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2006

Antitrust

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Articles 1 - 23 of 23

Full-Text Articles in Law

Antitrust And Competition Law Update: U.S. V. Visa: Government Wins Major Rule Of Reason Case, William Kolasky, Robert Bell, Lee Greenfield, Veronica Kayne, Jim Lowe, Doug Melamed, Thomas Mueller, Ali Stoeppelwerth Oct 2006

Antitrust And Competition Law Update: U.S. V. Visa: Government Wins Major Rule Of Reason Case, William Kolasky, Robert Bell, Lee Greenfield, Veronica Kayne, Jim Lowe, Doug Melamed, Thomas Mueller, Ali Stoeppelwerth

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series

On September 17, 2003, the Second Circuit issued an important decision in U.S. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 2003 WL 22138519 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2003). The court affirmed a district court ruling invalidating Visa and Mastercard rules that prohibit member banks from issuing American Express or Discover.1 The district court had found that these ìexclusionary rulesî substantially harmed competition and failed scrutiny under a rule of reason analysis. Visa is noteworthy both because it is a (relatively rare) government win in a major rule of reason case ó with the Second Circuit affirming the trial courtís ...


Understanding Single-Firm Behavior: Empirical Perspectives Session, Jonathan Baker, Luke Froeb, Robert Marshall, Wally Mullin, David Reitman, F. Michael Scherer, Clifford Winston Sep 2006

Understanding Single-Firm Behavior: Empirical Perspectives Session, Jonathan Baker, Luke Froeb, Robert Marshall, Wally Mullin, David Reitman, F. Michael Scherer, Clifford Winston

Presentations

In 2006 and 2007, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cohosted hearings on single-firm conduct and antitrust law. For more information, consult the hearings information page or contact the Legal Policy Section at singlefirmconduct@usdoj.gov.


Economic Evidence In Antitrust: Defining Markets And Measuring Market Power In Paolo Buccirossi, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan Sep 2006

Economic Evidence In Antitrust: Defining Markets And Measuring Market Power In Paolo Buccirossi, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This paper addresses an important aspect of the interdisciplinary collaboration between law and economics: the use antitrust courts can and should make of empirical industrial organization economics, in light of the expansion of empirical knowledge generated during the last few decades. First we show how courts can apply what economists have learned about identification of alternative theories of industry structure and firm strategy to the problems of defining markets and determining whether market power has been exercised. We emphasize that the same analytic issues arise regardless of whether the evidence on these concepts is quantitative or qualitative. Second we show ...


Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, Robert H. Lande Apr 2006

Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article examines five common beliefs about antitrust damages and shows they all are untrue.

Myth #1. Antitrust violations give rise to treble damages.

Myth #2. There is "duplication" of antitrust damages because many defendants pay six-fold or more damages.

Myth #3. Courts should go easy on defendants when formulating liability rules or calculating overcharges because the awarded damages from a finding of an antitrust violation are so severe.

Myth #4. The size of the harms caused by antitrust violations, even by such "hardcore" violations as naked cartels, is relatively modest, and criminal penalties resulting from violations are out of ...


Standards Ownership And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2006

Standards Ownership And Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Antitrust law is a blunt instrument for dealing with many claims of anticompetitive standard setting. Antitrust fact finders lack the sophistication to pass judgment on the substantive merits of a standard. In any event, antitrust is not a roving mandate to question bad standards. It requires an injury to competition, and whether the minimum conditions for competitive harm are present can often be determined without examining the substance of the standard itself.

When government involvement in standard setting is substantial antitrust challenges should generally be rejected. The petitioning process in a democratic system protects even bad legislative judgments from collateral ...


Conservation Cartels: How Competition Policy Conflicts With Environmental Protection, Jonathan H. Adler Feb 2006

Conservation Cartels: How Competition Policy Conflicts With Environmental Protection, Jonathan H. Adler

Faculty Publications

The alleged purpose of antitrust law is to improve consumer welfare by proscribing actions and arrangements that reduce output and increase prices. Conservation seeks to improve human welfare by maximizing the long-term productive use of natural resources, a goal that often requires limiting consumption to sustainable levels. While conservation measures might increase prices in the short run, they enhance consumer welfare by increasing long-term production and ensuring the availability of valued resources over time. That is true whether the restrictions are imposed by a private conservation cartel or a government agency. Insofar as antitrust law fails to take this into ...


The Law Of Exclusionary Pricing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2006

The Law Of Exclusionary Pricing, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The success of the Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing and the Supreme Court's adoption of demanding proof requirements in its 1993 Brooke Group decision have made it very difficult for plaintiffs to win conventional predatory pricing claims. While many challenges to exclusionary pricing continue to be made, the legal theory has evolved away from classical predation to a variety of other theories. These include challenges to quantity and market share discounts, single item and package discounts, and various purchasing practices, including slotting fees, overinvestment in fixed cost assets, and overbuying of variable cost inputs. Plaintiffs have enjoyed somewhat greater ...


