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Full-Text Articles in Law
Too Big To Fail, Too Blind To See, Tom C.W. Lin
Too Big To Fail, Too Blind To See, Tom C.W. Lin
UF Law Faculty Publications
Too Big to Fail by Andrew Ross Sorkin offers a meticulous re-telling of one of the most important periods in recent history. As regulators, bankers, lawyers, scholars, and other interested parties sift through the rubble in search of knowledge about the crash, Too Big to Fail serves both as a chronicle of the recent past and a cautionary tale for the immediate future. Acknowledging past missteps, uncovering root causes, and correcting systemic shortcomings to prevent similar failure is arguably the key economic and regulatory challenge of our time. Part I of this Essay summarizes key episodes of the financial crisis …
Reforming Financial Regulation To Address The Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
Reforming Financial Regulation To Address The Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.
GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works
The ongoing financial crisis has revealed fundamental weaknesses in the regulatory systems of the United States, the United Kingdom and other European nations. In particular, publicly-funded bailouts of major banks have confirmed that “too big to fail” (TBTF) subsidies distort economic incentives and encourage excessive risk-taking by large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs). Accordingly, the primary goals of regulatory reform must be (i) to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, TBTF subsidies and (ii) to force LCFIs to internalize the risks and costs of their activities.
After surveying the causes and consequences of the financial crisis, this article proposes five regulatory …
Private Enforcement Of Systemic Risk Regulation, Heidi Mandanis Schooner
Private Enforcement Of Systemic Risk Regulation, Heidi Mandanis Schooner
Scholarly Articles
The failure of the regulatory system is at least one of the contributing causes to the 2008 Financial Crisis. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) will have a far-reaching impact on the financial services industry particularly in its attempt to regulate systemic risk. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, does not sufficiently address the problem of agency discretion generally, or the problem of an agency’s discretion to forebear, in particular. Under Dodd-Frank, the agencies retain considerable discretion and the effectiveness of the new regime depends on the optimal exercise of such discretion. This Article maintains that an …
Panel 3: Bankruptcy & Restructuring Of Financial Institutions, Barry E. Adler, William A. Ackman, Marcia L. Goldstein, Arthur J. Gonzalez, Michael J. Krimminger, Edward R. Morrison
Panel 3: Bankruptcy & Restructuring Of Financial Institutions, Barry E. Adler, William A. Ackman, Marcia L. Goldstein, Arthur J. Gonzalez, Michael J. Krimminger, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
Barry Adler: Thank you all for being here. It is an honor for me to be on this panel and an honor to moderate it. Let me introduce our panel before we get started. William A. Ackman, the founder and CEO of Pershing Square Capital Management; Marsha Goldstein, a partner and chair of the business finance and restructuring department at Weil, Gotshal; the Honorable Arthur Gonzalez, a judge in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York; and Ed Morrison, the Harvey Miller Professor of Law and Economics at Columbia Law School. Also on this panel is …
Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.
Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Because the quickest, simplest way for a financial institution to increase its profitability is to increase its leverage, an enduring tension will exist between regulators and systemically significant financial institutions over the issues of risk and leverage. Many have suggested that the 2008 financial crisis was caused because financial institutions were induced to increase leverage because of flawed systems of executive compensation. Still, there is growing evidence that shareholders acquiesced in these compensation formulas to cause managers to accept higher risk and leverage. Shareholder pressure then is a factor that could induce the failure of a systemically significant financial institution. …
Host’S Dilemma: Rethinking Eu Banking Regulation In Light Of The Global Crisis, Katharina Pistor
Host’S Dilemma: Rethinking Eu Banking Regulation In Light Of The Global Crisis, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
The quest for integrating financial markets into a single global marketplace has produced a host of legal and regulatory measures over the past two decades aimed at taming national protectionism, easing access to foreign markets, and lowering the regulatory burden for financial intermediaries that operate trans-nationally. Home country regulation and supervision – based on commonly agreed prudential standards – has become the core principle in the design of regulatory structures. This principle, first established as the “Basel Concordat” in a series of reports issued by the Bank of International Settlement in Basel has also informed financial regulation in the EU. …