Law Commons^™

Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications For Self-Pardons And Non-Delegation, Ethan J. Lieb, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The idea that public servants hold their offices in trust for subject-beneficiaries and that a sovereign's exercise of its political power must be constrained by fiduciary standards-like the duties of loyalty and care-is not new. But scholars are collecting more and more evidence that the framers of the U.S. Constitution may have sought to constrain public power in ways that we would today call fiduciary. In this article, we explore some important legal conclusions that follow from fiduciary constitutionalism.

After developing some historical links between private fiduciary instruments and state and federal constitutions, we opine on what a fiduciary constitution …

Faithful Execution And Article Ii, Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Article II of the U.S. Constitution twice imposes a duty of faithful execution on the President, who must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" and take an oath or affirmation to 'faithfully execute the Office of President." These Faithful Execution Clauses are cited often, but their background and original meaning have never been fully explored. Courts, the executive branch, and many scholars rely on one or both clauses as support for expansive views of presidential power, for example, to go beyond standing law to defend the nation in emergencies; to withhold documents from Congress or the courts; or …

Research Report On Federal Agency Alj Hiring After Lucia And Executive Order 13843, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

This draft report examines federal agency hiring practices for administrative law judges ("ALJs"), who preside over formal agency hearings, in light of the Supreme Court's determination that ALJs are constitutional officers and President Trump's executive order to exempt ALJs from certain statutory competitive-service hiring requirements. The report also provides recommendations for best agency hiring practices. Professors Jack Beermann and Jennifer Mascott co-authored this initial draft report. After Professor Mascott stepped down from the Administrative Conference of the United States to work in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, Professor Beermann edited the report and produced its final May …

James Wilson As The Architect Of The American Presidency, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

For decades, James Wilson has been something of a “forgotten founder.” The area where commentators generally recognize Wilson’s influence at the Convention is with respect to Article II, which establishes the executive and defines its powers. Most scholars characterize him as a resolute advocate of an independent, energetic, and unitary presidency, and a particularly successful one at that. In this regard, some scholars have generally characterized Wilson’s thinking as overly rigid. Yet a close examination of the Convention reveals Wilson to be more flexible than sometimes characterized. With respect to many aspects of the presidency, including the appointment power, the …

Faithful Execution And Article Ii, Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, Jed Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Article II of the U.S. Constitution twice imposes a duty of faithful execution on the President, who must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” and take an oath or affirmation to “faithfully execute the Office of President.” These Faithful Execution Clauses are cited often, but their background and original meaning have never been fully explored. Courts, the executive branch, and many scholars rely on one or both clauses as support for expansive views of presidential power, for example, to go beyond standing law to defend the nation in emergencies; to withhold documents from Congress or the courts; or …

Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications For Self- Pardons And Non-Delegation, Ethan J. Leib, Jed H. Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The idea that public servants hold their offices in trust for subject-beneficia-ries and that a sovereign’s exercise of its political power must be constrained by fiduciary standards—like the duties of loyalty and care—is not new. But scholars are collecting more and more evidence that the framers of the U.S. Constitution may have sought to constrain public power in ways that we would today call fiduciary. In this article, we explore some important legal conclu-sions that follow from fiduciary constitutionalism.

After developing some historical links between private fiduciary instruments and state and federal constitutions, we opine on what a fiduciary constitution …