Major Events And Policy Issues In Ec Competition Law, 2004-2005 (Part 1), John Ratliff Jan 2006

Major Events And Policy Issues In Ec Competition Law, 2004-2005 (Part 1), John Ratliff

Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series

This article is designed to offer an overview of the major events and policy issues related to Arts 81, 82 and 86 EC in 2004–2005. The article follows the format of previous years and is divided into three sections: — A general overview of major events (legislation and notices, European Court cases, European Commission decisions, ECN developments and new sector inquiries). — Discussion of current policy issues, including cartel enforcement, private actions and Art.82 EC modernisation. — An outline of certain areas of specific interest, notably competition and the liberal professions, the Commission’s ‘‘Sport and 3G’’ review and a DG ...


The 'Failure To Mitigate' Defense In Antitrust, Thom Lambert Jan 2006

The 'Failure To Mitigate' Defense In Antitrust, Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

The article begins with the premise that any failure to mitigate defense should aim to minimize the sum of three costs: the costs associated with inefficient behavior by defendants, the costs associated with inefficient behavior by plaintiffs, and the administrative costs of claim adjudication. If cost minimization is the goal, then whether a failure to mitigate defense exists, and the content of the antitrust plaintiff’s mitigation requirement, should differ depending on the type of damages the plaintiff is seeking to recover. The bulk of this article discusses how the defense should apply to different damages claims.The article proceeds ...


Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model , Thom Lambert Jan 2006

Tweaking Antitrust's Business Model , Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

This essay evaluates Hovenkamp's suggestions, concluding that most are sound, that a few might be slightly revised to enhance their effectiveness or administrability, and that a couple are downright unwise. In particular, the essay criticizes Hovenkamp's call for abandonment of the indirect purchaser rule and his proposed test for identifying exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.


Weyerhaeuser And The Search For Antitrust's Holy Grail, Thom Lambert Jan 2006

Weyerhaeuser And The Search For Antitrust's Holy Grail, Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

A general definition of exclusionary conduct has become a sort of Holy Grail for antitrust scholars. At present, four proposed definitions appear most promising: (1) conduct that could exclude an equally efficient rival; (2) conduct that raises rivals' costs unjustifiably; (3) conduct that, on balance, impairs consumer welfare by creating market power without providing countervailing consumer benefits; and (4) conduct that makes no economic sense but for its exclusionary effect on rivals.


Rankings, Reductionism, And Responsibility, Frank Pasquale Jan 2006

Rankings, Reductionism, And Responsibility, Frank Pasquale

Faculty Scholarship

After discussing how search engines operate, and sketching a normative basis for regulation of the rankings they generate, this piece proposes some minor, non-intrusive legal remedies for those who claim that they are harmed by search engine results. Such harms include unwanted (but high-ranking) results relating to them, or exclusion from high-ranking results they claim they are due to appear on. In the first case (deemed inclusion harm), I propose a right not to suppress the results, but merely to add an asterisk to the hyperlink directing web users to them, which would lead to the complainant's own comment ...


Antitrust And Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like Mcdonald's And Less Like The United Nations, Stephen F. Ross, Stefan Szymanski Jan 2006

Antitrust And Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like Mcdonald's And Less Like The United Nations, Stephen F. Ross, Stefan Szymanski

Journal Articles

Antitrust law generally favors joint ventures that allow separate firms to integrate economic functions while continuing to compete as independent entities. In evaluating the risks to competition that joint ventures could pose, insufficient attention has been paid to the risk that joint ventures with market power may be structured so that the parties, acting in their independent self interest, will prevent the venture from providing innovative goods and services responsive to consumer demand. In these cases, it may be better if a single firm provided services rather than having them provided jointly.

We illustrate this problem by challenging the conventional ...


Refusals To Deal With Competitors By Owners Of Patents And Copyrights: Reflections On The Image Technical And Xerox Decisions, Joseph P. Bauer Jan 2006

Refusals To Deal With Competitors By Owners Of Patents And Copyrights: Reflections On The Image Technical And Xerox Decisions, Joseph P. Bauer

Journal Articles

Under the patent and copyright laws, the owner of a patent for an invention or of a copyright for a work has the right to sell, license or transfer it, to exploit it individually and exclusively, or even to decide to withhold it from the public. By contrast, under the antitrust laws, a unilateral refusal to deal may constitute an element of a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and the courts may then impose a duty on the violator to deal with others, including possibly with its actual or would-be competitors.

The central question addressed by this ...


Antitrust & Hospital Mergers: Does The Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive Substance?, Thomas L. Greaney Jan 2006

Antitrust & Hospital Mergers: Does The Nonprofit Form Affect Competitive Substance?, Thomas L. Greaney

All Faculty Scholarship

Following a string of government losses in cases challenging hospital mergers in federal court, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice issued their report on competition in health care seeking to set the record straight on a number of issues that underlie the judiciary's resolution of these cases. One such issue is the import of nonprofit status for applying antitrust law. This essay describes antitrust's role in addressing the consolidation in the hospital sector and the subtle influence that the social function of the nonprofit hospital has had in merger litigation. Noting that the political and ...


