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Articles 1 - 19 of 19

Full-Text Articles in Law

Consumer Interest In Corporate Law, David Yosifon Nov 2009

Consumer Interest In Corporate Law, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of the consumer interest in dominant theories of the corporation and in the fundamental doctrines of corporate law. In so doing, the Article fills a void in contemporary corporate law scholarship, which has failed to give sustained attention to consumers in favor of exploring the interests of other corporate stakeholders, especially shareholders, creditors, and workers. Utilizing insights derived from the law and behavioralism movement, this Article examines, in particular, the limitations of the shareholder primacy norm at the heart of prevailing "nexus of contracts" and "team production" theories of the firm. The Article concludes ...


Art Deaccessions And The Limits Of Fiduciary Duty, Sue Chen Jun 2009

Art Deaccessions And The Limits Of Fiduciary Duty, Sue Chen

Duke Law Student Papers Series

Art deaccessions prompt lawsuits against museums, and some commentators advocate using the stricter trust standard of care, instead of the prevailing corporate standard (business judgment rule), to evaluate the conduct of non‑profit museum boards. This Article explores the consequences of adopting the trust standard by applying it to previously unavailable deaccession policies of prominent art museums. It finds that so long as museum boards adhere to these policies, their decisions would satisfy the trust standard. This outcome illustrates an important limitation of fiduciary law: the trust standard evaluates procedural care but cannot assess deaccessions on their merits. Yet this ...


Behind Close Doors: Governance Issues In Private Equity Driven Industries – The Close Corporation Paradox And Its Impact On Private Equity In The Us And Sweden, Kristian Hermanrud Apr 2009

Behind Close Doors: Governance Issues In Private Equity Driven Industries – The Close Corporation Paradox And Its Impact On Private Equity In The Us And Sweden, Kristian Hermanrud

Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers

Publicly traded companies make up only a small fraction of the vast number of corporations operating in the US today. Only about 10,000 companies are traded publicly while there are roughly 20 million corporations doing business in the US. Likewise, over 245 private corporations’ annual revenues exceed $1 billion. Among these, more than twelve employ more than 50,000 employees. Despite the influence on vast amounts of people and capital legislature has, to a large degree, focused on publicly traded companies. The reasons for this stem, in large, back to the years of the market crash in the early ...


The Evolution Of Debt: Covenants, The Credit Market, And Corporate Governance, Charles K. Whitehead Apr 2009

The Evolution Of Debt: Covenants, The Credit Market, And Corporate Governance, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh Apr 2009

The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice between ...


Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh Feb 2009

Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to either the ...


A Voice-Based Framework For Evaluating Claims Of Minority Shareholder Oppression In The Close Corporation, Benjamin Means Jan 2009

A Voice-Based Framework For Evaluating Claims Of Minority Shareholder Oppression In The Close Corporation, Benjamin Means

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The Story Of Hewlett-Packard, Barbara Black Jan 2009

The Story Of Hewlett-Packard, Barbara Black

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

With the development of the modern corporation, corporate boards have been the locus of corporate authority, and particularly since the 1980s, boards and their performance have been under intense scrutiny. Nevertheless, corporate law has not developed a consistent theory for what boards are supposed to do; instead, it sends mixed messages about the functions and expectations of boards and the appropriate people to sit on them. The HP saga illustrates some of the dilemmas faced by directors confronted by these competing pressures.


Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol Jan 2009

Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate governance-the governance of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). There are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance across legal origins. In ...


Undressing The Ceo: Disclosing Private, Material Matters Of Public Company Executives, Tom C.W. Lin Jan 2009

Undressing The Ceo: Disclosing Private, Material Matters Of Public Company Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

Disclosing material private matters of public company executives is a difficult and complex but sometimes necessary act. Advocates that favor more disclosure and advocates that favor more privacy both have many legitimate arguments and concerns. This article argues that when viewed in the context of contemporary capital markets, the enhanced role of the executive, and the modern media, additional disclosure from executives about material, private matters is desirable. In support of this argument, this article proposes a principle-based approach for executive disclosure that affords companies and executives reasonable deference on what to disclose and how to disclose it, while simultaneously ...


The Real Reason Why Businesses Make Bad Decisions, Nancy B. Rapoport Jan 2009

The Real Reason Why Businesses Make Bad Decisions, Nancy B. Rapoport

Scholarly Works

This book review examines Professor Jonathan Macey's latest book on corporate governance, and it uses Professor Macey's analysis to explain the latest rash of corporate scandals.


