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Vol. 5 No. 2, Spring 2014; Pay-For-Delay And Interstate Commerce: Why Congress Or The Supreme Court Must Take Action Opposing Reverse Payment Settlements, Corey Hickman May 2014

Vol. 5 No. 2, Spring 2014; Pay-For-Delay And Interstate Commerce: Why Congress Or The Supreme Court Must Take Action Opposing Reverse Payment Settlements, Corey Hickman

Northern Illinois Law Review Supplement

A pay-for-delay drug settlement, also called a reverse payment settlement, occurs when a brand name pharmaceutical company agrees to pay the maker of a similar generic drug to delay the release of the generic drug into the stream of commerce, thereby allowing the brand name pharmaceutical company to eliminate competition for an extended period of time. These agreements allow both the brand name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer to profit immensely. These settlements cost the American public an estimated $3.5 billion per year. Further, reverse payment settlements on average prevent generic drugs from entering the stream of commerce for an …


Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2014

Actavis, The Reverse Payment Fallacy, And The Continuing Need For Regulatory Solutions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

The Actavis decision punted more than it decided. Although narrowing the range of possible outcomes by rejecting the legal rules at the extremes and opting for a rule of reason middle ground, the opinion failed to grapple with the most challenging issues of regulatory policy raised by pharmaceutical patent settlements. In particular, it failed to clearly delineate the social costs of permitting and disallowing patent settlements, avoided grappling with the crucial issues of patent validity and infringement, and erroneously focused on “reverse payments” as a distinctive antitrust problem when equally or more anticompetitive settlements can be crafted without reverse payments. …


Patent Examiners And Litigation Outcomes, Shine Tu Jan 2014

Patent Examiners And Litigation Outcomes, Shine Tu

Law Faculty Scholarship

Conventional wisdom argues that unnecessary litigation of low quality patents hinders innovation, and that the PTO could play a role with its high grant rates. Accordingly, it is important to answer these questions: (1) which patent examiners are issuing litigated patents, (2) are examiners who are "rubber stamping" patents issuing litigated patents at a disproportionately higher rate, and (3) are examiners with less experience issuing more litigated patents? In sum, do patent examiners who issue litigated patents have common characteristics? Intuition would argue that those examiners who issue the most patents (approximately one patent every three business days) would exhibit …


Patent Dialogue, Jonas Anderson Jan 2014

Patent Dialogue, Jonas Anderson

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This Article examines the unique dialogic relationship that exists between the Supreme Court and Congress concerning patent law. In most areas of the law, Congress and the Supreme Court engage directly with each other to craft legal rules. When it comes to patent law, however, Congress and the Court often interact via an intermediary institution: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. In patent law, dialogue often begins when Congress or the Supreme Court acts as a dialogic catalyst, signaling reform priorities to which the Federal Circuit often responds.

Appreciating the unique nature of patent dialogue has important …


Predictability And Nonobviousness In Patent Law After Ksr, Christopher A. Cotropia Jan 2014

Predictability And Nonobviousness In Patent Law After Ksr, Christopher A. Cotropia

Law Faculty Publications

In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed the doctrine of nonobviousness, the ultimate question of patentability, for the first time in thirty years. In mandating a flexible approach to deciding nonobviousness, the KSR opinion introduced two predictability standards for determining nonobviousness. The Court described predictability of use (hereinafter termed "Type I predictability" )-whether the inventor used the prior art in a predictable manner to create the invention-and predictability of the result (hereinafter termed "Type II predictability")-whether the invention produced a predictable result-both as a means for proving obviousness. Although Type I predictability is easily explained as …


Making Patents Useful, Sean B. Seymore Jan 2014

Making Patents Useful, Sean B. Seymore

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

It is axiomatic in patent law that an invention must be useful. The utility requirement has been a part of the statutory scheme since the Patent Act of 1790. But what does it mean to be useful? The abstract and imprecise nature of the term combined with the lack of objective criteria for assessing it make utility the most malleable patentability requirement. As the invention landscape has evolved over time, the Patent Office and the courts have exploited this malleability to create technologically specific utility standards — de minimis for some inventions, but considerably more stringent for others. This has …


Minimizing The Costs Of Patent Trolling, Vincent R. Johnson Jan 2014

Minimizing The Costs Of Patent Trolling, Vincent R. Johnson

Faculty Articles

Patent trolling is a serious legal problem. In addressing patent trolling, disclosure requirements and periodic reporting standards will be critical to minimizing the costs of this controversial practice.

Patent trolling, at its most problematic, generally refers to patent infringement allegations made by non-practicing entities (NPEs) which produce essentially no products or services except in connection with the buying and selling of patent rights. The targets of these patent “trolls” often lack basic information that is relevant to their evaluation of the claims against them, and policymakers know too little about specialized patent assertion entities and their impact on innovation and …


Patent Law Federalism, Paul Gugliuzza Jan 2014

Patent Law Federalism, Paul Gugliuzza

Faculty Scholarship

Most lawsuits arising under federal law can be filed in either state or federal court. Patent suits, however, may be filed only in federal court. Why do patent cases receive exceptional treatment? The usual answer is that federal courts, unlike state courts, provide uniformity and expertise in patent matters. This Article analyzes whether exclusive jurisdiction actually serves those policy aims and concludes that the uniformity-expertise rationale is overstated. If exclusive federal patent jurisdiction is to be justified, attention must also be given to pragmatic considerations, such as the respective quality of state and federal trial courts, the courts’ ability to …