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Full-Text Articles in Law
In Re Endochoice Holdings Inc. Order Preliminarily Approving Class Action Settlement And Providing For Issuance Of Notice, Elizabeth E. Long
In Re Endochoice Holdings Inc. Order Preliminarily Approving Class Action Settlement And Providing For Issuance Of Notice, Elizabeth E. Long
Georgia Business Court Opinions
No abstract provided.
The Guardian Trustee In Bankruptcy Courts And Beyond, Lindsey Simon
The Guardian Trustee In Bankruptcy Courts And Beyond, Lindsey Simon
Scholarly Works
Litigation systems create dangers of unfairness. Citizens worry, and should worry, about exploitive settlements in aggregate litigation, potential biases in administrative proceedings, and troubling power imbalances in criminal trials. Public confidence in adjudicative processes has eroded to an all-time low. This Article explores the untapped potential of adding independent watchdog entities to address systemic threats to the integrity of government decisionmaking. These entities, which I call “guardian trustees,” do not fit within the traditional framework of our adversary system. Though guardian trustees already operate in bankruptcy proceedings, they have thus far received little attention in scholarly literature. This Article begins …
Cutting Class Action Agency Costs: Lessons From The Public Company, Amanda M. Rose
Cutting Class Action Agency Costs: Lessons From The Public Company, Amanda M. Rose
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The agency relationship between class counsel and class members in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions is similar to that between executives and shareholders in U.S. public companies. This similarity has often been noted in class action literature, but until this Article no attempt has been made to systematically compare the approaches taken in these two settings to reduce agency costs. Class action scholars have downplayed the importance of the public company analogy because public companies are subject to market discipline and class actions are not. But this is precisely why the analogy is useful: because public companies are subject to market …