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Cooperative Research And Technology Enhancement (Create) Act Of 2003: Hearing On H. R. 2390 Before The H. Subcomm. On Courts, The Internet And Intellectual Property Of The H. Comm. On The Judiciary, 108th Cong., June 10, 2003 (Statement Of John R. Thomas, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), John R. Thomas Jun 2003

Cooperative Research And Technology Enhancement (Create) Act Of 2003: Hearing On H. R. 2390 Before The H. Subcomm. On Courts, The Internet And Intellectual Property Of The H. Comm. On The Judiciary, 108th Cong., June 10, 2003 (Statement Of John R. Thomas, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), John R. Thomas

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.


Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property And The Mythologies Of Control, R. Polk Wagner Jan 2003

Information Wants To Be Free: Intellectual Property And The Mythologies Of Control, R. Polk Wagner

All Faculty Scholarship

This article challenges a central tenet of the recent criticism of intellectual property rights: the suggestion that the control conferred by such rights is detrimental to the continued flourishing of a public domain of ideas and information. I argue that such theories understate the significance of the intangible nature of information, and thus overlook the contribution that even perfectly controlled intellectual creations make to the public domain. In addition, I show that perfect control of propertized information - an animating assumption in much of the contemporary criticism - is both counterfactual and likely to remain so. These findings suggest that …


Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies, James Bessen Jan 2003

Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting Of Complex Technologies, James Bessen

Faculty Scholarship

Patent race models assume that an innovator wins the only patent covering a product. But when technologies are complex, this property right is defective: ownership of a product's technology is shared, not exclusive. In that case I show that if patent standards are low, firms build "thickets" of patents, especially incumbent firms in mature industries. When they assert these patents, innovators are forced to share rents under cross-licenses, making R&D incentives sub-optimal. On the other hand, when lead time advantages are significant and patent standards are high, firms pursue strategies of "mutual non-aggression." Then R&D incentives are stronger, even optimal.