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2009

Antitrust

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Updating The Merger Guidelines: Comments, Steven C. Salop, Serge Moresi Nov 2009

Updating The Merger Guidelines: Comments, Steven C. Salop, Serge Moresi

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

These comments (originally submitted to the DOJ and FTC in November 2009) make a number of comments relevant to revising the Merger Guidelines. The comments focus on the use of the GUPPI (gross upward pricing pressure index) in unilateral effects analysis. They also comment on the deterrence and incipiency standard, exclusionary effects of horizontal mergers and market definition when there are multi-product firms or pre-merger coordination, among other issues.


Toward A Better Competition Policy For The Media, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen P. Grunes Nov 2009

Toward A Better Competition Policy For The Media, Maurice E. Stucke, Allen P. Grunes

College of Law Faculty Scholarship

It is difficult to formulate meaningful competition policy when there is a fierce debate over the current competitiveness of the media industry. After addressing the importance of the marketplace of ideas in our democracy, our article examines the current state of the media industry, including the response of traditional media to audience declines, the growth of new media, the impact of media consolidation (including its impact on minority and women ownership), and the role of the Internet. In response to recent calls for liberalizing cross-ownership rules to protect traditional media, our article outlines why conventional antitrust policy is difficult to ...


On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit, Stolt-Neilsen S.A., V. Animalfeed International, No. 08-1198 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009), Cornelia T. Pillard Oct 2009

On Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Second Circuit, Stolt-Neilsen S.A., V. Animalfeed International, No. 08-1198 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009), Cornelia T. Pillard

U.S. Supreme Court Briefs

No abstract provided.


Quick - Somebody Call Amnesty International! Intel Says Eu Antitrust Fine Violated Human Rights, Robert H. Lande Jul 2009

Quick - Somebody Call Amnesty International! Intel Says Eu Antitrust Fine Violated Human Rights, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This articles discusses Intel's claim that the EU's fine against it for a competition law violation was so large that its human rights' were violated.


Slides: Water Leasing In The Lower Arkansas Valley: The "Super Ditch Company", Peter Nichols Jun 2009

Slides: Water Leasing In The Lower Arkansas Valley: The "Super Ditch Company", Peter Nichols

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

Presenter: Peter NIchols, Trout, Raley, Montano, Witwer & Freeman, Denver, CO

28 slides


The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande Jun 2009

The Price Of Abuse: Intel And The European Commission Decision, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The May 13, 2009 decision by the European Commission ('EC') holding that Intel violated Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome and should be fined a record amount and prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, set off a predictable four part chorus of denunciations:

  1. Intel did nothing wrong and was just competing hard;
  2. Intel's discounts were good for consumers;;
  3. The entire matter is just another example of Europeans protecting their own against a more efficient U.S. company; and;
  4. Even if Intel did engage in anticompetitive activity, the fine was much too large. These assertions will be addressed in ...


Of Myths And Evidence: An Analysis Of 40 U.S. Cases For Countries Considering A Private Right Of Action For Competition Law Violations, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis May 2009

Of Myths And Evidence: An Analysis Of 40 U.S. Cases For Countries Considering A Private Right Of Action For Competition Law Violations, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis

All Faculty Scholarship

This article assesses some of the benefits of private enforcement of the United States antitrust laws by analyzing forty large recent, successful private cases. It should help in assessing the desirability and efficacy of private enforcement - information that may prove useful to jurisdictions contemplating a private right of action for competition cases.


National Security Review Of Foreign Mergers And Acquisitions Of Domestic Companies In China And The United States, Kenneth Y. Hui Apr 2009

National Security Review Of Foreign Mergers And Acquisitions Of Domestic Companies In China And The United States, Kenneth Y. Hui

Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers

China’s recently enacted Anti-Monopoly Law has received much academic attention. In particular, many articles and comments have been written about Article 31 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, a provision on national security review of foreign mergers and acquisitions of domestic companies. The provision has often been labelled as draconian and protectionist. This paper argues that Article 31 is not necessarily so. Article 31 is actually, to a large extent, in line with the national security provisions found in liberal economies. By taking a comparative approach, this paper will demonstrate the similarities between the national security laws in China and the ...


Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2009

Analyzing Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects In Product-Differentiated Markets, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This essay offers a brief, non-technical exposition of the antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers in product differentiated markets where the resulting price increase is thought to be unilateral - that is, only the post-merger firm increases its prices while other firms in the market do not. More realistically, non-merging firms who are reasonably close in product space to the merging firm will also be able to increase their prices when the post-merger firm's prices rise. The unilateral effects theory is robust and has become quite conventional in merger analysis. There is certainly no reason for thinking that it involves any ...


The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2009

The Neal Report And The Crisis In Antitrust, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Neal Report, which was commissioned by Lyndon Johnson and published in 1967, is rightfully criticized for representing the past rather than the future of antitrust. Its authors completely embraced a theory of competition and industrial organization that had dominated American economic thinking for forty years, but was just in the process of coming to an end. The structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm that the Neal Report embodied had in fact been one of the most elegant and most tested theories of industrial organization. The theory represented the high point of structuralism in industrial organization economics, resting on the proposition that certain ...


Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Feb 2009

Mergers And Market Dominance, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Mergers involving dominant firms legitimately receive close scrutiny under the antitrust laws, even if they involve tiny firms. Further, they should be examined closely even in markets that generally exhibit low entry barriers. Many of the so-called "unilateral effects" cases in current merger law are in fact mergers that create dominant firms. The rhetoric of unilateral effects often serves to disguise this fact by presenting the situation as if it involves the ability of a small number of firms (typically two or three) in a much larger market to increase their price to unacceptable levels. In fact, if such a ...


Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande Feb 2009

Revitalizing Section 5 Of The Ftc Act Using “Consumer Choice” Analysis, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper makes two points. First, Section 5 of the FTC Act, properly construed, is indeed significantly broader and more encompassing than the Sherman Act or Clayton Act. Section 5 violations include incipient violations of the other antitrust laws, and also violations of their policy or spirit.

Second, the best - and probably the only - way to interpret Section 5 in an expansive manner is to do so in a way that also is relatively definite, predictable, principled and clearly bounded. This best can be done if Section 5 is articulated using the consumer choice framework. Without the discipline and constraints ...


Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers Jan 2009

Measuring Compliance With Compulsory Licensing Remedies In The American Microsoft Case, William H. Page, Seldon J. Childers

UF Law Faculty Publications

Section III.E of the final judgments in the American Microsoft case requires Microsoft to make available to software developers certain communications protocols that Windows client operating systems use to interoperate with Microsoft's server operating systems. This provision has been by far the most difficult and costly to implement, primarily because of questions about the quality of Microsoft's documentation of the protocols. The plaintiffs' technical experts, in testing the documentation, have found numerous issues, which they have asked Microsoft to resolve. Because of accumulation of unresolved issues, the parties agreed in 2006 to extend Section III.E for ...


Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol Jan 2009

Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate governance-the governance of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). There are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance across legal origins. In ...


The Future Of International Antitrust And Improving Antitrust Agency Capacity, D. Daniel Sokol Jan 2009

The Future Of International Antitrust And Improving Antitrust Agency Capacity, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

One of the key issues in international antitrust has been how to make antitrust more effective around the world. Most antitrust laws have been adopted or significantly modified since 1990. A number of key jurisdictions are either fairly new to antitrust altogether or to an antitrust regime that effectively employs the latest in economic thinking and the legal tools necessary to promote competition. Jurisdictions that have made antitrust a new and important cornerstone to economic policy include Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Because of the stakes involved in the ability of antitrust to foster economic development and to prevent misguided ...


Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, D. Daniel Sokol Jan 2009

Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

When government regulates, it may either intentionally or unintentionally generate restraints that reduce competition ("public restraints"). Public restraints allow a business to cloak its action in government authority and to immunize it from antitrust regulation. Private businesses may misuse the government's grant of antitrust immunity to facilitate behavior that benefits businesses at consumers' expense. One way is by obtaining government grants of immunity from antitrust scrutiny. A recent series of Supreme Court decisions has made this situation worse by limiting the reach of antitrust law in favor of sector regulation. This is true even though the Supreme Court refers ...


Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring A Rule Of Reason For Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Thom Lambert Jan 2009

Dr. Miles Is Dead. Now What?: Structuring A Rule Of Reason For Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

This article critiques six approaches that have been proposed for evaluating minimum RPM and offers an alternative approach. The six approaches critiqued are (1) the Brandeisian, unstructured rule of reason; (2) Judge Posner's rule of per se legality; (3) the approach advocated by 27 states in the recent Nine West case; (4) the approach adopted by the Federal Trade Commission in that case; (5) the approach advocated by economists William Comanor and F.M. Scherer; and (6) the approach proposed in the Areeda & Hovenkamp Antitrust Law treatise. Finding each of these approaches deficient, the article proposes an alternative evaluative ...


Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market Competition, Sungjoon Cho Jan 2009

Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market Competition, Sungjoon Cho

All Faculty Scholarship

Through trade policies such as antidumping remedies, the United States government often protects domestic producers at the expense of market competition. Yet a judicially created antitrust immunity, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, obstructs the Federal Trade Commission’s antitrust investigations of these trade remedies. This Article argues that judicial and administrative interventions are needed to restore antitrust oversight when implementing trade remedies. This Article does not propose a repealing of the current antidumping statue, an act that would be politically infeasible in the current protectionist atmosphere of Congress. Instead, it takes a more modest yet realistic stance: antidumping remedies must be sanitized ...


The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2009

The Viability Of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

A price squeeze occurs when a vertically integrated firm "squeezes' a rival's margins between a high wholesale price for an essential input sold to the rival, and a low output price to consumers for whom the two firms compete. Price squeezes have been a recognized but controversial antitrust violation for two-thirds of a century. We examine the law and economics of the price squeeze, beginning with Judge Hand's famous discussion in the Alcoa case in 1945. While Alcoa has been widely portrayed as creating a "fairness" or "fair profit" test for unlawful price squeezes, Judge Hand actually adopted ...


United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2009

United States Competition Policy In Crisis: 1890-1955, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The development of marginalist, or neoclassical, economics led to a fifty-year long crisis in competition theory. Given an industrial structure with sufficient fixed costs, competition always became "ruinous," forcing firms to cut prices to marginal cost without sufficient revenue remaining to pay off investment. Early neoclassicists such as Alfred Marshall were not able to solve this problem, and as a result many economists were hostile toward the antitrust laws in the early decades of the twentieth century. The ruinous competition debate came to an abrupt end in the early 1930's, when Joan Robinson and particularly Edward Chamberlin developed models ...


Patents, Property, And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2009

Patents, Property, And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The decision to regulate involves the identification of markets where simple assignment of property rights is not sufficient to ensure satisfactory competitive results, usually because some type of market failure obtains. By contrast, if property rights are well defined when they are initially created and can subsequently be traded to some reasonably competitive equilibrium, then regulation is thought not to be necessary. In such cases the antitrust laws have a significant role to play in ensuring that the market can be as competitive as free trading allows. One problem with the patent system is that once a patent is granted ...


Complex Bundled Discounts And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Erik Hovenkamp Jan 2009

Complex Bundled Discounts And Antitrust Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Erik Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

A bundled discount occurs when a seller conditions a discount or rebate on the buyer's purchaser or two or more different products. Firms that produce fewer than all the good in the bundle find it difficult to compete because they must amortize the discount across a smaller range of goods. For example, if the dominant firm offers a 10% discount for purchase of both good A and good B, but the rival makes only good B, it will have to offer a discount that is large enough to match the dominant firm's B discount as well as the ...


