. Davis

Articles

For the past twenty-five years, my academic and professional pursuits have straddled the line between business and law. I majored in business administration in college and then worked as an analyst in the Corporate Finance department at a bulge bracket Wall Street firm. After completing a JD/MBA, I returned to investment banking with a focus on middle-market mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and subsequently practiced law with a focus on private equity and M&A. Finally, in 2004, I found my current home as a corporate law professor. In my courses, which include Mergers & Acquisitions, Enterprise Organization, and Investor ...


Concentrated Ownership And Corporate Control: Wallenberg Sphere And Samsung Group, Hwa-Jin Kim Jan 2014

Concentrated Ownership And Corporate Control: Wallenberg Sphere And Samsung Group, Hwa-Jin Kim

Articles

Samsung Group’s success cannot be attributed to its corporate governance structure, at least thus far. The corporate governance of Samsung has been rather controversial. As the group faces the succession issue the corporate governance has become as crucial as their new products and services. Samsung has discovered a role model on the other side of the planet, Wallenberg Sphere in Sweden. Much effort has been made to learn about Wallenberg’s arrangements and key to its success. However, a fundamental difference between the institutions in Sweden and Korea has made the corporate structures of the two groups radically different ...


'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson Jan 2014

'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatization ” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by all - encompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained intervention and makes a case — wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the United States — that ...


Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand Jan 2013

Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand

Articles

Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of insider trading laws (i.e., super-compliance). Thus, we aim to understand the determinants of firms’ private insider trading policies (ITPs), which are quasi-contractual devices. Based on the assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from restricting insider trading) ought to be more inclined than other firms to adopt more stringent ITPs, we develop several testable hypotheses. We test our hypotheses using data from a sample of firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard and ...


Pathway To Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions In The People's Republic Of China, Donald C. Clarke, Nicholas C. Howson Jan 2012

Pathway To Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions In The People's Republic Of China, Donald C. Clarke, Nicholas C. Howson

Book Chapters

Using a dataset of Chinese judicial opinions arising in over fifty cases, this paper analyses the development and current implementation of shareholder derivative actions in the courts of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), both before and after the derivative lawsuit was explicitly authorized in the PRC’s 2006 Company Law effective January 1, 2006. In addition, we describe the very unique ecology of enterprise organization and corporate governance in modern China, and critique the formal design of the derivative action and offer reform suggestions. We find the design of the Chinese derivative lawsuit to be, in some respects ...


The Development Of Modern Corporate Governance In China And India, Nicholas C. Howson, Vikramaditya S. Khanna Jan 2010

The Development Of Modern Corporate Governance In China And India, Nicholas C. Howson, Vikramaditya S. Khanna

Book Chapters

Corporate governance reform has become a topic of considerable debate both in the US and in many emerging markets. Indeed, the discussion is important because these reforms may have potentially long-standing effects upon the global allocation of capital, and in understanding the ways in which governance norms are communicated across markets and nations in an ever-globalizing world. In this chapter we examine the corporate governance reform efforts of the world's two biggest and fastest growing emerging markets, the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and India. In the process we find that our understanding of how and ...


When 'Good' Corporate Governance Makes 'Bad' (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis And The Limits Of Private Law, Nicholas C. Howson Jan 2009

When 'Good' Corporate Governance Makes 'Bad' (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis And The Limits Of Private Law, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, investors, analysts, legislators, and pundits have spotlighted “good” or “improved” corporate governance as a remedy for all that presently ails us. It is one remedy in a long wish list that includes tougher requirements for risk capital, liquidity, and leverage; compensation and bonus reform; reimposition ofthe Glass-Steagall-like separation of bank “utility” and “casino” functions; the downsizing or breakup of institutions deemed “too big to fail;” enhanced consumer protection; securities law liability for secondary violators (like credit rating agencies); direct taxation of proprietary trading; “macroprudential” regulation; and new transparency requirements ...


Monitoring Of Corporate Groups By Independent Directors, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2009

Monitoring Of Corporate Groups By Independent Directors, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Both the United States and Korea have reformed their corporate governance in recent years to put increasing responsibilities on independent directors. Independent directors have been found to be an important force protecting the interests of shareholders when it comes time to make certain highly salient decisions, such as firing a CEO or selling the company. This article compares the role of independent directors in the US and Korean systems. I argue that the US may have placed regulatory burdens on independent directors that they are unlikely to be able to satisfy, given their part-time status. By contrast, in the chaebol ...


Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2008

Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

I begin in Part II by explaining the wrong turn that the Court took in Basic. The Basic Court misunderstood the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages. As a result, the securities class action regime established in Basic threatens draconian sanctions with limited deterrent benefit. Part III then summarizes the cases leading up to Stoneridge and analyzes the Court's reasoning in that case. In Stoneridge, like the decisions interpreting the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 that came before it, the Court emphasized policy implications. Sometimes policy implications are invoked to broaden the ...


Tender Offers By Controlling Shareholders: The Specter Of Coercion And Fair Price, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2004

Tender Offers By Controlling Shareholders: The Specter Of Coercion And Fair Price, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Taking your company private has never been so appealing. The collapse of the tech bubble has left many companies whose stock prices bordered on the stratospheric now trading at small fractions of their historical highs. The spate of accounting scandals that followed the bursting of the bubble has taken some of the shine off the aura of being a public company-the glare of the spotlight from stock analysts and the business press looks much less inviting, notwithstanding the monitoring benefits that the spotlight purports to confer. Moreover, the regulatory backlash against those accounting scandals has made the costs of being ...


Too Busy To Mind The Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2003

Too Busy To Mind The Business? Monitoring By Directors With Multiple Board Appointments, Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

We examine the number of external appointments held by corporate directors. Directors who serve larger firms and sit on larger boards are more likely to attract directorships. Consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983), we find that firm performance has a positive effect on the number of appointments held by a director. We find no evidence that multiple directors shirk their responsibilities to serve on board committees. We do not find that multiple directors are associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud litigation. We conclude that the evidence does not support calls for limits on directorships held by an individual.


Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2003

Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have ...


A Property Theory Perspective On Russian Enterprise Reform, Michael Heller Jan 2001

A Property Theory Perspective On Russian Enterprise Reform, Michael Heller

Book Chapters

Why have Russian enterprises performed so poorly since privatization? This is a problem with many answers, each independently sufficient: the bleak mix includes vacillating macroeconomic policy, endemic corruption, a corrosive tax structure, poor human capital, and so forth. Even well-performing companies must hide good results because visible profits or dividends provoke confiscatory taxation and mafia visits. In such a difficult environment, the rule of law generally, and corporate governance in particular, may seem not to count. Macroeconomic implosions dwarf subtle distinctions in corporate dividend rules or minority voting rights.


Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian Enterprise Fiascos, Merritt B. Fox, Michael A. Heller Jan 2000

Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian Enterprise Fiascos, Merritt B. Fox, Michael A. Heller

Articles

This Article draws on a rich array of deviant behavior in Russian enterprises to craft lessons for corporate governance theory. First, Professors Fox and Heller define corporate governance by looking to the economic functions of the firm. Based on this definition, they develop a typology that comprehensively shows all the channels through which bad corporate governance can inflict damage on a country's real economy. Second, they explain the causes of Russian enterprise fiascoes by looking to the particular initial conditions prevailing at privatization-untenable firm boundaries and insider allocation of firm shares-and the bargaining dynamics that have followed. This focus ...


How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages Of Economics And Of Citizenship, James Boyd White Jan 1985

How Should We Talk About Corporations? The Languages Of Economics And Of Citizenship, James Boyd White

Articles

My immediate subject in this Comment is section 2.01 of the American Law Institute's proposed Principles of Corporate Governance (Tentative Draft No. 2), which defines in general terms the proper objectives and conduct of a business corporation. My larger subject has to do with the adequacy and inadequacy of various languages in which corporate pur­poses and limits might be expressed, and especially with the limits of the economic language used in the ALI Draft.


Corporations And Express Trusts As Business Organizations, Horace Lafayette Wilgus Jan 1914

Corporations And Express Trusts As Business Organizations, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

PRESIDENT BUTLER of Columbia University is reported to have said in an address before the New York Chamber of Commerce in 1911, that "the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modem times, whether you judge it by its social, by its ethical, by its industrial, or, in the long run--after we understand it and know how to use it,--by its political, effects." 1


Right Of Joint Adventurers Holding All The Stock Of A Corporation To A Dissolution And Accounting In Equity, Horace Lafayette Wilgus Jan 1910

Right Of Joint Adventurers Holding All The Stock Of A Corporation To A Dissolution And Accounting In Equity, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

The case of Jackson v. Hooper, in the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, decided February 28, 1910, by Judge DILL, (42 N. Y. Law Journal, March 8, 1910), overruling Vice Chancellor HOWELL, of the Court of Chancery (74 AtL. 130) presents interesting and unusual points in corporation and partnership law, and the jurisdiction of courts of equity over corporate affairs.