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Full-Text Articles in Law
Tradable Pollution Permits And The Regulatory Game, Jason S. Johnston
Tradable Pollution Permits And The Regulatory Game, Jason S. Johnston
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This paper analyzes polluters' incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs …
Signaling Social Responsibility: On The Law And Economics Of Market Incentives For Corporate Environmental Performance, Jason S. Johnston
Signaling Social Responsibility: On The Law And Economics Of Market Incentives For Corporate Environmental Performance, Jason S. Johnston
All Faculty Scholarship
This article analyzes the law and economics of market internalization: the capability of markets to both penalize and reward firms for their environmental, health and safety performance. As for market sticks, the article maintains that market transactions - both private and public sales of corporate assets as well as transactions in publicly traded securities - are an important avenue through which firms realize comparative advantages in regulatory compliance, and that such transactions have the potential to significantly enhance corporate environmental and social performance. Asset transactions tend to drive environmental cleanup and transfer assets to firms that are better able to …