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- Charles Tiebout (1)
- Confucian Constitutional Order; Jiang Qing; Chinese politics; Chinese government; China (1)
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- Direct Democracy; Public Interest; Candidate Elections; Voting Ethics; Political Morality; Representation (1)
- Elected officials; government officials; fiduciaries; government power (1)
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
The Political Morality Of Voting In Direct Democracy, Michael Serota, Ethan J. Leib
The Political Morality Of Voting In Direct Democracy, Michael Serota, Ethan J. Leib
Faculty Scholarship
The voting levers in candidate elections and in direct democracy elections are identical. The political obligations that bind the citizens that pull them are not. This Essay argues that voters in direct democracy elections, unlike their counterparts in candidate elections, serve as representatives of the people and are, accordingly, bound by the ethics of political representation. Upending the traditional dichotomy between representative and direct democracy, this Essay explains why citizens voting in direct democracy are representative legislators who must vote in the public interest and must not vote in their private interests.
Review Of "Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’S Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future" By Jiang Qing, Carl F. Minzner
Review Of "Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’S Ancient Past Can Shape Its Political Future" By Jiang Qing, Carl F. Minzner
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Mobility Case For Regionalism, Nestor M. Davidson, Sheila R. Foster
The Mobility Case For Regionalism, Nestor M. Davidson, Sheila R. Foster
Faculty Scholarship
In the discourse of local government law, the idea that a mobile populace can “vote with its feet” has long served as a justification for devolution and decentralization. Tracing to Charles Tiebout’s seminal work in public finance, the legal-structural prescription that follows is that a diversity of independent and empowered local governments can best satisfy the varied preferences of residents metaphorically shopping for bundles of public services, regulatory environment, and tax burden. This localist paradigm generally presumes that fragmented governments are competing for residents within a given metropolitan area. Contemporary patterns of mobility, however, call into question this foundational assumption. …
Translating Fiduciary Principles Into Public Law, Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, Michael Serota
Translating Fiduciary Principles Into Public Law, Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet, Michael Serota
Faculty Scholarship
Because public office is a public trust, fiduciary architecture can help orient us in figuring out how political power should be exercised legitimately. Part of the appeal of conceiving the political relationship between representative and represented in fiduciary terms is that it regards politics in more realistic and textured ways — as a constellation of power relationships in a web of trust and vulnerability — rather than as a mere social contract no one ever signed. Thinking of legislators as public fiduciaries tells us much about the nature of the relationship between the governed and their governors and it can …