Law Commons^™

Judicial Disciplinary Systems For Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives On, Carl F. Minzner

Faculty Scholarship

Local Chinese courts commonly use responsibility systems (mubiao guanli zeren zhi, zeren zhuijiu zhi) to evaluate and discipline judges. Judges receive sanctions under these systems for a wide range of behavior, such as illegal or unethical dealings with parties and lawyers, inappropriate courtroom behavior, and neglect of duty.

Many local court Chinese responsibility systems also discipline judges for simple legal error. Judges may face sanctions linked to the number of cases that are reversed on appeal, simply because the interpretation of law made by a higher court differs from that of the original trial judge. Sanctions include monetary fines and …

Riots And Cover-Ups: Counterproductive Control Of Local Agents In China, Carl F. Minzner

Faculty Scholarship

Chinese cadre responsibility systems are a core element of Chinese law and governance. These top-down personnel systems set concrete target goals linked to official salaries and career advancement. Judges and courts face annual targets for permissible numbers of mediated, reversed, and closed cases; Communist Party secretaries and government bureaus face similar targets for allowable numbers of protests, traffic accidents, and mine disasters. For many local Chinese officials, these targets have a much more direct impact on their behavior than do formal legal and regulatory norms.

This Article argues that Chinese authorities are dependent on responsibility systems, particularly their use of …

Why The Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning Over Litigation, Taisu Zhang

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, the Chinese public, when facing disputes with government officials, have preferred a non-legal means of resolution, the Xinfang system, over litigation. Some scholars explain this by claiming that administrative litigation is less effective than Xinfang petitioning. Others argue that the Chinese have historically eschewed litigation and continue to do so habitually. This paper proposes a new explanation: Chinese have traditionally litigated administrative disputes, but only when legal procedure is not too adversarial and allows for the possibility of reconciliation through court-directed settlement. Since this possibility does not formally exist in modern Chinese administrative litigation, people tend to …

The 60th Anniversary Of The Prc: A Retrospective On The Chinese Legal System – Introduction, Benjamin L. Liebman

Faculty Scholarship

Since its establishment in 1987, the Columbia Journal of Chinese Law and its successor, the Columbia Journal of Asian Law, have played an important role in publishing English language scholarship about the law of China and Asia. An important part of this mission has been the publication of scholarship not only by scholars in the United States and Europe, but also by scholars from China and elsewhere in Asia. I am delighted that this special edition of the Journal, marking the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China and thirty years of legal reforms in China, …

Banking Reform In The Chinese Mirror, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This paper analyzes the transactions that led to the partial privatization of China’s three largest banks in 2005-06. It suggests that these transactions were structured to allow for inter-organizational learning under conditions of uncertainty. For the involved foreign investors, participation in large financial intermediaries of central importance to the Chinese economy gave them the opportunity to learn about financial governance in China. For the Chinese banks partnering with more than one foreign investor, their participation allowed them to benefit from the input by different players in the global financial market place and to learn from the range of technical and …