Law Commons^™

Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Considers Community's Racial Tension With Police In Finding Illegal Seizure And Lack Of Voluntary Consent. — United States V. Washington, 490 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2007), Portia Pedro

Faculty Scholarship

The traditional story of Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine involves a complex compromise between public safety and the constitutional right to personal liberty. Although the choice of viewpoint is often left out of the story, much also depends on whose perspective — police officers’ or civilians’ — a judge employs for search and seizure determinations. The chosen perspective circumscribes the types of facts that a judge considers in these evaluations. In United States v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court should have suppressed evidence obtained through a vehicle search because the consent was not voluntary, or, …

Warrantless Location Tracking, Ian Samuel

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The ubiquity of cell phones has transformed police investigations. Tracking a suspect's movements by following her phone is now a common but largely unnoticed surveillance technique. It is useful, no doubt, precisely because it is so revealing; it also raises significant privacy concerns. In this Note, I consider what the procedural requirements for cell phone tracking should be by examining the relevant statutory and constitutional law. Ultimately, the best standard is probable cause; only an ordinary warrant can satisfy the text of the statutes and the mandates of the Constitution.

Waiting For The Other Shoe: Hudson And The Precarious State Of Mapp, David A. Moran

Articles

I have no idea whether my death will be noted in the New York Times. But if it is, I fear the headline of my obituary will look something like: "Professor Dies; Lost Hudson v. Michigan' in Supreme Court, Leading to Abolition of Exclusionary Rule." The very existence of this Symposium panel shows, I think, that my fear is well-grounded. On the other hand, I am not quite as fearful that Hudson foreshadows the complete overruling of Mapp v. Ohio2 and Weeks v. United States3 as I was when I published an article just three months after the Hudson decision …

The Automobile Exception In Nevada: A Critique Of The Harnisch Cases, Thomas B. Mcaffee, John P. Lukens, Thaddeus J. Yurek Iii

Scholarly Works

This Article offers a critique of Nevada's Harnisch cases and calls for the Nevada Supreme Court to reconsider its ruling. The authors begin by examining the historical development of the automobile exception, beginning with Carroll v. United States. There the Supreme Court reasoned that both probable cause and the exigency of the mobility of automobiles justified a search without a warrant. But almost seventy-five years later, in Maryland v. Dyson, the Court clarified its conclusion that the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement. In turn, the authors will then examine Nevada's application of the automobile exception prior to 1998's …

In The Trenches: Searches And The Misunderstood Common-Law History Of Suspicion And Probable Cause, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

A detailed analysis of the common law during the Framers’ era, and of how it reflected the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions, shows that many judges believed they could issue search warrants without independently assessing the adequacy of probable cause, and that this view persisted even after the Fourth Amendment became effective. This conclusion challenges the leading originalist account of the Fourth Amendment, which Professor Thomas Davies published in the Michigan Law Review in 1999.

Learned treatises in particular, and to a lesser extent a few case decisions, had articulated a judicial duty to monitor probable cause. But it is a mistake …

A Response To Professor Steinberg’S Fourth Amendment Chutzpah, Fabio Arcila

Scholarly Works

Professor David Steinberg believes that the Fourth Amendment was intended only to provide some protection against physical searches of homes through imposition of a specific warrant requirement because the Framers' only object in promulgating the Fourth Amendment was to ban physical searches of homes under general warrants or no warrants at all. This response essay takes issue with his thesis by (1) discussing its implications, (2) reviewing some concerns with his methodology in reviewing the historical record, and (3) examining the theoretical implication underlying his thesis that, except as to homes, we have a majoritarian Fourth Amendment, and questioning whether …