Law Commons^™

Natural Law, Slavery, And The Right To Privacy Tort, Anita L. Allen

All Faculty Scholarship

In 1905 the Supreme Court of Georgia became the first state high court to recognize a freestanding “right to privacy” tort in the common law. The landmark case was Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. Must it be a cause for deep jurisprudential concern that the common law right to privacy in wide currency today originated in Pavesich’s explicit judicial interpretation of the requirements of natural law? Must it be an additional worry that the court which originated the common law privacy right asserted that a free white man whose photograph is published without his consent in …

Punishment Without Culpability, John F. Stinneford

UF Law Faculty Publications

For more than half a century, academic commentators have criticized the Supreme Court for failing to articulate a substantive constitutional conception of criminal law. Although the Court enforces various procedural protections that the Constitution provides for criminal defendants, it has left the question of what a crime is purely to the discretion of the legislature. This failure has permitted legislatures to evade the Constitution’s procedural protections by reclassifying crimes as civil causes of action, eliminating key elements (such as mens rea) or reclassifying them as defenses or sentencing factors, and authorizing severe punishments for crimes traditionally considered relatively minor.

The …

A Short And Happy Guide To Contracts, David G. Epstein

Law Faculty Publications

In this book we will reveal the rules of contract law in as straightforward and clear a fashion as they permit. But we will also talk some about policy and the difference between the two. Policy reflects the normative objectives we want to attain, and the rules are the vehicles for getting us there. In this book, we are going to break the subject of contracts into seven short questions: 1. Has a deal been made? 2. Is the deal enforceable? 3. Are there defenses to enforcement of the deal? 4 What are the terms of the deal? 5. When …

Response: There Is No New General Common Law Of Severability, Kevin C. Walsh

Law Faculty Publications

In this solicited response to The New General Common Law of Severability, I first offer an interpretation of Ayotte and subsequent Supreme Court decisions as continuous with existing doctrine instead of a departure from it. I then suggest that much of Scoville’s evidence for a federalization of severability doctrine is better viewed as evidence of doctrinal looseness rather than of doctrinal change. I conclude by returning to the lessons of severability’s doctrinal history, suggesting that the prehistory of severability doctrine may supply a better guide for how courts should deal with problems of partial unconstitutionality in the future.

Codifying Custom, Timothy Meyer

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Codifying decentralized forms of law, such as the common law and customary law, has been a cornerstone of the positivist turn in legal theory since at least the nineteenth century. Commentators laud codification’s purported virtues, including systematizing, centralizing, and clarifying the law. These attributes are thought to increase the general welfare of those subject to legal rules, and therefore to justify and explain codification. The codification literature, however, overlooks codification’s distributive consequences. In so doing, the literature misses the primary motive for codification: to define legal rules in a way that advantages individual codifying institutions, regardless of how codification affects …

Constitutional Backdrops, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

The Constitution is often said to leave important questions unanswered. These include, for example, the existence of a congressional contempt power or an executive removal power, the role of stare decisis, and the scope of state sovereign immunity. Bereft of clear text, many scholars have sought answers to such questions in Founding-era history. But why should the historical answers be valid today, if they were never codified in the Constitution's text?

This Article describes a category of legal rules that weren't adopted in the text, expressly or implicitly, but which nonetheless have continuing legal force under the written Constitution. These …

The Case Of The Retired Justice: How Would Justice John Paul Stevens Have Voted In J. Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. V. Nicastro?, Rodger D. Citron

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.