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Full-Text Articles in Law
Algorithmic Entities, Lynn M. Lopucki
Algorithmic Entities, Lynn M. Lopucki
UF Law Faculty Publications
In a 2014 article, Professor Shawn Bayern demonstrated that anyone can confer legal personhood on an autonomous computer algorithm by putting it in control of a limited liability company. Bayern’s demonstration coincided with the development of “autonomous” online businesses that operate independently of their human owners—accepting payments in online currencies and contracting with human agents to perform the off-line aspects of their businesses. About the same time, leading technologists Elon Musk, Bill Gates, and Stephen Hawking said that they regard human-level artificial intelligence as an existential threat to the human race. This Article argues that algorithmic entities—legal entities that have …
One Share, One Vote And The False Promise Of Shareholder Homogeneity, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
One Share, One Vote And The False Promise Of Shareholder Homogeneity, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Shareholder democracy has blossomed. The once moribund shareholder franchise is now critical in takeover contests, merger decisions, and board oversight. However, the mechanisms of this vote remain largely undertheorized. In this Article, we use voting rights and social choice theory to develop a new approach to the corporate franchise. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found its …
The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
The False Promise Of One Share, One Vote, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie
All Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder democracy has blossomed. The once moribund shareholder franchise is now critical in takeover contests, merger decisions, and board oversight. However, the mechanisms of this vote remain largely under theorized. In this Article, we use voting rights and social choice theory to develop a new approach to the corporate franchise. Political democracies typically tie the right to vote to the level of a person's interest in the outcome of the election. Corporate democracies, on the other hand, tend to define the requisite institutional interest quite narrowly, and thus restrict the right to vote to shareholders alone. This restriction has found …