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Full-Text Articles in Law
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas
Faculty Scholarship
Because representative shareholder litigation has been constrained by numerous legal developments, the corporate governance system has developed new mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs. We posit that recent significant governance developments in the corporate world are the natural consequence of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of shareholder suits to address certain genre of managerial agency costs. We thus argue that corporate governance responses evolve to fill voids caused by the inability of shareholder suits to monitor and discipline corporate managers.
We further claim that these new governance responses are themselves becoming stronger due in part to the rising …
Modern-Day Monitorships, Veronica Root
Modern-Day Monitorships, Veronica Root
Faculty Scholarship
When a sexual abuse scandal rocked Penn State, when Apple was found to have engaged in anticompetitive behavior, and when servicers like Bank of America improperly foreclosed upon hundreds of thousands of homeowners, each organization entered into a "Modern-Day Monitorship”. Modern-day monitorships are utilized in an array of contexts to assist in widely varying remediation efforts. This is because they provide outsiders with a unique source of information about the efficacy of the tarnished organization's efforts to resolve misconduct. Yet, despite their use in high profile and serious matters of organizational wrongdoing, they are not an outgrowth of careful study …