Law Commons^™

Apple V. Pepper: Rationalizing Antitrust’S Indirect Purchaser Rule, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In Apple v. Pepper the Supreme Court held that consumers who allegedly paid too much for apps sold on Apple’s iStore could sue Apple for antitrust damages because they were “direct purchasers.” The decision reflects some bizarre complexities that have resulted from the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Illinois Brick, which held that only direct purchasers could sue for overcharge injuries under the federal antitrust laws. The indirect purchaser rule was problematic from the beginning. First, it was plainly inconsistent with the antitrust damages statute, which gives an action to “any person who shall be injured in his business …

Standing For Nothing, Robert Mikos

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

A growing number of courts and commentators have suggested that states have Article III standing to protect state law. Proponents of such "protective" standing argue that states must be given access to federal court whenever their laws are threatened. Absent such access, they claim, many state laws might prove toothless, thereby undermining the value of the states in our federal system. Furthermore, proponents insist that this form of special solicitude is very limited-that it opens the doors to the federal courthouses a crack but does not swing them wide open. This Essay, however, contests both of these claims, and thus, …

An Organizational Account Of State Standing, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

Again and again in regard to recent high-profile disputes, the legal community has tied itself in knots over questions about when state plaintiffs should have standing to sue in federal court, especially in cases where they seek to sue federal-government defendants. Lawsuits challenging everything from the Bush administration’s environmental policies to the Obama administration’s immigration actions to the Trump administration’s travel bans have become mired in tricky and technical questions about whether state plaintiffs belonged in federal court.

Should state standing cause so much controversy and confusion? This Essay argues that state plaintiffs are far more like at least one …

Forward: Some Puzzles Of State Standing, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

When should states have standing? In recent years, there has been an explosion in literature on that question.1 Yet, even today, there seem to be as many questions as answers. In this Foreword to the Notre Dame Law Review’s 2019 Federal Courts, Practice, and Procedure Symposium on state standing, I discuss a few such puzzles. First, should states have “special” standing when they sue the federal government—that is, greater access to federal court than private parties? Second, and conversely, should states have at least “equal” access to federal court, or should they face more barriers than private parties? These questions …

Tribes, Cities, And Children: Emerging Voices In Environmental Litigation, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

an environmental nongovernmental organization ("NGO") on behalf of a neighbor or hiker.1 The NGO would allege that the individual faced health risks, that her property was contaminated, or that she could no longer hike, fish, swim, or view wildlife such as the endangered Nile crocodile, as in the well-known case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.

Government Standing And The Fallacy Of Institutional Injury, Tara Leigh Grove

Faculty Publications

A new brand of plaintiff has come to federal court. In cases involving the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, and partisan gerrymandering, government institutions have brought suit to redress “institutional injuries”—that is, claims of harm to their constitutional powers or duties. Jurists and scholars are increasingly enthusiastic about these lawsuits, arguing (for example) that the Senate should have standing to protect its power to ratify treaties; that the House of Representatives may sue to preserve its role in the appropriations process; and that the President may go to court to vindicate his Article II prerogatives. This Article …

Constitutional Environmental Law, Or, The Constitutional Consequences Of Insisting That The Environment Is Everybody's Business, Robin Kundis Craig

Utah Law Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional environmental law has become a recognized and institutionalized specialty within environmental law, an acknowledgement of the pervasive interactions between the U.S. Constitution and the federal environmental statutes that go well beyond the normal constitutional underpinnings of federal administrative law. This Article posits that constitutional environmental law is the result of Congress consciously deciding that environmental protection is everybody’s business — specifically, from Congress’s that states should participate in rather than be preempted by federal environmental law, that private citizens and organizations should help to enforce the statutes, and that private land and water rights are necessary components of national …

The Myth Of Morrison: Securities Fraud Litigation Against Foreign Issuers, Robert Bartlett, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon

All Faculty Scholarship

Using a sample of 388 securities fraud lawsuits filed between 2002 and 2017 against foreign issuers, we examine the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. We find that the description of Morrison as a steamroller, substantially ending litigation against foreign issuers, is a myth. Instead, we find that Morrison did not significantly change the type of litigation brought against foreign issuers, which, both before and after this case, focused on foreign issuers with a U.S. listing and substantial U.S. trading volume. Although dismissal rates rose post-Morrison, we find no evidence …

Byrd V United States: Unauthorized Drivers Of Rental Cars Have Fourth Amendment Rights? Not As Evident As It Seems, Tracey Maclin

Faculty Scholarship

No discerning student of the Supreme Court would contend that Justice Anthony Kennedy broadly interpreted the Fourth Amendment during his thirty years on the Court. His majority opinions in Maryland v. King, Drayton v. United States and his willingness to join the three key sections of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Hudson v. Maryland, which held that suppression is never a remedy for knock-and-announce violations, are just a few examples of Justice Kennedy’s narrow view of the Fourth Amendment.

In light of his previous votes in search and seizure cases, surprisingly Justice Kennedy, in what would be his final Fourth Amendment …

Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, Michael T. Morley

Scholarly Publications

Nationwide injunctions have become a focus of heated judicial, academic, and even public debate. Much of this analysis treats nationwide injunctions as a unitary concept, referring to a particular type of court order. In fact, the term may apply to five different categories of orders of national applicability, each of which raises very different constitutional, fairness, rule-based, structural, prudential, and other concerns.

This Article presents a taxonomy of the five types of nationwide injunctions and the proper judicial treatment of each. Rather than focusing on the geographic applicability and scope of a court order, injunctions should instead be categorized based …