Law Commons^™

The False Promise Of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay: Evidence From Executive Pensions And Deferred Compensation, Kelli A. Alces, Brian D. Galle

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Strengthening Investment In Public Corporations Through The Uncorporation, Kelli A. Alces

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Corporate Social Responsibility After Disaster, Susan S. Kuo, Benjamin Means

Faculty Publications

In recent years, corporations have devoted substantial resources to disaster relief worldwide. For instance, Wal-Mart garnered favorable attention for its contributions in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina. According to company press releases, Wal-Mart recently gave hundreds of thousands of dollars for disaster relief in Brazil following a flood, and it has pledged millions in support of Japan in the wake of the tsunami.

Large corporations have not only the economic resources, but also the logistical capacity and operational expertise to make a difference in the first terrible days after a disaster. However, commentators disagree about how …

A Theory Of Representative Shareholder Suits And Its Application To Multijurisdictional Litigation, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

We develop a theory to explain the uses and abuses of representative shareholder litigation based on its two most important underlying characteristics: the multiple sources of the legal rights being redressed (creating dynamic opportunities for arbitrage) and the ability of multiple shareholders to seek to represent the collective group in such litigation (creating increased risk of litigation agency costs by those representatives and their attorneys). Placed against the backdrop of controlling managerial agency costs, our theory predicts that: (1) the relative strength of the different forms of shareholder litigation will shift over time; (2) these shifts can result in new …

Who Bears The Cost Of Excessive Executive Compensation (And Other Corporate Agency Costs)?, David I. Walker

Faculty Scholarship

Managerial agency costs are ubiquitous in the modern public corporation. Agency costs arise from the separation of ownership and control and reflect the divergence between share-value-maximizing actions of managers and managers’ actual actions, plus the monitoring and bonding expenditures (including contracting costs) undertaken to reduce that divergence. Agency costs vary firm by firm, but regulatory actions and even business practices can have a systematic impact on agency costs. For example, increased or decreased enforcement of insider trading rules can affect agency costs across a wide spectrum of companies. Who bears the burden of corporate agency costs? Who gains or suffers …