Law Commons^™

A Reputational View Of Antitrust’S Consumer Welfare Standard, Murat C. Mungan, John M. Yun

Faculty Scholarship

A reform movement is underway in antitrust. Citing prior enforcement failures, deviations from the original intent of the antitrust laws, and overall rising levels of sector concentration, some are seeking to fundamentally alter or altogether replace the current consumer welfare standard, which has guided courts over the past fifty years. This policy push has sparked an intense debate over the best approach to antitrust law enforcement. In this Article, we examine a previously unexplored potential social cost from moving away from the consumer welfare standard: a loss in the information value to the public from a finding of liability. A …

Brandeisian Banking, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

Banking law shapes the structure of the banking system, which in turn shapes the structure of the economy. One of the most significant ways that banking law in the United States traditionally sought to promote Brandeisian values of stability and decentralization was through a combination of carrots and sticks that enabled small banks across the country to thrive. To see this requires a richer understanding of Brandeis as someone who valued not just atomistic competition but also small business and broad flourishing. It also requires a deeper understanding of the ways different parts of banking law worked together during the …

Antitrust For Dominant Digital Platforms: An Alternative To The Monopoly Power Standard To Restore Competition, Jordan Ramsey

Senior Honors Theses

Antitrust law is meant to promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive business practices such as mergers and acquisitions as well as exclusionary conduct. Judicial interpretation of antitrust law has allowed dominant digital platforms to undertake anticompetitive actions without prosecution. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be amended to remove the monopoly power standard that allows firms to engage in anticompetitive conduct as long as the conduct does not create or uphold monopoly power. The amendment would make anticompetitive conduct illegal regardless of monopoly power, as long as six proof requirements are met. This would result in lessened market concentration, which would benefit …

The Constitutional Moment That Wasn't: 1912-1914 And The Meaning Of The Sherman Act, Alan J. Meese

Popular Media

No abstract provided.

Antitrust Antitextualism, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Judges and scholars frequently describe antitrust as a common-law system predicated on open-textured statutes, but that description fails to capture a historically persistent phenomenon:judicial disregard of the plain meaning of the statutory texts and manifest purposes of Congress. This pattern of judicial nullification is not evenly distributed: when the courts have deviated from the plain meaning or congressional purpose, they have uniformly done so to limit the reach of antitrust liability or curtail the labor exemption to the benefit of industrial interests. This phenomenon cannot be explained solely or even primarily as a tug-of-war between a progressive Congress and conservative …

Do Legal Origins Predict Legal Substance?, Anu Bradford, Yun-Chien Chang, Adam S. Chilton, Nuno Garoupa

Faculty Scholarship

There is a large body of research in economics and law suggesting that the legal origin of a country – that is, whether its legal regime is based on English common law or French, German, or Nordic civil law – profoundly impacts a range of outcomes. However, the exact relationship between legal origin and legal substance has been disputed in the literature and not fully explored with nuanced legal coding. We revisit this debate while leveraging novel cross-country data sets that provide detailed coding of two areas of laws: property and antitrust. We find that having shared legal origins strongly …

Behavioral Lessons For Antitrust Enforcement, Avishalom Tor

Faculty Lectures and Presentations

These are lecture slides to accompany a virtual lecture.

Avishalom Tor, professor and director of the Research Program on Law and Market Behavior at Notre Dame Law School, delivered this lecture to lawyers and economists of the Department of Justice’s antitrust division in Washington D.C. and throughout the country in the summer of 2020.

The lecture provides a systematic review of the lessons empirical behavioral findings offer to antitrust law, enforcement, and policy. Professor Tor introduces key findings of behavioral antitrust and explores their implications for doctrine and enforcement across the field, in areas ranging from horizontal restraints, through …

The Curse Of Bigness: New Deal Supplement, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

This is a supplement to the book, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age. It covers the years between 1920 - 1945, with a focus on the New Deal, and represents material left out of the original book.

It is meant to be read together with the larger volume, but can also be read separately.

Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …

Analyzing Vertical Mergers To Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article analyzes three recent vertical mergers: a private antitrust case attacking the consummated merger of Jeld-Wen and Craftmaster Manufacturing Inc. (“CMI”) that was cleared by the DOJ in 2012 but subsequently litigated and won by the plaintiff, Steves & Sons in 2018; and two recent vertical merger matters investigated and cleared (with limited remedies) by 3-2 votes by the Federal Trade Commission in early 2019 -- Staples/Essendant and Fresenius/NxStage. There are some factual parallels among these three matters that make it interesting to analyze them together. First, the DOJ’s decision to clear Jeld-Wen/CMI merger appears to be a clear …

A Knowledge Theory Of Tacit Agreement, Wentong Zheng

UF Law Faculty Publications

A persistent puzzle in antitrust law is whether and when an unlawful agreement could arise from conduct or verbalized communications that fall short of an explicit agreement. While courts have found such tacit agreements to exist in idiosyncratic scenarios, they have failed to articulate a clear and consistent logic for such findings. This Article attempts to fill this gap by proposing a unified theory of tacit agreement. It defines a tacit agreement as an agreement formed by non-explicit communications that enable the alleged coconspirators to have constructive knowledge of one another's conspiratory intent. This approach to tacit agreement is more …

Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Nancy Rose, Steven Salop, Fiona Scott Morton

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …

Antitrust And Democracy, Spencer Weber Waller

Faculty Publications & Other Works

Our solution of the anti-monopoly problems must be in terms of our ideals-- the ideals of political and economic democracy. We want no economic or political dictatorship imposed upon us either by the government or by big business. We want no system of detailed regulation of prices by the government nor price fixing by private interests. We do not want bureaucracy or regimentation of any kind, but we will prefer governmental to private bureaucracy and regimentation, if we have to make such a choice. We cannot permit private corporations to be private governments. We must keep our economic system under …

The Blue Devil's In The Details: How A Free Market Approach To Compensating College Athletes Would Work, David A. Grenardo

Faculty Articles

Everyone involved in the business of major college athletics, except the athletes, receives compensation based on a free market system. The National Collegiate Athletic Association's (NCAA) cap on athlete compensation violates antitrust law, and athletes should be allowed to earn their free market value as everyone else does in this country. This Article provides a detailed approach to compensating college athletes under a free market model, which includes a salary cap, the terms of a proposed standard player 's contract, a discussion of who can represent players, and payment simulations for football and basketball teams. A free market approach would …

Trade Openness And Antitrust Law, Anu Bradford, Adam S. Chilton

Faculty Scholarship

Openness to international trade and adoption of antitrust laws can both curb anti-competitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship between the two. Some argue that greater trade openness makes antitrust unnecessary, while others contend that antitrust laws are still needed to realize the benefits of trade liberalization. Data limitations have made this debate largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and antitrust empirically using new data on antitrust laws and enforcement activities. We find that trade openness and stringency of antitrust laws are positively correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears …

Five Principles For Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy, Jonathan Baker, Steven Salop, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Nancy Rose

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

There seems to be consensus that the Department of Justice’s 1984 Vertical Merger Guidelines do not reflect either modern theoretical and empirical economic analysis or current agency enforcement policy. Yet widely divergent views of preferred enforcement policies have been expressed among agency enforcers and commentators. Based on our review of the relevant economic literature and our experience analyzing vertical mergers, we recommend that the enforcement agencies adopt five principles: (i) The agencies should consider and investigate the full range of potential anticompetitive harms when evaluating vertical mergers; (ii) The agencies should decline to presume that vertical mergers benefit competition on …

Antitrust In Digital Markets, John M. Newman

Articles

Antitrust law has largely failed to address the challenges posed by digital markets. At the turn of the millennium, the antitrust enterprise engaged in intense debate over whether antitrust doctrine, much of it developed during a bygone era of smokestack industries, could or should evolve to address digital markets. Eventually, a consensus emerged: although the basic doctrine is supple enough to apply to new technologies, courts and enforcers should adopt a defendant-friendly, hands-off approach.

But this pro-defendant position is deeply- and dangerously- flawed. Economic theory, empirical research, and extant judicial and regulatory authority all contradict the prevailing views regarding power, …

Procompetitive Justifications In Antitrust Law, John M. Newman

Articles

The Rule of Reason, which has come to dominate modern antitrust law, allows defendants the opportunity to justify their conduct by demonstrating procompetitive effects. Seizing the opportunity, defendants have begun offering increasingly numerous and creative explanations for their behavior.

But which of these myriad justifications are valid? To leading jurists and scholars, this has remained an "open question," even an "absolute mystery." Examination of the relevant case law reveals multiple competing approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions. The ongoing lack of clarity in this area is inexcusable: procompetitive-justification analysis is vital to a properly functioning antitrust enterprise.

This Article provides answers …

The At&T/Time Warner Merger: How Judge Leon Garbled Professor Nash, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The US District Court in the AT&T/Time Warner vertical merger case has issued its opinion permitting the merger. At of this writing in August 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has appealed to the DC Circuit and filed its brief, as have several Amici. I was disappointed that the DOJ was unable to prove its case to the satisfaction of Judge Leon, the trial judge. Notwithstanding the court’s confidence that the merger is procompetitive, I remain concerned that it will have anti- competitive effects, both on its own and following the subsequent vertical mergers in the TV industry, which this …

Amazon – An Infrastructure Service And Its Challenge To Current Antitrust Law, Lina M. Khan

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter maps out facets of Amazon’s power. In particular, it traces the sources of Amazon’s growth and analyzes the potential effects of its dominance. Doing so enables us to make sense of the company’s business strategy and illuminates anticompetitive aspects of its structure and conduct. This analysis reveals that the current framework in antitrust — specifically its equating competition with “consumer welfare,” typically measured through short- term effects on price and output — fails to capture the architecture of market power in the 21st- century marketplace. In other words, the potential harms to competition posed by Amazon’s dominance are …

The “Protection Of The Competitive Process” Standard, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

The antitrust law should return to a standard more realistic and suited to the legal system – the “protection of the competitive process.” It posits a basic question for law enforcement and judges. Given complained-of conduct, is that conduct actually part of the competitive process, or is it a sufficient deviation as to be unlawful? In this view, antitrust law aims to create a body of common-law rules that punish and therefore deter such disruptions – hence “protecting the competitive process.”