Competition Come Full Circle? Pending Legislation To Repeal The U.S. Railroad Exemption, Christopher L. Sagers Jan 2009

Competition Come Full Circle? Pending Legislation To Repeal The U.S. Railroad Exemption, Christopher L. Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Repeal of the railroad antitrust exemptions has been advocated ever since deregulation of that industry, and bills have been introduced twice to do it. However, there is no particular reason yet to believe railroad exemption repeal will occur in this Congress. The pending bills have not progressed far and have failed before, and they are opposed by the industry. But even if they progress, and assuming there is not also some significant change to the overall railroad regulatory framework, it seems unlikely that antitrust litigation will be very successful or that it will much change the status quo in rail ...


The Method And Role Of Comparative Law, Edward J. Eberle Jan 2009

The Method And Role Of Comparative Law, Edward J. Eberle

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Dagher, American Needle, And The Evolving Antitrust Theory Of The Firm: What Will Become Of Section 1?, Christopher L. Sagers Jan 2009

Dagher, American Needle, And The Evolving Antitrust Theory Of The Firm: What Will Become Of Section 1?, Christopher L. Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

This summer, on the last regularly scheduled sitting of its October 2008 Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case that could have far-reaching consequences throughout the law of Sherman Act Section 1. In the case under review, American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, the Seventh Circuit, by unanimous panel decision, entered a striking ruling in the long-running debate over whether professional sports leagues can be “single entities” under Copperweld. The court not only said yes, but did so in what is possibly the most likely context in which the member teams could have competed with one another - the licensing ...


Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright Jan 2009

Can Bundled Discounting Increase Consumer Prices Without Excluding Rivals?, Daniel A. Crane, Joshua D. Wright

Articles

Since we abhor suspense, we will quickly answer the question our title poses: No. As a general matter, bundled discounting schemes lower prices to consumers unless they are predatory—that is to say, unless they exclude rivals and thereby permit the bundled discounter to price free of competitive restraint. The corollary of this observation is that bundled discounting is generally pro-competitive and pro-consumer and should only be condemned when it is capable of excluding rivals. We pose and answer this question because it is at the heart of Section VI of Professor Elhauge’s provocative draft article which is the ...


Intellectual Liability, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Intellectual Liability, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Intellectual property is increasingly a misnomer since the right to exclude is the defining characteristic of property and incentives to engage in inventive and creative activity are increasingly being granted in the form of liability rights (which allow the holder of the right to collect a royalty from users) rather than property rights (which allow the holder of the right to exclude others from using the invention or creation). Much of this recent reorientation in the direction of liability rules arises from a concern over holdout or monopoly power in intellectual property. The debate over whether liability rules or property ...


Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Linkline's Institutional Suspicions, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust scholars are having fun again. Not so long ago, they were the poor, redheaded stepchildren of the legal academy, either pining for the older days of rigorous antitrust enforcement or trying to kill off what was left of the enterprise. Other law professors felt sorry for them, ignored them, or both. But now antitrust is making a comeback of sorts. In one heady week in May of 2009, a front-page story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney-the Obama Administration's new Antitrust Division head at the Department of Justice-to jettison the entire report ...


Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Obama's Antitrust Agenda, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Antitrust law is back in vogue. After years in the wilderness, antitrust enforcement has reemerged as a hot topic in Washington and in the legal academy. In one heady week inMay of 2009, a frontpage story in the New York Times reported the dramatic decision of Christine Varney —theObama administration’s new AntitrustDivision head—to jettison the entire report onmonopolization offenses released by the Bush JusticeDepartment just eightmonths earlier. In a speech before the Center for American Progress, Varney announced that the Justice Department is “committed to aggressively pursuing enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” As if to ...


Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2009

Bargaining In The Shadow Of Rate-Setting Courts, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Judges will tell you that they are comparatively poor rate regulators. The specialized, technical competence and supervisory capacity that public utilities commissions enjoy are usually absent from judicial chambers. Nonetheless, when granting antitrust remedies-particularly remedies for monopolistic abuse of intellectual property-courts sometimes purport to act as rate regulators for the licensing or sale of the defendant's assets. At the outset, we should distinguish between two forms ofjudicial rate setting. In one form, a court (or the FTC in its adjudicative capacity) grants a compulsory license and sets a specific rate as part of a final judgment or an order ...