Law Commons^™

Common Capital: A Thought Experiment In Cross-Border Resolution, Anna Gelpern

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Cross-border bank resolution efforts focus on burden-sharing between bank owners, private creditors and the public. There is little talk of burden-sharing among governments, despite the rich history of governments trying to stick one another with the cost of financial conglomerate failures. There is an unspoken fear that acknowledging the need to allocate losses among governments would undermine post-crisis pledges of No More Bailouts. This symposium essay argues for making government stakes in private financial firms more transparent, and for using the contingent public share as a key to loss allocation among governments in cross-border banking crises.

Baltimore After The War Of 1812: Where Robert Mills Met His Waterloo And When James A. Buchanan Broke The Bank, Garrett Power

Faculty Scholarship

In 1815 Baltimore City was boom town. Its militiamen had repulsed the British sea invasion and presaged an end to the War of 1812. Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815 signaled an end to European wars. Freedom of the seas had been restored. The Baltimore “Clipper” was the best sailing ship on the ocean. Baltimore looked to become the country’s leading exporter of grain, flour, and tobacco. Merchant James A. Buchanan, a partner in one of the country’s greatest shipping firms, had been named President of the Baltimore Branch of the Second National Bank of the United States. Civic leaders …

Of Hungry Wolves And Horizontal Conflicts: Rethinking The Justifications For Bank Holding Company Liability, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

To what extent should bank holding companies bear the costs of bank failure? Current banking law provides a number of ways to impose liability on bank holding companies for bank failure. Those devices, however, have developed haphazardly and sometimes rest on inconsistent theoretical foundations. This Article critiques the regulatory justifications that have been offered for holding company liability and offers an alternative justification for imposing liability on holding companies based on the idea that directors of bank subsidiaries suffer from an especially difficult form of horizontal conflict--the situation where the board of directors owes several different duties and chooses to …

Why D’Oench, Duhme? An Economic, Legal, And Philosophical Critique Of A Failed Bank Policy, Richard E. Flint

Faculty Articles

In 1942, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case of D’Oench, Duhme, & Co. c. FDIC. This decision established an equitable estoppel under the umbrella of federal common law to protect the insurance fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from secret agreements between borrowers and banks which misrepresented the value of a bank’s assets.

In the last fifty years, the D’Oench doctrine has been greatly expanded by the courts, and its purported legislative counterpart, 12 U.S.C. Section 1823(e) has enjoyed similar expansion. More recently, courts have even created a fiction by holding that the FDIC …