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A Theory Of Representative Shareholder Suits And Its Application To Multijurisdictional Litigation, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
A Theory Of Representative Shareholder Suits And Its Application To Multijurisdictional Litigation, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
We develop a theory to explain the uses and abuses of representative shareholder litigation based on its two most important underlying characteristics: the multiple sources of the legal rights being redressed (creating dynamic opportunities for arbitrage) and the ability of multiple shareholders to seek to represent the collective group in such litigation (creating increased risk of litigation agency costs by those representatives and their attorneys). Placed against the backdrop of controlling managerial agency costs, our theory predicts that: (1) the relative strength of the different forms of shareholder litigation will shift over time; (2) these shifts can result in new …
Agency Coordination In Shared Regulatory Space, Jim Rossi, Jody Freeman
Agency Coordination In Shared Regulatory Space, Jim Rossi, Jody Freeman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article argues that inter-agency coordination is one of the great challenges of modern governance. It explains why lawmakers frequently assign overlapping and fragmented delegations that require agencies to "share regulatory space," why these delegations are so pervasive and stubborn, and why consolidating or eliminating agency functions will not solve the problems they create. The Article describes a variety of tools that Congress, the President and the agencies can use to manage coordination challenges effectively, including agency interaction requirements, formal inter-agency agreements, and joint policymaking. The Article assesses the relative costs and benefits of these coordination tools, using the normative …