Law Commons^™

Dynamic Disclosure: An Exposé On The Mythical Divide Between Voluntary And Mandatory Esg Disclosure, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

In March 2022, for the first time in its history, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed rules mandating disclosure related to climate change. The proposed rules are remarkable because heretofore many in the business community, including the SEC, vehemently resisted climate-related disclosure, based primarily on the argument that such disclosure is not material to investors. This resistance is exemplified by the current lack of any SEC disclosure mandates for climate change. The proposed rules have sparked considerable pushback including allegations that the rules violate the First Amendment, would be too costly, and focus on “social” or “political” issues …

A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman

Faculty Scholarship

Constant cyber threats result in: intellectual property loss; data disruption; ransomware attacks; theft of valuable company intellectual property and sensitive customer information. During March 2022, The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule addressing Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, which requires: 1. Current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents; 2. Periodic disclosures about a registrant’s policies and procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks; 3. Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures; 4. Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its oversight of cybersecurity risk; 5. Registrants to provide updates about previously reported cybersecurity …

The Corporate Forum, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Christina M. Sautter

Faculty Works

In this response to Professor Jill Fisch’s article "GameStop and the Reemergence of the Retail Investor," we focus on one of the risks associated with the growth of retail investing that Fisch surveys, uncontrolled information sourcing. Drawing on our work on retail investors, we revisit an instrument dear to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, whose potential has not been unleashed so far, the corporate forum. Our response succinctly discusses the main mechanics of the corporate forum, the benefits the corporate forum could provide, and the feasibility hurdles that might undermine the success of corporate forums.

Purpose Proposals, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

Repurposing the corporation is the hot issue in corporate governance. Commentators, investors and increasingly issuers, maintain that corporations should shift their focus from maximizing profits for shareholders to generating value for a more expansive group of stakeholders. Corporations are also being called upon to address societal concerns – from climate change and voting rights to racial justice and wealth inequality.

The shareholder proposal rule, Rule 14a–8, offers one potential tool for repurposing the corporation. This Article describes the introduction of innovative proposals seeking to formalize corporate commitments to stakeholder governance. These “purpose proposals” reflect a new dynamic in the debate …

Board Committee Charters And Esg Accountability, Lisa Fairfax

All Faculty Scholarship

We are currently witnessing a sharp increase in corporate attention on environmental, sustainability, and governance (“ESG”). The steep rise in corporate focus on ESG has prompted considerable criticism, not only from those concerned about how best to ensure that corporations are held accountable for their ESG commitments, but also from those who strenuously insist that corporate commitment to ESG is merely rhetorical or otherwise merely a passing fad. In an effort to shed light on the concerns around ESG accountability, and gain perspective about the potential illusory or short-term nature of ESG, I conducted my own survey of the committee …

Initial Public Offering And Optimal Corporate Governance, Albert H. Choi

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper examines the long-standing debate over whether firms have a market-based incentive to adopt optimal governance provisions at their initial public offering (IPO). Various scholars and practitioners have argued that firms that offer stock to the public with suboptimal governance structure will be penalized by the market through a lower IPO price. At the same time, others have documented empirical evidence that many IPO firms have putatively suboptimal governance provisions, such as anti-takeover provisions and dual class structure, and many, especially those with dual-class structure, enjoy a market premium at their IPO. This paper attempts to bridge this gap. …

The Educated Retail Investor: A Response To "Regulating Democratized Investing", Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Christina M. Sautter

Faculty Works

The diffusion of mobile-first investing apps, like Robinhood, has increased retail investor participation in financial markets, particularly from the Millennial and GenZ generations, and has increased the diversity of retail investors. However, mobile-first investing apps are not free from controversy. In Regulating Democratized Investing, Abraham Cable tackles the debate on regulating mobile-first investing apps and largely opposes paternalistic regulation, which would raise unsurmountable barriers at the entrance of the stock market for retail investors. But it concedes to a form of regulation that in Cable’s own words “serves ultra-retail investors a modest portion of what they really want.” We strongly …

The Wireless Investors Movement, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Christina M. Sautter

Faculty Works

The inaugural guest academic article for the University of Chicago Business Law Review Blog discusses how Millennial and GenZ investors can set in motion a social movement with disruptive effects on the current corporate governance paradigm. It refers to Millennial and GenZ investors as “wireless investors” and their social movement as the “Wireless Investors Movement.” The Wireless Investors Movement, fueled by wireless investors’ vision of the world and technology savviness, will bring corporations to pursue social and environmental causes. This short contribution analyzes the characteristics of the Wireless Investors Movement and the effects it will have on corporate governance.

The Long-Term Effects Of Short Selling And Negative Activism, Peter Molk, Frank Partnoy

UF Law Faculty Publications

We investigate the long-term effects of short selling and “negative activism,” where activists seek to profit from declines in the share prices of targeted firms. We show that negative activism is associated with significant and declining long-term share returns and operating performance, as well as an increase in securities litigation and regulatory actions against targeted firms. We explore the policy implications of this new evidence, including ways that policy makers and market participants might take advantage of the potential benefits of short selling negative activism. Our message is straightforward: resist impulses to curb short selling, and instead embrace attempts to …

Asset Managers As Regulators, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional view of regulation is that it exists to constrain corporate activity that harms the public. But amid perceptions of government failure, many now call on corporations to tackle social problems themselves. And in this moment of dissatisfaction with government, powerful asset managers have stepped in to serve as regulators of last resort, adopting rules that bind corporate America on issues of great social importance, including climate change and workplace diversity. This Article describes this dynamic — where shareholders have become regulators — which has been made possible by the rise of institutional shareholding (and index investing in particular) …

Shifting Influences On Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness And Policy Channeling, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate governance scholarship is typically portrayed as driven by single factor models, for example, shareholder value maximization, director primacy or team production. These governance models are Copernican; one factor is or should be the center of the corporate governance solar system. In this essay, we argue that, as with binary stars, the shape of the governance system is at any time the result of the interaction of two central influences, which we refer to as capital market completeness and policy channeling. In contrast to single factor models, which reflect a stable normative statement of what should drive corporate governance, in …