After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The "Protection Of Competition" Standard In Practice, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

The consumer welfare standard in antitrust has been heavily criticized. But would, in fact, abandoning the “consumer welfare” standard make the antitrust law too unworkable and indeterminate?

I argue that there is such a thing as a post-consumer welfare antitrust that is practicable and arguably as predictable as the consumer welfare standard. In practice, the consumer welfare standard has not set a high bar. The leading alternative standard, the “protection of competition” is at least as predictable, and arguably more determinate than the exceeding abstract abstract consumer welfare test, while being much truer the legislative intent underlying the antitrust laws. …

The Antitrust Jurisprudence Of Neil Gorsuch, John M. Newman

Articles

In 2017, the U.S. Senate confirmed Neil M. Gorsuch's nomination to serve on the Supreme Court. Like Justice Stevens before him, Gorsuch's primary area of expertise is antitrust law. Like Stevens, Gorsuch both practiced and taught in the field before joining the bench. As a judge for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Gorsuch penned multiple substantive antitrust opinions.

His unique expertise will likely situate Gorsuch as one of the Court's leading voices on antitrust matters for decades to come. A close examination of his prior antitrust opinions thus offers vital insight into his approach to antitrust principles and execution. …

Amateurism And The Ncaa: How A Changing Market Has Turned Caps On Athletic Scholarships Into An Antitrust Violation, Daniel Laws

Law Student Publications

The college athletics industry is worth $16 billion, and it only continues to grow as the number of collegiate students and student-athletes increases. The governing body of collegiate athletics, the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), prides itself on the amateur status of its athletes. To preserve its athletes' amateurism, the NCAA mandates that its member institutions agree not to compensate student-athletes with athletic scholarships that are above the university's cost of attendance. Typically, this type of horizontal agreement- one between competitors that artificially caps the amount a worker can earn violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act as an unreasonable …

Constraining Monitors, Veronica Root

Journal Articles

Monitors oversee remediation efforts at dozens, if not hundreds, of institutions that are guilty of misconduct. The remediation efforts that the monitors of today engage in are, in many instances, quite similar to activities that were once subject to formal court oversight. But as the importance and power of monitors has increased, the court’s oversight of monitors and the agreements that most often result in monitorships has, at best, been severely diminished and, at worst, vanished altogether.

The lack of regulation governing monitors is well documented; yet, the academic literature on monitorships to date has largely taken the state of …

Sharing Economy Meets The Sherman Act: Is Uber A Firm, A Cartel, Or Something In Between?, Mark Anderson

Articles

The sharing economy is a new industrial structure that is made possible by instantaneous internet communication and changes in the life, work, and purchasing habits of individual entrepreneurs and consumers. Antitrust law is an economic regulatory scheme dating back to 1890 in the United States that is designed to address centrally controlled concentrations of economic power and the threats that those concentrations pose to consumer interests and economic efficiency. In order to accommodate a modern enterprise structure in which thousands or millions of independent contractors join forces to provide a service by agreement among themselves, antitrust law requires re-envisioning and …

Scalia And Antitrust, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Ask almost anyone in Massachusetts, or in any other predominantly liberal American state, what they think about Justice Antonin Scalia, and you are bound to hear comments, not a few of them derisory, about original intent as an approach to constitutional law. This was true long before his death on February 13, 2016, and is still true today. The theory of originalism, the notion that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers, had become so closely associated with Scalia that the man had become the living embodiment of the theory.

Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Applications, John M. Newman

Articles

"Free" products have exploded in popularity along with widespread Internet adoption-but many of them are not truly free. Customers often trade their attention or personal information to access zero-price products. This exchange dynamic brings zero-price markets within the scope of antitrust law. But despite the critical role that such markets now play in modern economies, the antitrust enterprise has largely failed to account for their unique attributes.

In response, this Article undertakes two primary tasks. The first is to address particular areas of current antitrust doctrine that require revision or reinterpretation in the face of zero prices. Topics addressed include …

The Evolution And Vitality Of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article reviews the formulation and evolution of the Philadelphia National Bank anticompetitive presumption through the lens of decision theory and Bayes Law. It explains how the economic theory, empirical evidence and experience are used to determine a presumption and how that presumption interacts with the reliability of relevant evidence to rationally set the appropriate burden of production and burden of persuasion to rebut the presumption. The article applies this reasoning to merger presumptions. It also sketches out a number of non-market share structural factors that might be used to supplement or replace the current legal and enforcement presumptions for …

Trending@Rwu Law: Professor Carl Bogus's Post: When Corporations Grow Too Powerful: Reviving An Old Debate, Carl Bogus

Law School Blogs

No abstract provided.