Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Foxes At The Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
Foxes At The Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The dark side of occupational licensing-its tendency to raise prices to consumers with dubious effects on service quality, its enormous payout to licensees, and its ability to shut many willing workers out of the workforce-has begun to receive significant attention. But little has been said about the legal institutions that create and administer this web of professional entry and practice rules. State-level licensing boards regulate nearly one-third of American workers, yet, until now, there has been no systematic attempt to understand who serves on these boards and how they operate. This Article undertakes an ambitious and comprehensive study of all …
The Production Function Of The Regulatory State, J.B. Ruhl, Jonathan R. Nash, James Salzman
The Production Function Of The Regulatory State, J.B. Ruhl, Jonathan R. Nash, James Salzman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
How much will our budget be cut be this year? This question has loomed ominously over regulatory agencies for over three decades. After the 2016 presidential election, it now stands front and center in federal policy, with the Trump administration pledging over $50 billion in cuts. Yet very little is known about the fundamental relationship between regulatory agencies budgets and the social welfare outcomes they are charged to produce. Indeed, the question is scarcely studied in scholarship from law, economics, or political science. This article lays the groundwork for a new field of theoretical and empirical research, using what we …
Shareholder Voting In Proxy Contests For Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections And Management Proposals, Randall Thomas, Patrick C. Tricker
Shareholder Voting In Proxy Contests For Corporate Control, Uncontested Director Elections And Management Proposals, Randall Thomas, Patrick C. Tricker
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This paper surveys the empirical literature on shareholder voting, specifically on votes related to contested and uncontested director elections and on management proposals. While much of current theory depicts shareholder votes as an ineffective control on the boards decision making, the empirical literature paints a more nuanced picture. When a proxy contest breaks out, shareholders wield immense influence. These contests tend to have significant benefits for the corporation, including facilitating a change in management, reducing unnecessary liquidity, and prompting the payout of dividends. Even in uncontested director elections, shareholders decisions to vote for or withhold their vote reflect the company's …