Law Commons^™

Learning From Practice: What Adr Needs From A Theory Of Justice, Kate Kruse

Faculty Scholarship

Adding to the impressive body of work that has made her a leading voice in the fields of both alternative dispute resolution and professional responsibility, Carrie Menkel-Meadow's Saltman Lecture connects the theoretical exploration currently occurring on two parallel tracks: (1) theories of justice that investigate the ideal of a deliberative democracy; and (2) theories of alternative dispute resolution arising from its reflective practice. As she notes, theorists on both tracks are grappling with similar questions about the processes or conditions that will best bring together parties with widely divergent viewpoints to consensus-building dialogue around contested issues.

While Menkel-Meadow focuses on …

Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination On Mediator Values Beyond Self Determination And Neutrality, James Coben

Faculty Scholarship

The author asserts that the exclusive reliance on the "Two Towers" of self-determination and neutrality as the foundation for mediation practice has inevitably left us with a process routinely characterized by mediator manipulation and deception. The "tricks" are tolerated by sophisticated repeat players, and absent transparency in practice, disturbingly not known to others. The evolution of mediation, from empowerment/community roots to corporate/court sustenance, is no surprise given the nation's journey through the Reagan revolution, the ideology of free markets, and the Supreme Court's unbridled support for freedom to contract in disputing. In short, mediation is at a crossroads needing to …

Procedural Justice, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article begins in part I, Introduction, with two observations. First, the function of procedure is to particularize general substantive norms so that they can guide action. Second, the hard problem of procedural justice corresponds to the following question: How can we regard ourselves as obligated by legitimate authority to comply with a judgment that we believe (or even know) to be in error with respect to the substantive merits?

The theory of procedural justice is developed in several stages, beginning with some preliminary questions and problems. The first question--what is procedure?--is the most difficult and requires an extensive …