Transnational Regulatory Litigation, Hannah Buxbaum Jan 2006

Transnational Regulatory Litigation, Hannah Buxbaum

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Recent years have seen much debate about the role of national courts in addressing global harms. That debate has focused on the application by domestic courts of international law - for instance, in civil actions brought in U.S. courts to enforce human rights law. This article identifies a parallel development in the area of economic regulation. It classifies and analyzes a category of cases that seek the application of regulatory law by domestic courts in situations involving global economic misconduct. Like the public international law cases, these cases highlight the tension between the benefits to be gained by enhanced enforcement ...


Antitrust Around The World: An Empirical Analysis Of The Scope Of Competition Laws And Their Effects, Keith Hylton Jan 2006

Antitrust Around The World: An Empirical Analysis Of The Scope Of Competition Laws And Their Effects, Keith Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper investigates a dataset that codes key features of the competition laws of 102 countries. It first compares the scope of the laws overall, and of various subcomponents such as the law governing dominance, collusive conduct, and mergers. The second question examined in this paper is whether competition law has any effect on the intensity of competition within a nation. We find, in ordinary least squares regressions, thatthe scope of a country's competition law is positively associated with the perceived intensity of competition inthe country's economy. However, we find no evidence that the scope of competition law ...


The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande Jan 2006

The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the optimal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States cartels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which ...


Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande Jan 2006

Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this commentary is to analyze some of the empirical issues that help lay the foundation for the policy conclusions in the excellent and provocative article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion (hereinafter "D&E"). To oversimplify, D&E asserts that discounts usually are procompetitive. It also concedes, but essentially in its footnotes, that discounts can be anticompetitive, but argues that these anticompetitive situations are so rare they should have little impact on public policy. D&E then asserts that efficiencies from discounts are common and significant. It then asserts that the only way to bring clarity ...


The Demise Of Regulation In Ocean Shipping: A Study In The Evolution Of Competition Policy And The Predictive Power Of Microeconomics, Christopher L. Sagers Jan 2006

The Demise Of Regulation In Ocean Shipping: A Study In The Evolution Of Competition Policy And The Predictive Power Of Microeconomics, Christopher L. Sagers

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Over its 140 year history, ocean liner shipping has almost always enjoyed an antitrust exemption permitting price-fixing cartels of ocean carriers. The exemption was premised on the belief that problems of cost and capacity inherent in the trade can be resolved only by horizontal collusion. Now that that exemption has been whittled away by deregulatory efforts, the pre- and post-deregulation evidence presents one of the world's rare opportunities for natural experiment on the behavior and effectiveness of collusive cartel pricing. Moreover, because normal and effective competition never really existed prior to 1998, the normative foundation of the antitrust exemption ...


Why Have A Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms In Communications, Tim Wu Jan 2006

Why Have A Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms In Communications, Tim Wu

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents telecommunications law with a challenge: how much of the present Telecommunication's Acts objectives might be accomplished with a focus on a central anti-discrimination rule? The one-rule model provides one answer. This rule should be (1) a general norm that is technologically neutral, (2) in the form of an ex ante rule with ex poste remedies, and (3) anchored on a model of consumers' rights. The form of the rule recommended here is hardly radical. It is, rather, something of a restatement of the best of telecommunications practice based on decades of telecommunications experience. It borrows from ...


Fielding A Team For The Fans: The Societal Consequences And Title Vii Implications Of Race-Considered Roster Construction In Professional Sport, N. Jeremi Duru Jan 2006

Fielding A Team For The Fans: The Societal Consequences And Title Vii Implications Of Race-Considered Roster Construction In Professional Sport, N. Jeremi Duru

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Professional sports organizations' relationships with their players are, like other employer-employee relationships, subject to scrutiny under the antidiscrimination mandates embedded in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Professional sports organizations are, however, unique among employers in many respects. Most notably, unlike other employers, professional sports organizations attract avid supporters who identify deeply with the teams and their players. To the extent an organization racially discriminates, therefore, such discrimination creates the risk that fans will identify with the homogenous or racially disproportionate roster that results. The consequences of such race-based team identification are wide-reaching and potentially tragic. Through ...


Competition Policy As A Political Bartain, Jonathan Baker Jan 2006

Competition Policy As A Political Bartain, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Competition policy in the U.S. may be understood as a self-enforcing political bargain emerging from a repeated political interaction between two large and diffuse interest groups, consumers and producers. Absent such a bargain, regulatory policy would fluctuate between pro-producer policies that tolerate the exercise of market power and pro-consumer policies that systematically redistribute surplus from producers to consumers. This perspective is consistent with the broad contours of the historical U.S. experience with antitrust, particularly with the continuity in antitrust enforcement and decline in the political salience of competition policy since the 1940s. The adoption of Chicago school views ...