The Corporate Lawyer's Role In A Contemporary Democracy, Colin Marks, Nancy B. Rapoport Jan 2009

The Corporate Lawyer's Role In A Contemporary Democracy, Colin Marks, Nancy B. Rapoport

Scholarly Works

This paper reviews the traditional arguments for corporate social responsibility and asks the question of what corporate lawyers should do to help their clients do the right thing ethically. It also sets out a test - the technically test -- that highlights when something is usually on the wrong side of the ethical line. (If you have to give legal advice starting with "Well, technically...," you're on the wrong side of the line.)


Conflicts And Financial Collapse: The Problem Of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2009

Conflicts And Financial Collapse: The Problem Of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate governance scholarship has long focused on conflicts of interest between firms and their top executive officers. This Essay contends that increasing leverage and financial complexity make it important for scholars to also focus on conflicts of interest between firms and their secondary managers.


Monitoring Of Corporate Groups By Independent Directors, Adam C. Pritchard Jan 2009

Monitoring Of Corporate Groups By Independent Directors, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Both the United States and Korea have reformed their corporate governance in recent years to put increasing responsibilities on independent directors. Independent directors have been found to be an important force protecting the interests of shareholders when it comes time to make certain highly salient decisions, such as firing a CEO or selling the company. This article compares the role of independent directors in the US and Korean systems. I argue that the US may have placed regulatory burdens on independent directors that they are unlikely to be able to satisfy, given their part-time status. By contrast, in the chaebol ...


Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures In An Era Of Excessive Executive Compensation And Ponzi Schemes, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong Jan 2009

Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures In An Era Of Excessive Executive Compensation And Ponzi Schemes, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong

All Faculty Scholarship

In the spring of 2009, public outcry erupted over the multi-million dollar bonuses paid to AIG executives even as the company was receiving TARP funds. Various measures were proposed in response, including a 90% retroactive tax on the bonuses, which the media described as a "clawback." Separately, the term "clawback" was also used to refer to remedies potentially available to investors defrauded in the multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff. While the media and legal commentators have used the term "clawback" reflexively, the concept has yet to be fully analyzed. In this article, we propose a doctrine of ...


Arrow's Theorem And The Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie Jan 2009

Arrow's Theorem And The Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, we contest one of the main arguments for restricting corporate board voting to shareholders. In justifying the limitation of the franchise to shareholders, scholars have repeatedly turned to social choice theory—specifically, Arrow’s theorem—to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise. Citing to the theorem, corporate law commentators have argued that lumping different groups of stakeholders together into the electorate would result in a lack of consensus and, ultimately, the lack of coherence that attends intransitive social choices, perhaps even leading the corporation to self-destruct. We contend that this argument is misguided. First, we argue that scholars ...


When 'Good' Corporate Governance Makes 'Bad' (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis And The Limits Of Private Law, Nicholas C. Howson Jan 2009

When 'Good' Corporate Governance Makes 'Bad' (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis And The Limits Of Private Law, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, investors, analysts, legislators, and pundits have spotlighted “good” or “improved” corporate governance as a remedy for all that presently ails us. It is one remedy in a long wish list that includes tougher requirements for risk capital, liquidity, and leverage; compensation and bonus reform; reimposition ofthe Glass-Steagall-like separation of bank “utility” and “casino” functions; the downsizing or breakup of institutions deemed “too big to fail;” enhanced consumer protection; securities law liability for secondary violators (like credit rating agencies); direct taxation of proprietary trading; “macroprudential” regulation; and new transparency requirements ...


The Dangers Of Equitable Remedies, Mary Siegel Jan 2009

The Dangers Of Equitable Remedies, Mary Siegel

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Introduction: "While Delaware jurisprudence is renowned for its clarity and sophistication, one area of its corporate case law is, by design, uncharacteristically ambiguous: equitable remedies. One Delaware judge summarized his equitable powers as follows: " [T]his court will use its 'broad discretion to tailor [a remedy] to suit the situationas it exists.' As Delaware has long recognized, 'the Court of Chancery [has] the inherent powers of equity to adapt its relief to the particular rights and liabilities of each party." The most well known of the equitable remedies is the Schnell doctrine, which allows the court to invalidate conduct that ...


Unconscious Bias And The Limits Of Director Independence, Antony Page Jan 2009

Unconscious Bias And The Limits Of Director Independence, Antony Page

Faculty Publications

Corporate directors make difficult decisions: How much should we pay our CEO? Should we permit a lawsuit against a fellow director? Should we sell the company? Directors are legally obligated to decide in good faith based on the business merits of the issue rather than extraneous considerations and influences. Naturally, some directors may have preferences, or even biases: Our CEO, my colleague and friend, deserves a lot; The company should not sue my fellow board member; We should not sell, because after all, I would like to remain a board member. But the courts presume that independent directors either do ...