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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Property As Legal Knowledge: Means And Ends, Annelise Riles
Property As Legal Knowledge: Means And Ends, Annelise Riles
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This article takes anthropologists’ renewed interest in property theory as an opportunity to consider legal theory-making as an ethnographic subject in its own right. My focus is on one particular construct – the instrument, or relation of means to ends, that animates both legal and anthropological theories about property. An analysis of the workings of this construct leads to the conclusion that rather than critique the ends of legal knowledge, the anthropology of property should devote itself to articulating its own means.
Real Time: Unwinding Technocratic And Anthropological Knowledge, Annelise Riles
Real Time: Unwinding Technocratic And Anthropological Knowledge, Annelise Riles
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
“The Bank of Japan is our mother,” bankers in Tokyo sometimes said of Japan's central bank. Drawing on this metaphor as an ethnographic resource, and on the example of central bankers who sought to unwind their own technocratic knowledge by replacing it with a real-time machine, I retrace the ethnographic task of unwinding technocratic knowledge from those anthropological knowledge practices that critique technocracy. In so doing, I draw attention to special methodological problems—involving the relationship between ethnography, analysis, and reception—in the representation and critique of contemporary knowledge practices.
After Bureaucracy, Michael C. Dorf
After Bureaucracy, Michael C. Dorf
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Enriching The Contracts Course, Robert A. Hillman
Enriching The Contracts Course, Robert A. Hillman
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Civil Obedience, W. Bradley Wendel
Civil Obedience, W. Bradley Wendel
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Discussions of legal ethics generally assume that lawyers should deliberate straightforwardly on the basis of reasons to act or refrain from acting. This model of deliberation fails to account for the role of the law in resolving normative disagreement and coordinating social activity by people who do not share comprehensive ethical doctrines. The law represents a collective decision about what citizens ought to do, which replaces the reasons individuals would otherwise have to act. This Article contends that legal ethics ought to be understood as an aspect of this theory of the authority of law. On this account, lawyers have …
Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference For Landownership In Regulatory Takings Law, Eduardo M. Peñalver
Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference For Landownership In Regulatory Takings Law, Eduardo M. Peñalver
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This article critiques the Court's attempt to cabin the Lucas "per se" takings rule by limiting it to real property. It argues that the distinction between real and personal property cannot be justified by history or the differing expectations of property owners. It then applies five theoretical frameworks (libertarian, personhood, utilitarian, public choice, and Thomistic-Aristotelian natural law) and finds that none of them supports the jurisprudential distinction between real and personal property. As a result, the article argues that "because the distinction between personal and real property is an unprincipled one, it cannot save the Court from the unpalatable implications …