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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Law
Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford
Death, Desuetude, And Original Meaning, John F. Stinneford
UF Law Faculty Publications
One of the most common objections to originalism is that it cannot cope with cultural change. One of the most commonly invoked examples of this claimed weakness is the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whose original meaning would (it is argued) authorize barbaric punishment practices like flogging and branding, and disproportionate punishments like the death penalty for relatively minor offenses. This Article shows that this objection to originalism is inapt, at least with respect to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. As I have shown in prior articles, the original meaning of “cruel and unusual” is “cruel and contrary to …
Fidelity, Change, And The Good Constitution, James E. Fleming
Fidelity, Change, And The Good Constitution, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
In thinking about fidelity and change in constitutional interpretation, many have framed the basic choice as being between originalism and living constitutionalism. Consider, for example, Jack M. Balkin’s Living Originalism, Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B. Solum’s Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, and John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good Constitution. I shall argue for the superiority of what Ronald Dworkin called “moral readings of the Constitution” and what what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. By “moral reading” and “philosophic approach,” I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as …
Language Disenfranchisement In Juries: A Call For Constitutional Remediation, Jasmine Gonzales Rose
Language Disenfranchisement In Juries: A Call For Constitutional Remediation, Jasmine Gonzales Rose
Faculty Scholarship
Approximately thirteen million U.S. citizens, mostly Latinos and other people of color, are denied the right to serve on juries due to English language requirements and despite the possibility (and centuries-old tradition) of juror language accommodation. This exclusion results in the underrepresentation of racial minorities on juries and has a detrimental impact on criminal defendants, the perceived legitimacy of the justice system, and citizen participation in democracy. Yet, it has been virtually ignored. This Article examines the constitutionality of juror language requirements, focusing primarily on equal protection and the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. Finding the existing …
The Means Principle, Larry Alexander
The Means Principle, Larry Alexander
Faculty Scholarship
Michael Moore believes there are deontological constraints on actors’ pursuit of good consequences. He believes these constraints are best conceived of as agent-relative prohibitions such as “you must not intentionally kill, batter, rape, steal, etc.” I, joined in recent years by Kimberly Ferzan, believe that the best interpretation of deontological constraints — the interpretation that best accounts for our intuitions about certain stock cases — is that they are constraints on the causal means by which good consequences may be achieved. We believe those constraints can be unified under a single deontological principle, what we call the “means principle.” It …
Resolving The Original Sin Of Bolling V. Sharpe, Gregory Dolin
Resolving The Original Sin Of Bolling V. Sharpe, Gregory Dolin
All Faculty Scholarship
On May 17, 1954 the Supreme Court handed down two decisions that for the first time categorically held that racial segregation in public schools was per se unlawful – Brown v. Board of Education and Bolling v. Sharpe. Ostensibly, both cases dealt with a same question; however, in Brown the entity accused of discrimination was a creature of the State of Kansas, while in Bolling the discrimination was practiced by the federal government. The problem that the Supreme Court faced was the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, by its own terms, guaranteed “equal protection of the laws” only vis-à-vis …
Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen
Reading Blackstone In The Twenty-First Century And The Twenty-First Century Through Blackstone, Jessie Allen
Book Chapters
If the Supreme Court mythologizes Blackstone, it is equally true that Blackstone himself was engaged in something of a mythmaking project. Far from a neutral reporter, Blackstone has some stories to tell, in particular the story of the hero law. The problems associated with using the Commentaries as a transparent window on eighteenth-century American legal norms, however, do not make Blackstone’s text irrelevant today. The chapter concludes with my brief reading of the Commentaries as a critical mirror of some twenty-first-century legal and social structures. That analysis draws on a long-term project, in which I am making my way through …
Originalism All The Way Down?, Kurt T. Lash
Originalism All The Way Down?, Kurt T. Lash
Law Faculty Publications
In their new book, Originalism and the Good Constitution, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport attempt to vanquish what they call constructionist originalism with an approach that I call methodist originalism. Unlike constructionist theories, which allow for non-originalist construction of underdetermined texts, methodist originalism proposes filling in the historical gaps with what McGinnis and Rappaport claim were the originally accepted methods of interpretation. This is originalism all the way down.
It’s a creative effort, and one that appropriately rejects some of the more latitudinous originalist theories currently in play. Unfortunately, the same history McGinnis and Rappaport rely upon fatally undermines …
A Concise Guide To Using Dictionaries From The Founding Era To Determine The Original Meaning Of The Constitution, Gregory E. Maggs
A Concise Guide To Using Dictionaries From The Founding Era To Determine The Original Meaning Of The Constitution, Gregory E. Maggs
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
This Article explains how dictionaries published in the Founding Era may provide evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution. In addition, the Article identifies and discusses six potential problems with relying on definitions from these dictionaries, and cautions that these potential problems must be considered when using Founding Era dictionaries either to make claims about the Constitution’s original meaning or to evaluate claims about original meaning made by others. Finally, the Article includes an Appendix describing nine English language dictionaries and four legal dictionaries from the Founding Era that the Supreme Court has cited in constitutional cases, and indicates …
The Limits Of Textualism In Interpreting The Confrontation Clause, Stephanos Bibas
The Limits Of Textualism In Interpreting The Confrontation Clause, Stephanos Bibas
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
A Concise Guide To Using Dictionaries From The Founding Era To Determine The Original Meaning Of The Constitution, Gregory E. Maggs
A Concise Guide To Using Dictionaries From The Founding Era To Determine The Original Meaning Of The Constitution, Gregory E. Maggs
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
This Article explains how dictionaries published in the Founding Era may provide evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution. In addition, the Article identifies and discusses six potential problems with relying on definitions from these dictionaries, and cautions that these potential problems must be considered when using Founding Era dictionaries either to make claims about the Constitution’s original meaning or to evaluate claims about original meaning made by others. Finally, the Article includes an Appendix describing nine English language dictionaries and four legal dictionaries from the Founding Era that the Supreme Court has cited in constitutional cases, and indicates …
We The People: Each And Every One, Randy E. Barnett
We The People: Each And Every One, Randy E. Barnett
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In his book series, We the People, Bruce Ackerman offers a rich description of how constitutional law comes to be changed by social movements. He also makes some normative claims about “popular sovereignty,” “popular consent,” “higher law,” and “higher-lawmaking.” In this essay, I examine these claims and find them to be both highly under-theorized and deeply problematic. Ackerman’s own presentation of what he considers to be an informal process of constitutional amendment illustrates the importance of formality in protecting the rights retained by the people. And he assumes a collective conception of popular sovereignty without considering the serious normative …