Law Commons^™

Race-Conscious Affirmative Action By Tax Exempt 501(C)(3) Corporations After Grutter And Gratz, David A. Brennen

Scholarly Works

Part I of this Article examines how the Equal Protection Clause limits the government's ability to engage in race-based affirmative action. Part I focuses on how constitutional law analysis has evolved in light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger. Part II provides a brief description of tax law's public policy limitation. This part shows how the IRS, though not required to do so, has generally followed Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence when applying the public policy limitation to race-based activity by private tax exempt 501(c)(3) institutions. Part III discusses how the Supreme …

Race Conscious Affirmative Action By Tax Exempt 501(C)(3) Corporations After Grutter And Gratz, David A. Brennen

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generally acts as a legal limit on the permissible bounds of government action. Accordingly, public universities and other government entities are constitutionally prohibited from engaging in acts that violate equal protection of the laws. The Supreme Court recently reinforced this point when it ruled, in two related cases, that public universities may consider the race of applicants when making admissions decisions, so long as an applicant's race does not amount to a deciding factor when granting admission. By its very terms, the constitutional limitation imposed by the Equal Protection Clause only directly …

Are Title Vi's Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This Essay, however, contends that section 602 disparate impact regulations in Tide VI are valid because Congress has implicitly sanctioned their creation, and explicitly approved them in subsequent related statutes.

Part II of this Essay discusses the legislative history of Tide VI, which suggests that Congress intended to give administrative agencies discretion to define "discrimination" in their Tide VI regulations as prohibiting either intentional conduct or actions having disparate impacts against racial minorities as long as the President approved such rules.

Part III illustrates that five different Congresses have enacted four subsequent related statutes that explicitly incorporate Tide VI disparate …

Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice O'Connor's Closing Comments On Grutter, Vikram David Amar, Evan H. Caminker

Articles

Most Supreme Court watchers were unsurprised that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's vote proved pivotal in resolving the University of Michigan affirmative action cases; indeed, Justice O'Connor has been in the majority in almost every case involving race over the past decade, and was in the majority in each and every one of the 5-4 decisions the Court handed down across a broad range of difficult issues last Term. Some smaller number of observers were unsurprised that Justice O'Connor decided (along with the four Justices who in the past have voted to allow latitude with regard to race-based affirmative action programs) …

Looking Ahead: The Future Of Affirmative Action, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education, race is still a serious issue in this country. Fortunately, we no longer debate whether it is legal for the government to operate segregated schools or to treat blacks as second-class citizens. We finally answered that question correctly—it is unconstitutional for the law to segregate and to treat blacks worse than whites.

Today, we face the more difficult question of ascertaining the constitutionality of “affirmative action” or “benign discrimination” programs. The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in 1978 in the landmark case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke …