Law Commons^™

The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, And The Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response To Justice Scalia, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a five to three majority of the United States Supreme Court held unlawful the Bush Administration's use of military commissions to try alien combatant detainees held at the United States airbase in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba-at least until and unless Congress enacted more specific authorization for the composition and procedures of the commissions. 1 There are many features of the Court's opinion that we find questionable: its analysis of the wartime scope of the "executive Power"2 vested in the President by Article II of the Constitution,3 its construction of the statutes that supposedly limit the President's power …

The Incredible Shrinking Constitutional Theory: From The Partial Constitution To The Minimal Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Cass Sunstein and I have written fundamentally different books. My Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy' puts forward a liberal Constitution-perfecting theory, one that aspires to interpret the American Constitution so as to make it the best it can be. Sunstein's Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing Courts Are Wrong for America2 advances a minimalist critique of radical conservative constitutional theories of "fundamentalism" that call for restoring the "Constitution in exile."

Ordinary Powers In Extraordinary Times: Common Sense In Times Of Crisis Symposium: Extraordinary Powers In Ordinary Times, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution was written, debated, ratified, and implemented in the shadow of crisis. The country was birthed in war. In the aftermath of ratification, opponents of the Constitution could have precipitated a civil war that would have jeopardized the survival of the fledgling national government. I Throughout the founding era, any number of European powers were perceived to pose a serious threat of invasion. 2 Well into the 1800s, especially in certain northeastern states, substantial homegrown support for realignment with England persisted; the possibility of an internal rebellion in those areas was quite real.3 Individuals interested more in power …

The Balkanization Of Originalism, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Are we all originalists now? If anything would prompt that question, it would be Ronald Dworkin and Jack Balkin dressing up their theories in the garb of originalism (or, at any rate, being interpreted as originalists). For they are exemplars of two bete noires of originalism as conventionally understood: namely, the moral reading of the Constitution, and pragmatic, living constitutionalism, respectively.' Yet in recent years Dworkin has been interpreted as an abstract originalist2 and Balkin has now embraced the method of text and principle, which he presents as a form of abstract originalism.'

Police Interrogation During Traffic Stops: More Questions Than Answers, Tracey Maclin

Faculty Scholarship

This short paper focuses on whether the Fourth Amendment permits police, during a routine traffic stop, to arbitrarily question motorists about subjects unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop. The paper was prompted by a recent Ninth Circuit ruling, United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2007), which was authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt.

Prior to Mendez, the Ninth Circuit had taken the position that the Fourth Amendment barred police from questioning motorists about subjects unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop, unless there was independent suspicion for such questioning. This rule was based on the …

Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In Part I of this Article, the author briefly recaps the argument against precedent that the author sketched in The Constitutional Case Against Precedent. Although the author’s purpose here is to refine that argument, the author still believes that the original argument is right in most particulars, and it still functions as a prima facie case against the use of precedent in constitutional interpretation. In Part II, the author surveys different possible grounds for the practice of precedent. In Part III, the author dismisses the possibility that the Constitution or some other controlling legal source affirmatively commands the use of …