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You've Got Your Mother's Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn From The Her/History Of Divorce And Child Custody Mediation, Nancy A. Welsh
You've Got Your Mother's Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn From The Her/History Of Divorce And Child Custody Mediation, Nancy A. Welsh
Faculty Scholarship
Due to our current deep economic woes, growing bankruptcy filings, and apparent legislative unwillingness to expand the number of judges, bankruptcy courts are exploring the use of mediation to help resolve adversary proceedings, negotiate elements of reorganizations, and deal with claims that cannot be heard directly in bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, mediation advocates have been consistent in urging greater use of the process to reduce debtors’ and claimants’ costs, bridge the jurisdictional and standing challenges that bankruptcies can pose, and offer claimants the opportunity to be heard and determine their own resolution of claims. At this point, the relatively few …
Overlooking Tort Claimants' Best Interests: Non-Debtor Releases In Asbestos Bankruptcies , Joshua M. Silverstein
Overlooking Tort Claimants' Best Interests: Non-Debtor Releases In Asbestos Bankruptcies , Joshua M. Silverstein
Faculty Scholarship
The asbestos crisis has spawned the development of extraordinary new remedies. One of the most dramatic and controversial is known as a "non-debtor release," a bankruptcy order extinguishing claims against a party who has not itself filed for bankruptcy. Also known as a "third-party release," this form of relief first found acceptance in early asbestos insolvencies. Since that time, Congress has passed a statute—§ 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code—that expressly authorizes non-debtor releases in asbestos reorganizations. Powerful remedies are subject to abuse, and third-party releases are no exception. In this article, I argue that bankruptcy courts and litigants have overlooked …
Creditor Control And Conflict In Chapter 11, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison
Creditor Control And Conflict In Chapter 11, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze a sample of large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions during 2001. We find pervasive creditor control. In contrast to traditional views of Chapter 11, equity holders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process. 70 percent of CEOs are replaced in the two years before a bankruptcy filing, and few reorganization plans (at most 12 percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule to distribute value to equity holders. Senior lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants, such as line-item budgets, in loans extended to firms in bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors …
Debt, Bankruptcy, And The Life Course, Allison Mann, Ronald J. Mann, Sophie Staples
Debt, Bankruptcy, And The Life Course, Allison Mann, Ronald J. Mann, Sophie Staples
Faculty Scholarship
This Essay considers the significance of credit markets and bankruptcy for life course mobility. Comparing parallel data from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), it analyzes use of the bankruptcy process as a function of the distribution of unplanned events, the ability of households to use credit markets to limit the adverse effects of such events, and barriers in access to the bankruptcy system. Our findings suggest two things. One, although the financial characteristics of filers vary markedly by age and race, bankrupt households generally come from the bottom quartiles of the …
Chrysler, Gm And The Future Of Chapter 11, Edward R. Morrison
Chrysler, Gm And The Future Of Chapter 11, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
Although they caused great controversy, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies broke no new ground. They invoked procedures that are commonly observed in modern Chapter 11 reorganization cases. Government involvement did not distort the bankruptcy process; it instead exposed the reality that Chapter 11 offers secured creditors – especially those that supply financing during the bankruptcy case – control over the fate of distressed firms. Because the federal government supplied financing in the Chrysler and GM cases, it possessed the creditor control normally exercised by private lenders. The Treasury Department found itself with virtually the same, unchecked power that the FDIC …
Is The Bankruptcy Code An Adequate Mechanism For Resolving The Distress Of Systemically Important Institutions?, Edward R. Morrison
Is The Bankruptcy Code An Adequate Mechanism For Resolving The Distress Of Systemically Important Institutions?, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
The President and members of Congress are considering proposals that would give the government broad authority to rescue financial institutions whose failure might threaten market stability. These systemically important institutions include bank and insurance holding companies, investment banks, and other "large, highly leveraged, and interconnected" entities that are not currently subject to federal resolution authority. Interest in these proposals stems from the credit crisis, particularly the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. That bankruptcy, according to some observers, caused massive destabilization in credit markets for two reasons. First, market participants were surprised that the government would permit a massive market player to …