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Managerial Entrenchment And Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory And Evidence From A Recessionary Market, Jay B. Kesten
Managerial Entrenchment And Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory And Evidence From A Recessionary Market, Jay B. Kesten
Scholarly Publications
Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and valuation of takeover premiums. The mainstream view, both of academics and market participants, is that entrenchment reduces accountability to shareholders and amplifies agency costs, thus decreasing shareholder wealth. Two influential studies (Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell (2009) and Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003)) present empirical evidence consistent with this conclusion, finding statistically significant negative correlations between entrenchment and …