Law Commons^™

Churches' Lobbying And Campaigning: A Proposed Statutory Safe Harbor For Internal Church Communications, Edward A. Zelinsky

Articles

President Trump, reiterating the position he took during the presidential campaign, has recently reaffirmed his pledge to “get rid of and totally destroy the Johnson Amendment,” the provision of the Internal Revenue Code which prohibits tax-exempt institutions from participating in political campaigns. The Code also bars tax-exempt institutions, including churches, from substantial lobbying activities.

Rather than the blanket repeal of the Johnson Amendment proposed by President Trump, I argue for a statutory safe harbor for the internal communications of churches. This limited safe harbor would protect in-house church discussions from both Section 501(c)(3)’s ban on substantial lobbying and from that …

Transparency, Transparency:Comparing The New Lobbying Legislation In Ireland And The Uk, Sean Keeling, Sharon Feeney, John Hogan

Articles

his paper analyses the strength of the new laws regulating lobbying in Ireland and the United Kingdom (UK). This examination was conducted using the Centre for Public Integrity’s (CPI) ‘Hired Guns’ quantitative method for assessing the stringency of lobbying legislation. These laws were introduced, after years of unfulfilled promises and scandals, in an effort to increase the public’s trust in their representative institutions. We find that the Irish Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 offers a slightly higher level of transparency than the UK’s Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014. Additionally, using the CPI’s index allows …

Astroturf Activism, Melinda (M.J.) Durkee

Scholarship@WashULaw

Corporate influence in government is more than a national issue; it is an international phenomenon. For years, businesses have been infiltrating international legal processes. They secretly lobby lawmakers through front groups: “astroturf” imitations of grassroots organizations. But because this business lobbying is covert, it has been underappreciated in both the literature and the law. This Article unearths the “astroturf activism” phenomenon. It offers an original descriptive account that classifies modes of business access to international officials and identifies harms, then develops a critical analysis of the laws that regulate this access. I show that the perplexing set of access rules …

Regulatory Entrepreneurship, Elizabeth Pollman, Jordan M. Barry

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines what we term “regulatory entrepreneurship” — pursuing a line of business in which changing the law is a significant part of the business plan. Regulatory entrepreneurship is not new, but it has become increasingly salient in recent years as companies from Airbnb to Tesla, and from DraftKings to Uber, have become agents of legal change. We document the tactics that companies have employed, including operating in legal gray areas, growing “too big to ban,” and mobilizing users for political support. Further, we theorize the business and law-related factors that foster regulatory entrepreneurship. Well-funded, scalable, and highly connected …

Gridlock, Lobbying, And Democracy, Joseph P. Tomain

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

With the refusal to fill the Supreme Court vacancy left by Antonin Scalia, the Senate adds another layer of gridlock in Washington. In the recent past, congressional gridlock has threatened to shut down the legislative process by such maneuvers as creating a faux debt crisis and by regularly assailing the president and the executive branch over so-called job-killing regulations. Through these efforts, obstructionist Republicans have attempted a gridlock hat-trick by trying to shut down each of the three branches of government-at least as far as the headlines go. The political reality, however, is more nuanced, and gridlock is more complicated …

Industry Lobbying And "Interest Blind" Access Norms At International Organizations, Melissa J. Durkee

Scholarly Works

The standard approach of many international organizations (IOs) to non-governmental associations makes no formal distinctions between nonprofit private sector groups, known as trade or industry associations, and public interest groups. Thus, most IOs offer accreditation and access to both kinds of group on equal terms, without differentiating between them. I call this approach “interest blind” and use this short essay to examine its origins and consequences. Specifically, the approach has resulted in robust participation in international governance by industry and trade lobbying groups, which can affect the quality of deliberation at IOs and of the information that international officials and …