Law Commons^™

Duality In Contract And Tort, Tim Friehe, Joshua C. Teitelbaum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We study situations in which a single investment serves the dual role of increasing the expected value of a contract (a reliance investment) and reducing the expected harm of a post-performance accident (a care investment). We show that failing to account for the duality of the investment leads to inefficient damages for breach of contract and inefficient standards for due care in tort. Conversely, we show that accounting for the duality yields contract damage measures and tort liability rules that provide correct incentives for efficient breach and reliance in contract and for efficient care in tort.

Formalism In Contract Exposition, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Formalism in contract law has had many defenders and many critics. What lawmakers need, however, is an account of when formalist approaches work and when they do not. This article addresses that need by providing general theory of the rules of contract interpretation and construction and identifying several ways those rules can be more or less formalist. The theory draws from legal philosophy, the philosophy of language, economic contracts scholarship, and caselaw.

The result is a distinction between two forms of formalism in contract law. Formalities effect legal change by virtue of their form alone, thereby obviating interpretation. Examples from …

Convergence By Design: Who Contracts And The Plural Purposes Of Contract Law, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A theory is robustly pluralist if it maintains that law is justified by multiple independent nonordered principles. Some have argued that robustly pluralist theories are deficient because they can provide no practical guidance when those principles conflict. The objection is misplaced when applied to pluralist theories of contract law.

This article demonstrates the possibility of a robustly pluralist and practically relevant theory of contract law by modeling a multipurpose law of contract. Five simple models are constructed to illustrate several purposes a contract law might serve, depending on preferences of the populace (self-interested utility maximizers, a preference for sharing, a …

How To Interpret A Vending Machine: Smart Contracts And Contract Law, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A smart contract is software designed to do the job of a legal contract: ensuring the performance of parties who might not otherwise trust one another to do so. By running a smart contract on blockchain, users can lock themselves into future performances without relying on a third-party enforcer or platform host, thereby realizing a “fully trustless” exchange. This new technology has wide range of potential applications, and contracts are likely to become an increasingly common part of the economy.

Some have argued that smart contracts represent a new type of legal contract, analogizing the software’s code to a contractual …

Efficient Breach, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The theory of efficient breach is the best known, and the most controversial, product of nearly half a century of economic analysis of contract law. In its simplest form, which is the one that dominates the legal imagination, the theory argues that expectation damages are good because they allow, even encourage, a party to breach when performance becomes inefficient, thereby increasing social welfare. Many noneconomists assume the theory is well supported by principles of neoclassical economics. Thus critics commonly focus on the theory’s moral failings, or on problems with the neoclassical approach more generally. But today no economic thinker defends …

Interpretation And Construction In Altering Rules, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay is a response to Ian Ayres's, "Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules," 121 Yale L.J. 2032 (2012). Ayres identifies an important question: How does the law decide when parties have opted-out of a contractual default? Unfortunately, his article tells only half of the story about such altering rules. Ayres cares about rules designed to instruct parties on how to get the terms that they want. By focusing on such rules he ignores altering rules designed instead to interpret the nonlegal meaning of the parties' acts or agreement. This limited vision is characteristic of economic approaches to …

Promise Etc., Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This Article examines the moral obligations contractual agreements generate. It distinguishes a narrow sense of "promise," central to autonomy theories, according to which to promise is to communicate an intention to undertake an obligation by the very communication of that intention. Not every agreement involves promises in this sense. Yet nonpromissory agreements too commonly generate moral obligations. And even when a party promises to perform, her promise need not be the only reason for her moral obligation to do so. Other possible reasons include reliance, an invitation to trust, implicit or explicit, principles of reciprocity, and the harm that nonperformance …

To Perform Or Pay Damages, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz argue that contractual promises between sophisticated parties are best interpreted as disjunctive promises to perform or pay damages. They further argue that this dual performance hypothesis answers moral critics of the expectation remedy. This comment makes three claims about Markovits and Schwartz's argument. First, although the dual performance hypothesis is supported by Markovits and Schwartz's instrumentalist model, they do not have a good argument that it is empirically correct -- that it is the best interpretation of what sophisticated parties actually intend. …

Implied Certification Under The False Claims Act, Gregory Klass, Michael Holt

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The False Claims Act prohibits fraud by government contractors, including a contractor's false certification of compliance with the contract, statutes or regulations. In the early 1990s, some courts began holding that the act of requesting payment from the government implicitly represents such compliance for the purposes the FCA. Circuits are today split on the implied certification doctrine. This Article provides a theory of implied certification, suggests how the circuit split should be resolved and describes how contracting agencies should write contracts in light of the existing rule. There are good reasons for the implied certification rule: it is an information-forcing …

Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In the 1980s, Charles Fried was right to focus on what was missing from both the “death of contract” and “law and economics” approaches to contract law: the internal morality of contract. But he focused on the wrong morality. Rather than embodying the morality of promise-keeping, the enforcement of contracts can best be explained and justified as a product of the parties’ consent to be legally bound. In this essay, I observe that, in Contract as Promise, Fried himself admits that the “promise principle” cannot explain or justify two features that are at the core of contract law: the objective …

Intent To Contract, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is a remarkable difference between black-letter contract laws of the United States and England. In England, the existence of a contract is supposedly conditioned on the parties' intent to be legally bound, while section 21 of the Second Restatement of Contracts states that "[n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract." There are also differences within U.S. law on the issue. While section 21 describes courts' approach to most contracts, the parties' intent to contact can be a condition of validity of preliminary agreements, domestic agreements and social …

A Conditional Intent To Perform, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor’s conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor’s intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform.

Building on Michael Bratman’s planning theory of intentions, this article provides a theoretical account of the distinction between “foreground” and “background” conditions on intentions in general and then explains why foreground conditions …

Three Pictures Of Contract: Duty, Power And Compound Rule, Gregory Klass

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A fundamental divide among theories of contract law is between those that picture contract as a power and those that picture it as a duty. On the power-conferring picture, contracting is a sort of legislative act, in which persons determine what law will apply to their transaction. On the duty-imposing picture, contract law puts duties on persons entering into agreements for consideration whether they want them or not. Until now, very little attention has been paid to the problem of how to tell whether a given rule is power conferring or duty imposing -- a question that should lie at …