Law Commons^™

Standards Ownership And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust law is a blunt instrument for dealing with many claims of anticompetitive standard setting. Antitrust fact finders lack the sophistication to pass judgment on the substantive merits of a standard. In any event, antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad standards. It requires an injury to competition, and whether the minimum conditions for competitive harm are present can often be determined without examining the substance of the standard itself.

When government involvement in standard setting is substantial antitrust challenges should generally be rejected. The petitioning process in a democratic system protects even bad legislative judgments from collateral …

Conservation Cartels: How Competition Policy Conflicts With Environmental Protection, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

The alleged purpose of antitrust law is to improve consumer welfare by proscribing actions and arrangements that reduce output and increase prices. Conservation seeks to improve human welfare by maximizing the long-term productive use of natural resources, a goal that often requires limiting consumption to sustainable levels. While conservation measures might increase prices in the short run, they enhance consumer welfare by increasing long-term production and ensuring the availability of valued resources over time. That is true whether the restrictions are imposed by a private conservation cartel or a government agency. Insofar as antitrust law fails to take this into …

The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the optimal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States cartels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which …

Do Ask And Do Tell: Rethinking The Lawyer’S Duty To Warn In Domestic Violence Cases, Margaret B. Drew, Sarah Buel

Faculty Publications

Empirical data document that while domestic violence victims face high risk of recurring abuse, batterers’ lawyers may be privy to information that could avert further harm. Attorneys owe a duty of confidentiality to their clients that can be breached only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when counsel learns her client plans to commit a crime. To resolve the tension between client confidentiality and victim safety, this Article argues that, in the context of domestic violence cases, lawyers have an affirmative duty to (1) screen battering clients who have indicated a likelihood of harming others, (2) attempt to dissuade them from …