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Full-Text Articles in Law
Why More Antitrust Immunity For The Media Is A Bad Idea, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen P. Grunes
Why More Antitrust Immunity For The Media Is A Bad Idea, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen P. Grunes
NULR Online
The U.S. newspaper industry specifically and traditional media industries generally are in transition. In response to declining audiences and advertising revenue, many traditional media firms have laid off journalists and cut back on news. With their financial difficulties, some traditional media firms have called for greater leniency under the federal antitrust laws. Newspaper owners and journalists have called for greater antitrust immunity for joint advertising, joint fees for readership and accessing content online, and joint reporting. Others have called on the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to loosen further its Cross-Ownership Rules. Some politicians have suggested that the federal antitrust agencies …
Fcc Regulation And Increased Ownership Concentration In The Radio Industry, Peter Dicola
Fcc Regulation And Increased Ownership Concentration In The Radio Industry, Peter Dicola
Faculty Working Papers
In 1996, Congress increased the limits on how many radio stations one firm can own within a single "radio market." To enforce these limits, the FCC used an idiosyncratic method of defining radio markets, based on the complex geometry of the signal contour patterns of radio stations' broadcasts. Using a unique geographic data set, this paper provides the first calculations of the pre- and post-1996 limits on local radio ownership as actually implemented by the FCC. The limits are surprisingly permissive and vary considerably from city to city. While the limits were seldom binding on radio firms, I find a …
Competition Policy And Financial Distress, Ezra Friedman, Marco Ottaviani Ottaviani
Competition Policy And Financial Distress, Ezra Friedman, Marco Ottaviani Ottaviani
Faculty Working Papers
Traditional analyses of competition policy assume that firms operate in perfect credit markets. We argue that imperfections in credit markets should be taken into account, and show one channel by which accounting for financial conditions could alter the welfare effects of a merger. In line with empirical evidence, we posit that the presence of financial distress might diminish price competition by reducing firms' willingness to undertake long-term investments in their customer base. Mergers that reduce the probability of financial distress can induce the merging firms to compete more fiercely for customers, thus partly offsetting the traditional effects of an increase …