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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Shareholder Litigation: The Accidental Elegance Of Aronson V. Lewis, David A. Skeel Jr.
Shareholder Litigation: The Accidental Elegance Of Aronson V. Lewis, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
Unlike many key corporate law decisions, the 1984 Delaware Supreme Court decision in Aronson v. Lewis was not heralded by stories in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times, nor in any other newspaper of note. Even now, few people other than corporate law experts are likely to recognize the name. Yet Aronson plays a pivotal role in many corporate law decisions that do get a lot more attention. Aronson established the parameters for filing derivative litigation against the directors of a corporation (or a third party, but derivative suits against third parties are now rare). A shareholder …
Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
Hedge Funds In Corporate Governance And Corporate Control, Marcel Kahan, Edward B. Rock
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Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform. We argue that hedge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than intermittent and ex post). The reasons for these differences may lie in …
The Missing Monitor In Corporate Governance: The Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurer, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith
The Missing Monitor In Corporate Governance: The Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurer, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith
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This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect D&O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors: first, monitoring provides insurers with a way to manage moral hazard; second, monitoring provides benefits to shareholders who might not otherwise need the risk distribution that D&O insurance provides; and third, the “bonding” provided by risk distribution gives insurers a comparative advantage in monitoring. Nevertheless, we find that D&O insurers neither monitor corporate governance during the life of the insurance …
Who Writes The Rules For Hostile Takeovers, And Why? The Peculiar Divergence Of Us And Uk Takeover Regulation, John Armour, David A. Skeel Jr.
Who Writes The Rules For Hostile Takeovers, And Why? The Peculiar Divergence Of Us And Uk Takeover Regulation, John Armour, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch
Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact On Shareholders And Other Constituents, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence From The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith
Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence From The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch
Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
Regulators responded to the analyst scandals of the late 1990s by imposing extensive new rules on the research industry. These rules include a requirement forcing financial firms to separate investment banking operations from research. Regulators argued, with questionable empirical support, that the reforms were necessary to eliminate analyst conflicts of interest and ensure the integrity of sell-side research.
By eliminating investment banking revenues as a source for funding research, the reforms have had substantial effects. Research coverage of small issuers has been dramatically reduced—the vast majority of small capitalization firms now have no coverage at all. The market for research …